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Abstract 
 
Climate change and the related social and economic challenges present society with problems at multiple 
levels. There is a diverse range of actors who are contributing to climate change governance, including 
those who are going to be affected by the impacts. In areas of limited statehood were states have varying 
degrees of deficits in their abilities to steer effective climate change mitigation and adaptation, private 
actors such as business organisations are expected to step in. This research set to investigate how and why 
companies in South Africa and Kenya contribute to climate change governance. South Africa and Kenya are 
selected because they represent areas which have varying levels of limited statehood.  
The results from the content analysis and the case studies reveal that companies’ climate change 
governance contributions can be characterised into four configurations: laggards, emergent planners, 
efficiency drivers and visionaries. The laggards display very limited responses and if anything adopt 
cosmetic initiatives. The majority of Kenyan and South African firms are in this cluster. Emergent planners 
are in the early stages of implementing self-regulatory initiatives mostly at the firm level. The efficiency 
drivers which consist of mostly energy intensive companies engage in co-regulation which involves 
partnering with the state to set and implement rules in energy efficiency accords in both countries. The 
firms, in turn, self-regulate themselves by internally implementing the energy efficiency accord guidelines. 
The final configurations, the visionaries, make more comprehensive mitigation and adaptation governance 
contributions focusing on collective self-regulation and adopting the role of the “inspector” along their 
supply chain. 
On the basis of these empirical findings, the research identifies different ways in which the institutional, 
organisational and issue specific drivers interact to explain the variations in firms’ governance 
contributions between countries, sectors and different companies. First, corporate climate change 
governance contributions vary between South Africa and Kenya as a result of the countries’ different levels 
of statehood. South African firms are more responsive to climate change than Kenyan companies because 
they are more exposed to the shadow of hierarchy. Statehood is a significant factor in the context of 
possible alternative explanations. Second, the climate change governance contributions vary between 
sectors due to the combined effect of the shadow of anarchy and the task complexity associated with 
securing energy or water supply among “high salience” sectors. Furthermore, carbon intensive sectors 
have strong associations which enable them to address collective problems linked to climate change. 
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Lastly, there are significant levels of variance in the governance contributions between the different types 
of companies, that is, between large, multinational companies and smaller, domestic firms. The large firms 
engage in more comprehensive mitigation and adaptation efforts due to organisational factors which 
include “asset specificity” and organisational resources.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1: Background and context 
 
Globally, climate change has attracted the attention of business managers and scholars because its 
impacts have far reaching consequences on many facets of companies. The actual or potential physical, 
regulative, economic and strategic impacts present risks and opportunities for companies in different 
sectors with varying characteristics (Kolk and Pinske, 2004). In its role as investors, polluters, innovators, 
manufacturers and employers, business has become a key part of the fabric of global environmental 
governance (Levy, 2005). Hence, in recognition of the serious scientific, social and economic implications of 
climate change (Stern, 2006; UNPCC, 2007), it is hoped that business can make a significant contribution to 
climate change governance. 
In Africa, the predicted severe climate change impacts will require greater private sector participation 
because they possess the necessary capabilities to tackle such a complex challenge (Carroll and Shabana, 
2010; Mintzberg, 1983; Shrivastava, 2007).  In both management and governance literature, there is 
limited understating of how and why these companies operating in developing economies contribute to 
governance. Therefore, there is a greater need for empirical research on business contributions to climate 
change in developing economies, an area were governments have varying limited capacities to develop 
and implement explicit climate change regulations ( Börzel and Risse, 2010; Glunan, 2010; Risse and 
Lehmkuhl, 2006). Instead, most of the management literature focuses on corporate climate change 
strategies in areas such as North America and Europe which have “consolidated statehood” were the 
government can develop and implement regulations to influence corporate behaviour (Goodall, 2008; Levy 
and Kolk, 2002; Kolk and Pinkse, 2009; 2007; 2005; Hoffman, 2010; 2009). 
Attempting to research corporate climate change governance contributions in Africa could be viewed as 
less valuable to theory because the study will be simply examining an existing well-established construct 
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(George, 2012). Even though there could be a prescriptive value in understanding how organisations 
contribute to climate change governance in a different context, that does not necessarily translate to a 
framing that is valuable to theory because the underlying theory and hypothesis are the same as they have 
been in research in other settings, the only thing that has changed is the context (George, 2012). However, 
in the domain of governance in an emerging policy field, such as climate change, we can expect the 
institutional context to play a vital role (Maguire et al, 2004; Phillips et al, 2000). Hence, one of the 
premises of this research is that the different levels of statehood in African countries, relative to the 
developed economy context and also within Africa itself, have important theoretical implications.  
Most of the current research on corporate responses to climate change focuses on ideal environments in 
which the state has full legitimate authority to enforce rules (Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2006). However, outside 
these environments there are areas of “limited statehood”, from developing and transition countries to 
“failing” and “failed” states which lack the capacity to implement and enforce regulations (Clunan and 
Harold, 2010; Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2006; Wolf, 2008). Risse and Lehmkuhl (2006: 9) define “limited 
statehood” as ‘deficits by a nation-state to perform its core functions of monopolising the use of force and 
ability to enforce political decisions”. Governance literature argues that in areas with consolidated 
statehood, the state is able to incentivise business to participate in governance through the shadow of 
hierarchy cast by the state through regulations (Heritier and Lehmkhul, 2008). Does this mean that areas, 
such as Sub-Saharan Africa which have limited levels of statehood are unlikely to provide governance? This 
is the question that this research aims to answer by focusing on the role of the private sector as a non-
state actor in the policy area of climate change.   
The capacity of the state to hierarchically steer effective responses to climate change and other related 
socio-ecological challenges, for example, reliable water supply are also inherently constrained by the 
complex nature of the problem (Hamann and Börzel, 2013). Climate change policy comprises two basic 
strategies: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation basically refers to efforts to reduce or stabilise GHG 
emissions whilst adaptation denotes “any adjustments that take place in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected impacts of climate change, aimed at moderating harm or exploiting 
beneficial opportunities” (Klein et al, 2005, p. 580 in Kolk and Pinkse, 2012). Adaptation is particularly 
pertinent in developing countries because they are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change 
(Parry et al, 2007; Sokona and Denton, 2001). This presents more complexity to countries with governance 
gaps because climate change is intrinsically linked to socio-economic problems; hence; adapting to climate 
change entails concurrently responding to socio-economic challenges which at times conflict with climate 
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change (Ziervogel and Taylor, 2008). These challenges are compounded by numerous gaps including 
resources, participation, learning, motivation and coordination (Doh and Teegan, 2010; Kolk and Pinkse, 
2012; Selsky and Parker, 2005). For instance, countries are still grappling to understand the implications of 
the diverse climate change policy options and for those countries that have set mitigation and adaptation 
targets, they still have limited knowledge and means available to achieve these targets ( Börzel and 
Hamann, 2013). 
The above mentioned developing country challenges linked to conventional “top-down” hierarchical 
modes of steering such as state regulation have had limited success in certain contexts ( Börzel and Risse, 
2005; Jessop, 1998). Hence, more attention is now being placed on “bottom-up” modes of steering in 
which several non-state actors participate in governance or provision of public goods (Risse and Lehmkhul, 
2006). These “bottom-up” approaches are linked to “new modes of governance” which are characterised 
by involvement of private actors, particularly, civil society and business through voluntary action and/or 
collaboration (Börzel and Risse, 2010; Mayntz, 2002; 2010; Risse, 2011; Wolf, 2008). This means that 
business self-regulate themselves by voluntarily adopting climate change strategies via mechanisms of 
“soft steering” which include bargaining or steering through incentives (Treib et al, 2007). In some 
instances,  self-regulating  companies press governments to issue stricter regulation in a “race to the top” 
(Vogel and Kagan 2004; Flanagan 2006; Moi, 2001).  With regard to collaboration, business or civil society 
might be involved in decision making through co-governance with the state (for example Public Private 
Partnerships) or by taking over governance functions (Börzel and Risse, 2010).  This literature on “new 
modes of governance” has predominantly focused on areas with consolidated statehood such as Europe 
(Heritier, 2002; Heritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008), leaving gaps for theoretical contributions in areas of limited 
statehood, were at times the state has completely failed.  
The empirical analysis of this study focuses on South Africa and Kenya, countries that are both starting to 
experience climate change related impacts such as drought which also threatens business (de Wit and 
Stankiewicz, 2006; Hay et al, 2002; Koch et al, 2007). The changing weather patterns and resulting 
ecological and social effects are forecasted to have adverse effects on the Sub-Saharan region, particularly 
in the agriculture sector which accounts for 30 to 40 percent of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Anderson and Bruckner, 2012; WDI, 2011).  These two countries have varying degrees of deficits in their 
abilities to steer effective climate mitigation and adaptation. On one hand, South Africa has an emerging 
climate change policy framework which companies are starting to pre-empt. However, the country still has 
limitations regarding the capacity to implement these policies. On the other hand, Kenya does not have 
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any explicit climate change regulations but more pro-growth policies which might provide misaligned 
incentives for business. Furthermore, climate change is absent in the public domain in Kenya as compared 
to South Africa. These variations provide the basis for carrying out a comparative case study approach 
which can contribute to both governance and management theory. 
Due to the absence of consolidated statehood, many countries in areas of limited statehood also face the 
challenge of socio-economic development. Therefore, companies in these countries have a twin challenge 
of contributing to a low carbon economy whilst tackling socio economic challenges. In addition to the 
varying levels of limited statehood, Africa is also the continent were socio-economic needs are greatest 
(UNDP, 2012). Life expectancy in many parts of Africa is still only 51 years on average (and as low as 38 
years in some countries), while  gross income per capita averages US$ 862 (dropping as low as US$90 in 
other places) and adult literacy is less than 48% in some countries (UNDP, 2012). Furthermore, despite 
being relatively endowed with energy resources, Africa only generates 3,1% of the  world’s  electricity  
and  this  is  a  major  barrier  to  economic  development  (REN21,  2011).  Furthermore, energy 
production tends to be costly, relying heavily on fossil fuels (about 80% of electricity generation) (REN21, 
2011). 
 
The above discussion highlights the need to investigate the governance functions that are performed by 
business in areas of limited statehood in the context of climate change. Despite the low shadow of 
hierarchy, it is expected that the private sector will either participate in collaboratory efforts involving the 
public sector and civil society or they will voluntarily self-regulate themselves. These collaboratory and 
voluntary self-regulating activities take different forms of mitigation and adaptation strategies.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The central research question for this thesis is: how and why are companies in areas of limited statehood 
contributing to climate change governance? Companies in South Africa and Kenya are used to investigate 
this research question. The following sub-research questions are used to further explore the central 
research question. 
(1) What are the predominant climate change governance contributions by the private sector in areas of 
limited statehood? 
(2) What are the conditions and motivations that give rise to these governance contributions? 
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1.3 Private sector contributions to climate change governance 
 
Governance is broadly defined as “organised efforts to manage the course of events in a social system”. 
(Burris et al, 2008:3). The concept of governance allows scholars to conceive of politics beyond the state 
(Börzel, 2012). Hence, with a focus on the private sector, this thesis attempts to explain how non-state 
actors contribute to governance by setting and implementing rules that reduce negative externalities and 
govern the provision of public goods and services. More specifically these private sector contributions are 
focused on climate change governance. Climate change governance pertains to, first those efforts that 
seek to maintain a stable climate as an essential global public good – including the norms, rules and 
procedures that aim to mitigate climate change through reduction of atmospheric greenhouse gas, 
through reduced GHG emissions. Secondly, climate change governance seeks to ensure that social and 
ecological systems are able to adapt and effectively respond to the impacts of climate change that are 
already occurring and those that will occur in the future. 
The idea that business firms contribute to social and environmental governance is not novel. Corporate 
sustainability literature has extensively discussed how and why companies respond to environmental and 
social issues (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Fig, 2005; Kolk and Pinkse, 2009). Globalisation literature indicates 
that if business firms are left on their own they will not engage in social and environmental governance.  
Instead, business is mainly blamed for being responsible for much of the environmental pollution, for 
example, GHG emissions and many social problems (Revesz, 1992; Porter, 1999; Wilson, 1996). The ‘race 
to the bottom” literature indicates that global competition induces firms to invest in countries that 
minimise environmental and social regulations (Wilson, 1996; Taylor and Copeland, 2004). Likewise, firms 
will press governments with strict environmental regulations to lower the regulations in order to avoid 
losing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)(Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996; Lofdahl, 2002). 
However, there are instances in which firms self-regulate themselves to contribute to environmental and 
social governance, even going to the extent of pressing governments to issue stricter regulations in a “race 
to the top” (Börzel et al, 2009; Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Prakash and Potoski, 2007). However, there are 
authors who are still sceptical about the role of business firms in the environmental or social governance 
(Schillemans, 2008; Heritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). These authors argue that whilst business firms might 
engage in private and/or collective self-regulation, external intervention in the form of a shadow of 
hierarchy cast by the state is necessary for this form of steering to be effective (Heritier and Lehmkuhl, 
2008; Schmitter and Streeck, 1985). Therefore, the threat of legislation is necessary for companies to self-
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regulate themselves.  However, the success of such regulatory threats depends on their credibility, that is, 
on their ability and willingness of the state to implement the regulations (Halfteck, 2006; Heritier and 
Lehmkuhl, 2008).  
Nevertheless, as discussed in this thesis, firms can engage in climate change governance even if the 
shadow of hierarchy is weak. At the global level, firms contribute to drafting climate change related 
policies and submit codes of good conduct through collective-self regulation (Ronit and Schneider, 1999; 
Cutler et al, 1999). International organisations such as the UN in collaboration with non-state actors 
including the private sector develop and implement global standards such as the Global Compact and 
Global Reporting Initiatives. The effectiveness in implementation of these standards is always a challenge 
because of problems related to monitoring and accountability. At the global, national and local level 
business contribute to climate change governance through various modes of non-hierarchical coordination 
which focus on private and collective self-regulation. Private self-regulation involves firms internally 
implementing climate change-related standards and guidelines such as energy efficiency and sustainability 
reporting. On the other hand, collective self-regulations involves modes of steering such as delegation, 
cooptation, co-regulation (Börzel and Risse, 2005). Furthermore, the private sector can participate in 
public regulation. This could involve political activities such as lobbying to influence the direction of policy 
(Levey and Egan, 2003). In many instances, corporate political activities are directed at opposing climate 
change regulations (Kolk and Pinkse, 2007; Levy and Rothenberg, 2002).   
Transaction costs economists (Williamson, 1998; 2002; Brousseau and Fares, 2000; Oxley, 1999) have 
revealed how buyer firms have increasingly adopted the role of an “inspector” vis-a-vis their supply chain, 
deploying supervision activities over their suppliers’ products and production processes to ensure that 
they comply with environmental regulations and standards. In areas with consolidated statehood this is 
unusual because these are functions commonly performed by public actors under a legislative mandate 
(Heritier et al, 2009). In areas of limited statehood firms can be expected to engage in this form of 
governance because the state has limited capacity to monitor firms’ activities. The governance 
contributions are driven many factors which are discussed below. 
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1.4. Explaining the conditions and drivers to private sector contributions 
to climate change governance 
 
In addition to exploring the various climate change governance contributions by the private sector, this 
thesis also contributes to current debate on the conditions and drivers to the new modes of governance in 
areas of limited statehood. Current literature on business contributions to social and environmental 
governance has emphasised the significance of regulations or the threat of regulations as a driving force 
(Hamann and Börzel, 2013; Engau et al, 2009). This suggests a prominent role for institutional theory, 
which emphasises the role of external factors in assisting the companies to gain or enhance their 
legitimacy. In practice businesses’ action are often motivated by both legitimacy and competitiveness.  
However, in areas of limited statehood, the shadow of hierarchy cast by the state through regulation is 
limited. Therefore, other functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy exist which drive companies to 
engage in governance. These include the normative pressures from global, national and local communities 
and the shadow of anarchy which relates to the failure of the state to provide governance of public goods. 
The thesis also outlines the role of organisational factors as driving forces to firms’ contribution to climate 
change governance. 
 International studies literature has shown that the private sector can contribute to the effective provision 
of public goods, for example public health or environmental protection through self-regulation and public-
private co-regulation (Mayntz, 2003; 2006; Kooiman, 1993; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). For decades, 
climate public policy research has concentrated on inter-state regimes in solving the collective problem 
(Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007; Giddens, 2009). However, as revealed in this research, through private and 
collective self-regulation, non-state actors such as the private sector can contribute to solving such 
collective problems. These non-hierarchical modes of governance tend to increase the problem solving 
capacity and legitimacy of climate change governance in terms of “democratic participation and 
accountability” (Börzel and Risse, 2005: 1). 
Much of the empirical research has demonstrated that these non-hierarchical modes of steering often 
increase the effectiveness of governance of public goods in the presence of a shadow of hierarchy (Heritier 
and Lehmkuhl, 2008; Börzel, 2009; Heritier and Rhodes, 2010). This “shadow of hierarchy” provided by a 
strong state through regulations creates an incentive for the private sector to self-regulate and co-
regulate.  However, the shadow of hierarchy often occurs in areas with consolidated statehood. These are 
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areas mostly in the developed world for example, the European Union where the state has the ability to 
ultimately enforce collectively binding decisions.  
However, in “areas of limited statehood”, mostly in developing economies where the state lacks the ability 
to enforce decisions, the shadow of hierarchy is absent (Börzel, 2010; Börzel and Risse, 2012). This creates 
a dilemma for these areas because the lower the capacity of the state to develop and implement rules, the 
greater is the need for governance through non-hierarchical coordination (Börzel and Risse, 2010). On the 
other hand, limited statehood implies a weak shadow of hierarchy, a condition which is likely to result in 
new modes of governance that are ineffective (Börzel and Risse, 2010). Since these are the conditions in 
the case study countries of South Africa and Kenya does it mean a failure in the provision of climate 
change governance? This research attempts to answer this question by exploring how and why the private 
sector, as a non-state actor contributes to climate change governance with or without governance in areas 
of limited statehood. 
The research reveals that these areas of limited statehood are not doomed. Firstly, due to the fact that the 
configurations of limited statehood can vary entails that climate change governance can be provided in 
different territories, sectors along certain policy areas, for example energy or socially within firms of a 
certain size. For example, the presence of associative structures within the energy intensive sector in 
Kenya allows for firms in that sector to co-regulate with the state in energy efficiency voluntary accords. 
This explains why we do not refer to “states of limited statehood” but “areas of limited statehood” 
because whilst the state has failed to provide a shadow of hierarchy, there are other functional spaces or 
territories which have a shadow of hierarchy with the state. 
In addition to this, there are other ways to induce the private sector to contribute to climate change 
governance in areas of limited statehood that do not rely on the capacity of the state to cast a credible 
shadow of hierarchy (Börzel, 2010; Börzel and Risse, 2010). Therefore, non-hierarchical modes of steering 
by the private sectors are also driven by the functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy cast by a 
strong state. Firstly, external actors including international organisations such as the United Nations and 
MNCs’ home country regulations can substitute for an absent shadow of hierarchy in areas of limited 
statehood (Bond and Gresik, 1996; Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Baumann, 2007). Furthermore, normative 
pressures from local, national and international communities can create a “logic appropriateness” (March 
and Olsen, 1998) so that the reputation of the private actors is at stake forcing them to contribute to 
climate change governance. Moreover, the “logic of consequence” is created when the state is unable to 
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provide certain public goods -- water and energy in this study. This creates a shadow of anarchy which 
undermines the firms’ competitiveness ultimately compelling them to contribute to governance. Finally, 
private firms can participate in carbon markets because markets can function without some state 
regulation. Therefore, the research demonstrates that governance with or without the state in areas of 
limited statehood can work even in the absence of a shadow of hierarchy. 
The thesis also revealed that besides the shadow of hierarchy and the functional equivalents to the 
shadow of hierarchy, organisational factors also play a significant role in driving firms’ self-regulatory 
initiatives.  Firstly, firms often adopt the role of “inspectors” to their supply chain because they have a 
“high asset-specific” relationship with the supply chain (Heritier et al, 2009; Williamson, 2002). Asset 
specificity characterises a transaction or relationship if the related investments are “non-redeployable, 
specialized and unique to a task. It may take on a variety of forms – physical, human, site, dedicated assets, 
brand name” (Heritier et al, 2009: 3). Furthermore, organisational capabilities and culture can explain the 
variation in governance contributions between firms with different sizes. For example, MNCs possess more 
financial and technical resources than SMEs which enables them to participate in collective-self-regulation.   
1.4 Outline of thesis 
The first chapter provides a background to investigate how and why companies in areas of limited 
statehood contribute to climate change governance. To investigate these overarching questions, the 
chapter highlights the theoretical and empirical gaps within the climate change organisational field in areas 
of limited statehood. Due to a relatively absent “shadow of hierarchy” cast by the state through 
regulations, companies are most likely to adopt self regulatory initiatives to compensate for the 
institutional voids. In addition to this, companies might also engage the public sector in co-regulation, for 
example, through partnerships in which they make decisions together. The absence of a credible shadow 
of hierarchy might also create an incentive for companies to foster self-regulation to avoid a “shadow of 
anarchy”. The “shadow of anarchy is more prevalent in policy areas which have high task complexity which 
the state struggles to provide and/or manage, for example, water supply. In some countries which have 
some form of shadow of hierarchy, companies might engage in political activities to influence the direction 
of these regulations to meet their strategic needs. On the other hand, management theory puts more 
emphasis on the role organisational drivers such as organisational capabilities, culture and leadership play 
in providing economic incentives for corporate ecological responses.  
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Chapter two provides a conceptual framework which was used to design the research methodology and 
collect data.  To develop this  conceptual framework, the chapter reviews various governance, institutional 
and strategic management literature which could help in providing conceptual guidelines in investigating 
how and why companies in areas of limited statehood contribute to climate change governance. The first 
section discusses the concept of climate change and its impacts to the continent of Africa. The second 
section of the chapter discusses the different modes of governance in areas of limited statehood. The third 
and forth sections focus on reviewing the different modes of non-hierarchical steering and the conditions 
and drivers for these governance options. Section five and six discuss mitigation and adaptation 
governance contributions which are being adopted by companies, particularly in areas with consolidated 
statehood. The mitigation activities also include political activities to influence the direction of policy 
where a regulatory framework is emerging. The final section of the chapter discusses the institutional and 
organisational drivers to companies’ climate change activities. 
Chapter three outlines the mixed method research approach adopted in this study. The conceptual 
discussion in chapter two is used to guide the study in investigating how and why companies respond to 
climate change in areas of limited statehood. Companies in South Africa and Kenya are selected as case 
studies, because these countries have different institutional voids as a result of the varying levels of limited 
statehood. The research object is defined as the climate change organisational field, in which organisations 
and institutions interact. To examine this research object the research utilised a survey and a case study 
approach. The survey used content analysis to understand the climate change responses of the top 100 
listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa and all the 45 listed companies on 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange in Kenya. The main goal of the content analysis was to identify the main 
organisational configurations in response to climate change. The case study approach focused on 18 
companies in three different sectors (banking, food and drink manufacturing and heavy industrials). The 
methods of data collection and analysis for both the survey and case studies are also discussed in this 
chapter. 
Chapter four discusses the findings from the content analysis survey. Interviews data from the case studies 
is used to support and provide explanation for some of the results from the survey.  The content analysis 
data was analysed using cluster analysis and it revealed four configurational approaches adopted by 
companies in South Africa and Kenya. In South Africa, four clusters emerge (laggards; emergent planners; 
efficient drivers and visionaries), whilst in Kenya three clusters emerge (laggards; emergent planners; 
efficient drivers). The discussion in the chapter focuses on explaining how these clusters contribute to 
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climate change governance. The analysis of these clusters also reveals that the corporate responses to 
climate change vary across the countries and between and within the sectors.  
Chapter five and six provides an overview of how and why companies in South Africa and Kenya, 
respectively contribute to climate change governance. Firstly, the chapters discuss the mitigation and 
adaptation governance contributions of business firms in these countries. In South Africa it is revealed that 
companies in private self-regulation; collective private self-regulation; co-regulation and involvement in 
public regulation. Secondly, the chapters provide explanatory factors on why the companies engage in 
each of these new modes of governance and why there is variation between and within sectors.   
The final chapter seven provides a discussion of the research findings and the contributions to literature. 
Section 7.1 provides a discussion of each of the governance contributions to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. Section 7.2 explains the drivers to each of these governance contributions. Section 7.3 
provides the explanatory factors regarding the country level variations and those between and within 
sectors. The last two sections discuss the theoretical contributions of the study and the avenues for further 
research   
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CHAPTER TWO 
PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE GOVERNANCE 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of business contributions to climate change 
governance in areas with limited statehood and use it to develop conceptual tools to investigate corporate 
climate change strategies in areas of where the state has significant governance deficiencies, with South 
Africa and Kenya as the case studies. Firstly, the chapter provides a definition of climate change as a 
complex and cross-cutting environmental and socio-economic global challenge. The second section 
discusses the concept of limited statehood whilst the third section provides a conceptual discussion on the 
main modes of non-hierarchical steering by non-state actors with more focus on the private sector. The 
fourth section focuses on the involvement of the private sector in regulation through corporate political 
strategies. This is an approach mostly used by business to respond to the shadow of hierarchy cast by the 
state and other international bodies through various forms climate change rules and regulations. The fifth 
section explores the characterisation of business governance contributions to climate change through 
mitigation and adaptation. The main drivers and constraints to private sector climate change governance 
contributions are discussed in section six. The section focuses on the shadow of hierarchy and functional 
equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy as the main institutional drivers to business contributions to 
climate change governance. Section six also discusses organisational drivers which motivate companies to 
contribute to climate change governance. The conclusion section provides an illustrative diagram which 
outlines the interactions between the institutional and organisational drivers in influencing business 
contributions to climate change governance.  
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2.1 Defining climate change 
The most general definition of climate change provided by the UN Framework Convention on climate is “a 
change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of 
the global atmosphere and which is in addition to the natural climate variability observed over comparable 
time periods” (UN, 1992: 4). In this research climate change is specifically used to refer to changes caused 
by human activity (primarily burning of fossil fuels and land use changes) rather than changes in climate 
that may have resulted as part of the earth’s natural processes.  
New observations and related modelling of greenhouse gases (GHG), solar activity, land surface properties 
and aerosols indicate that global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial 
values (IPCC, 2007). The global increases of carbon dioxide concentration are primarily due to the burning 
of fossil fuels and land use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to 
agriculture (op.cit). The increased concentration of the most important greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide 
from a pre-industrial value of about 280ppm to 379 ppm3 in 2010 has led to “very high confidence that the 
average net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming, with a radiative forcing1 of 
+1.6” (op.cit: 3). The increased warming (the last twelve years rank among the 12 warmest years) has 
caused widespread melting of snow and glaciers and rising global average sea level (op.cit). Scientific 
observations also indicate that these changes have led to long term changes in the climate which include 
changes in arctic temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind 
patterns and aspects of extreme weather such as droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and intensity 
of tropical cyclones (see table 2.1) (op.cit).  
 
 
 
                                                          
1Radiative forcing is a measure of the influence that a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earth-atmosphere 
system and is an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change mechanism. Positive forcing tends to warm the surface while 
negative forcing tends to cool it.  
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Table 2.1: Recent trends, assessment of human influence on trend and projections for extreme 
weather events for which there is an observed late 20th century trend (IPCC, 2007) 
Phenomenon and direction of trend Likelihood that trend 
occurred in late 20
th
 
century (typically 
post 1960 
Likelihood of human 
contribution to 
observed trend 
Likelihood of future trends 
based on projections for 
21
st
 century using SRES 
scenarios 
Warmer and fewer cold days and 
nights over most land areas 
Very likely Likely Virtually certain 
Warmer and more frequent hot days 
and nights over most land areas 
Very likely Likely (nights) Virtually certain 
Warm spells/heat waves. Frequency 
increases over most land areas 
Likely More likely than not Very likely 
Heavy precipitation events. 
Frequency (or proportion of total 
rainfall from heavy falls) increases 
over most areas 
Likely More likely than not Very likely 
Area affected by drought increases  Likely in many 
regions since 1970s 
More likely than not Likely 
Intense tropical cyclone activity 
increases 
 Likely in many 
regions since 1970s 
More likely than not Likely 
Increased incidence of extreme high 
sea level (excludes tsunamis) 
Likely More likely than not Likely 
 
The projections in table 2.1 are going to going to have deep socio-economic implications, particularly in 
Africa, a region which is going to be severely affected by climate change. The overall costs and risks of 
climate change could be equivalent to loosing at least 5% of global gross domestic product (GDP) each year 
(Stern, 2006).  A 2º C increase in the world’s temperature levels above pre-industrial levels could result in a 
permanent reduction of between 4% and 5% in yearly per capita consumption in Africa (World Bank, 2008) 
This makes climate change a complex and vexing challenge, especially in the sub-Saharan region which is 
experiencing other socio-economic challenges such as high unemployment, diseases, illiteracy and political 
instability. The impacts due to both climate change and the socio-economic structures in Africa will most 
likely affect current agricultural production and consumption as increased populations will put pressure on 
dwindling agricultural land and yields (Fischer et al, 2012). The associated impacts of high temperatures, 
altered patterns of precipitation and possibly increased frequency of extreme events such as droughts and 
floods, will probably combine to depress agricultural yields (Fischer et al, 2012). These impacts are most 
likely to spread to other sectors such as energy and transportation (Stern, 2007; O’brien and Leichenko, 
2000). It is predicted that developing countries, particularly in Africa will suffer the most because of the 
predominance of agriculture in their economies, limited capabilities to adapt, their warmer baseline 
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climates and exposure to extreme events (Fraser et al, 2012; Jones and Thornton, 2003; Parry et al, 2001) . 
Therefore, there have been increased calls to build Africa’s adaptive capacity to climate change impacts 
(Quinn et al, 2011; Ziervogel et al, 2010). 
As a result, Africa will need to focus on identifying and implementing developmental trajectories that 
simultaneously reduce reliance on fossil fuels and improve the capacity of vulnerable communities to 
respond to direct impact of climate related extreme weather events. (Hamann and Börzel, 2013). 
However, more effort is required in building vulnerable communities’ adaptive capacities because some of 
them are already experiencing these climate change impacts. However, uncertainties remain with regard 
to adaptation pathways among policy makers and business (Kolk and Pinkse, 2012).  
 
With the exception of South Africa and Nigeria, most countries in Africa do not emit any recognisable GHG 
emissions. Nigeria and South Africa ranked 21st and 22nd, respectively in global rankings of GHG emissions 
in 2005 with Nigeria accounting for 1.03% (454 megatons of CO2e)of global emissions whilst South Africa 
accounted for 0.98% (433.3 megatons of CO2e) (WRI, 2011). These two countries account for almost 90% 
of the continent’s emissions (Menyah et al, 2010)2. The high vulnerability of Sub-Saharan countries has 
been recognized in the Kyoto climate change negotiations. For example, a Green Climate Fund was 
established as part of the ongoing international climate change negotiations to assist developing countries 
in adaptation and mitigation practices.   
 
In addition to the predicted severe impacts of climate change on Africa, the continent also has significant 
governance challenges which will undermine mitigation and adaptation to climate change (Alden and 
Alves, 2010; Sawyer, 2004). These governance deficiencies are caused by the varying levels of limited 
statehood in different African countries (Thauer, 2009). This relates to the fact that the governments do 
not have the capacity to provide common goods as they are not able to develop and implement policies 
(Börzel and Risse, 2010).  
                                                          
2 Nigeria produces almost 45% of its GHG emissions in Africa from its gas flaring in the Niger Delta whilst South Africa produces as much from 
ESKOM’s coal based electricity generation and other industrial activities (Sasol’s coal to liquids plant in Salsoburg in South Africa is the highest 
point source of GHG emissions in the world). 
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2.2. Governance in areas of limited statehood 
 
The term governance has been broadly used to refer to all forms of steering and producing social order 
including markets states (governments) and networks (see Stocker, 1998; Mayntz, 2002; Rosenau, 1992). 
In this thesis, governance is used to refer to “institutionalised modes of social structuring to produce and 
implement collectively binding rules or to provide public goods (in this case, reducing the negative 
externalities related to increased GHG emissions or adapting to the effects of increased GHG emissions)” 
(Risse, 2011: 4). Hence, climate change governance pertains to efforts that seek to maintain a stable 
climate, as an essential public good, through norms, rules and procedures that aim to mitigate GHG 
emissions and or ensure that social and economic systems are able to adapt to the effects of climate 
change (Hamann and Börzel, 2013). 
 
As the case with many forms of governance, both state and non-state actors participate in governance 
through hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of steering, respectively. Hierarchical modes of steering 
usually pertain to states and public actors who can use their authority to enforce rules and values, for 
example, climate change regulations.  On the other hand, non-state actors such as the private sector or 
not-for profit organisations can act as “functional equivalents to the state” in provision of governance 
through non-hierarchical forms of steering, for example, voluntary implementation of environmental 
protection standards (see figure 2.1) ( Grande and Pauly, 2005; Rosenau, 2000; Heritier and Lehmkuhl, 
2006). 
In areas of limited statehood where “political institutions are too weak to hierarchically adopt and enforce 
collectively binding rules” (Börzel and Risse, 2010: 1); non-state actors play a more prominent role as 
alternatives to the top down, command and control approach of hierarchical steering by states 
(governments). Limited statehood is not limited to areas where the state actors have failed or are failing to 
govern. Instead, most of the developing economies contain varying levels of limited statehood as they 
contain inadequate instruments to implement or enforce decisions due to insufficient political or 
administrative capacities (Börzel and Risse, 2010). Many underdeveloped and emerging economies can 
thus be classified as areas of limited statehood because central governments do not have political control 
of entire territories (for example, Somalia) or have limited capacities to implement or enforce regulations 
(for example, China, where the state has limited capacities to implement environmental laws (Marquis et 
al, 2011; Thauer, 2009). 
17 
 
This thesis aims to focus on the role of the private sector as non-state actors in climate change governance 
in these areas of limited statehood. Much of the current research on corporate responses to climate 
change focuses on ideal environments in which the state has full legitimate authority to enforce rules 
(Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2006). However, outside these environments, there are areas of limited statehood in 
which there is no clear understanding of the role of non-state actors such as the private sector, 
particularly, with regard to the vexing and complex issue of climate change governance. Since the role of 
the private sector in governance is still contested (Peters and Pierre; 1998; Bovaird, 2004; Falkner, 2003), 
more so, in areas of limited statehood, it is vital to clearly understand how and why business contributes to 
the governance of a valuable global public good such as climate. Literature indicates that companies, 
particularly, heavy polluting industries tend to escape strict environmental regulations by relocating to 
areas of limited statehood which have lower environmental standards (Porter, 1999; Wilson, 1996). In 
response, the countries with higher levels of environmental regulations will lower their environmental 
standards to attract the foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth which comes with heavy 
polluting industries (Frankel and Rose, 2005). Therefore, the behaviour of business could drive states to a 
“race to the bottom” to attract FDI, which could result to environmental degradation in these areas (Chan 
and Ross, 2003; Kaufmann and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Lofdahl, 2002).  
However, as highlighted above, companies can be drawn to play an important role to compensate for the 
governance deficiencies in these areas of limited of statehood through non-hierarchical steering (see 
figure 2.1). Empirical evidence indicates that companies can voluntarily commit to social and 
environmental standards and adopt self-regulatory regimes or they could enter into partnerships with 
state actors and enter co-regulating regimes (Börzel and Risse, 2005; Börzel and Thauer, 2013; Vogel and 
Kagan, 2004; Levey and Newell, 2002; Pinske and Kolk, 2009). Climate change is an important global 
challenge to carry out research which investigates whether business actually performs such governance 
functions. It is the aim of this research, to explore the different forms of climate change governance 
functions that business firms perform in areas of limited statehood and different motivations and 
constraints to these governance functions.  
Whilst large domestic and multinational enterprises (MNEs) are mostly responsible for emitting the highest 
amounts of GHG emissions, they also have the resources and capabilities to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change. However, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have the potential to play an important role 
because their ability in creative destruction which usually results in innovation (Rothwell and Zegveld, 
1982). Whilst large companies are bogged down in reducing their GHG emissions, SMEs could utilise their 
18 
 
potential in innovation to develop long term adaptive and resilient mechanisms. Furthermore, due to their 
small size, SMEs have the potential to quickly shift their organisational culture and embed in the ecological 
systems which enables them to learn and respond effectively to the impacts of climate change (Whiteman 
and Cooper, 2011). Hence, there is value in exploring the different contributions of both large and small 
firms which operate in different sectors which face slightly varying institutional pressures.    
Figure 2.1: An outline of non-hierarchical governance options (adopted from Börzel and Risse, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature has revealed that private sector self-regulation and co-regulation with the public sector could 
help the state in the effective and legitimate provision of public goods, for example the environment or 
public health (Börzel, 2012; Leibfried and Zurin, 2005; Rossenau and Czempiel, 1992). Whilst there has 
been an inclination for increased governance without the state (Börzel and Risse, 2010), the state still has 
to play an important role in the provision of governance services. On one hand, the state still has to 
Governance by government 
Governance without the government 
Governance with 
government 
Private self regulation 
No public involvement 
(for example private regimes, social partner autonomy) 
Public regulation 
No involvement of private actors 
Co-regulation/co-production of public and private actors 
Joint decision making of public and private actors 
(for example public private partnerships) 
Private self regulation in the shadow of hierarchy 
Involvement of public actors 
(for example voluntary agreements) 
Consultation/Cooptation of private actors 
Participation of private actors in public decision making  
(for example private actors as members of state, 
delegation, outsourcing) 
 
Delegation to private actors 
Participation of public actors 
(for example contracting-out; standard-setting) 
Public adoption of private regulation 
Output control by public actors 
(for example erga omnes effect given to collective agreements of social partners) 
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possess the necessary capabilities in terms of resources and autonomy to cast a credible shadow of 
hierarchy to incentivise no-state actors to cooperate and allay fears of being penalised (Börzel, 2012).On 
the other hand, these state capacities must not be too strong to provide an incentive for state actors to 
partner with non-state actors. This means that for governance without the state to work the shadow of 
hierarchy should be present (Börzel, 2007; Börzel, 2010). The shadow of hierarchy is discussed in further 
detail in the sections below in relation to drivers to climate change governance.  
Whilst in certain governance areas such as public health and provision of sanitation might be declining, 
several authors argue that the effective provision of governance services still require the state to provide a 
shadow of hierarchy (Scharpf, 1997; Rhodes, 1996; Jessop, 1998). In order to fulfil this role as a conduit for 
governance, the state requires statehood which is “the capacity to make and enforce collectively binding 
rules, with the monopoly on force as the ultimate ratio of its coercive power” (Börzel, 2012: 5). If 
governance without a state still requires statehood, then how do areas which have limited statehood 
provide governance services? In most cases non-state actors end up playing a larger role in governance, for 
example, NGOs providing sanitation and security in war torn countries such as Somalia. It is the aim of this 
research to explore how and why the private sector as non-state actors in areas of limited statehood 
contributes to climate change governance. It is apparent that the increased limited statehood in an area, 
the greater the need for governance from non-state actors to compensate for the state’s weaknesses. In 
this case, Africa is one of the regions predicted to be heavily impacted by the effects of climate change, 
which entails that they have to focus on adaptation than mitigation. However, evidence in the literature 
indicates that states in Sub-Saharan countries lack the capacity to develop climate change adaptive and/or 
resilience strategies. Therefore, non-state actors, particularly, the private sector are expected to play a 
much greater role in climate change governance because they have the resources and capabilities to 
develop innovative strategies (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). 
In addition to the shadow of hierarchy, there are other ways to induce non-state actors to provide 
governance services that do not necessarily rely on the absolute presence of statehood. The shadow of 
anarchy, which could be in the form of pressure from local communities or competitive disadvantages, for 
example, could induce non-state actors such as the private sector to participate in governance. 
Nonetheless, even markets require some form of shadow of hierarchy to function, for example, the carbon 
markets still require state institutions to provide companies the necessary platform and instruments to 
trade. This research explores how the shadow of anarchy is relevant in driving or constraining corporate 
responses to climate change governance in areas of limited statehood.  This concept of shadow of anarchy 
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will be further discussed in section 2.6.1.2 in relation to drivers of climate change governance in areas of 
limited statehood. 
Section 2.4 and 2.5 below will further explore how business contributes to climate change governance and 
the main drivers to these governance functions, some of which might be enhanced and complemented by 
organisational factors. This is because organisations are not just passive respondents to institutions, but 
they have other interests such as efficiency and competitiveness which could be driven by internal 
organisational drivers (Perrow, 1985). The focus on how internal organisational factors complement or 
enhance governance factors in explaining the drivers to business responses to environmental issues is very 
valuable, particularly, to political science because much of that literature has focused on external drivers 
to explain environmental firm policies.  
 
2.3. Business contributions to climate change governance 
The lack of progress within the international arena, particularly, the failure to agree on a clear path to 
combating climate change within the Kyoto Protocol has been framed as a governance failure (Haya, 2012; 
Helm, 2012). In addition to this, the impacts of climate change which are mostly attributed to business 
have also been attributed to as a market failure:  
“The problem of climate change involves a fundamental failure of markets: those who damage 
others by emitting greenhouse gases generally do not pay........ Climate change is a result of the 
greatest market failure the world has ever seen. The evidence on the seriousness of the risks from 
inaction or delayed action is now overwhelming. We risk damages on a scale larger that the two 
world wars of the last century” (Stern, 2007)3   
As a result of these failures, it is vital that binding norms and rules are established as part of a broader 
international climate change governance framework. Such a binding framework would be valuable in 
particular to areas of limited statehood which already face numerous governance deficiencies and are 
most likely to suffer from the severe impacts of climate change. Hence, there is value in attempting to 
understand how and why companies respond to such rules and regulations in areas where they exists and 
sometimes contribute to the development of such rules and regulations through non-hierarchical steering. 
                                                          
3 Quoted from The Guardian newspaper, 27 November, 2007: 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/nov/29/climatechange.carbonemissions  
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At the same time, companies are also expected to utilise their organisational capabilities to develop 
innovative products and services which contribute towards mitigating and adapting to climate change. 
These internal firm contributions are normally driven by various competitive drivers, ethical 
responsibilities and societal pressures which influence companies’ reputation (Bansal and Roth, 2000). The 
sections below discusses how companies can contribute to the development and implementation of 
climate change rules either through self- regulation and/ or collective self-regulation in partnership with 
public and other non-state actors. 
2.3.1 Private-self regulation 
 
Literature has highlighted some instances that contradict the “race to the bottom” theory where business 
firms impose stricter self regulatory standards and even pressing governments to issue stricter public 
regulations (Börzel et al, 2011; Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996; Lofdahl, 2002). According to Ruggie (2004: 13) 
companies can also be “drawn into playing public roles to compensate for governance gaps and 
governance failures at global and national level”. Self regulation is not a new phenomena as there are 
numerous examples where it has been applied as an industrial regulatory tool (Teubner et al, 1994; 
Bardach and Kagan, 1982). However, in the environmental arena, it is only in recent times that self-
regulation has enjoyed serious consideration as a viable alternative to traditional command and control 
regulation (Kolk and Pinkse, 2005; Elzen et al, 2004). Therefore, it is the aim of this thesis to understand 
the extent to which companies in areas of limited statehood self-regulate themselves as part of their 
contribution to climate change governance. 
In relation to climate change governance, this form of voluntary self regulation relate to activities which 
occur within the firm, particularly those that are intentional and have benefits to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation (Hamman and Börzel, 2013). The issue of intentionality is very important in climate change 
governance, for example, if companies seek to participate in the carbon markets to reduce their GHG 
emissions through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) they have to show the 
“additionality” of the project (Greiner, 2003; Yong, 2009; Schneider, 2009). This is a crucial element of 
credibility of climate change governance because the CDM project has to ensure that GHG emissions after 
implementation of a CDM project activity are lower than those that would have occurred in the alternative 
scenario to the implementation of the CDM project activity (Yong, 2009; Michaelowa, 2005). However, for 
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other mitigation efforts such as energy efficiency which could be driven by cost savings (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995), the intentionality of the efforts may be less obvious (Hamman and Börzel, 2013).  
In addition to individual voluntary commitments, some companies and industries go further to the extent 
of engaging in a “race to the top” and voluntarily subject themselves to costly regulations and demand 
governments to issue stricter regulations (Heritier et al, 2009; Buthe, 2010; Thauer, 2013). This contradicts 
the expected business behaviour which encourages a “race to the bottom” as weak states lower their 
environmental regulations to attract more FDI. Empirical research in South Africa within the automotive 
industry by Börzel et al, (2011) indicates that companies engage in this form of governance for the 
following reasons:  
“(i) if the quality of the brand name product they market benefits from observing strict regulatory 
provisions; (ii) if they have an economic advantage by seeing strict regulatory conditions imposed 
on foreign competitors; (iii) if they are under pressure from non-governmental organisations’ 
campaigns that may damage their reputation; finally, (v) if they are under regulatory pressure from 
their country of origin” (p.2). 
Furthermore, firms can adopt a role as an inspector towards their suppliers, deploying supervision 
activities over their supplier’s products and production processes in order to ensure that they comply with 
environmental and product regulatory standards (Heritier et al, 2009). These are responsibilities which are 
mostly performed by public actors which have a legislative mandate, for example, Safety, Health and 
Environmental inspectors or Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) officers in provincial governments. 
Therefore, there is value in attempting to understand how and why companies would adopt the role of 
inspector, particularly, in areas which have limited governance levels. Williamson (2000; 2002) argues that 
business firms always seeks to maximise their operations in a rational way, therefore, in order to “reduce 
contractual hazards and ensure that none of the transaction partners fall victim to a hold up in the 
implementation of a contract, firms devise private ordering or governance rules” (2002:13). These 
governance rules guide the partners’ transactions in the event that uncertainties arise during the 
implementation of the contract. In this context, this form of contract could be evident in the retail industry 
were a retailer agrees with its supply chain partners to reduce a certain amount of GHG emissions in a 
product life cycle with each partner having their own responsibilities. The retailer as an inspector will have 
the responsibility to govern the supply chain to ensure they meet their set target. Heritier et al (2009) 
argue that the higher the higher the asset specificity (substantial investments) of the relationship, the 
more a firm acts as an inspector (asset specificity is discussed in greater detail in section 2.7). Furthermore, 
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if there is pressure from consumers for sustainable products and services which have minimal impact to 
the climate, the retailer is most likely to behave as an inspector towards its suppliers. The political 
argument claims that the more a firm is under pressure from regulations from its country of origin, the 
more it controls and sanctions a supplier firm’s processes in the country of operation (Heritier et al, 2009).
  
2.3.2 Collective self-regulation  
Business firms also participate in self-regulation through partnerships with the public sector and at times 
with other non-state actors (see figure 2.1).  This form of governance resembles a cooperative state, 
“where state and non-state actors participate in mixed/public policy networks” (Mayntz, 2002: 21). This 
collective non-hierarchical mode of governance involves developing and implementing of norms and rules 
through partnerships between state and non-state actors. The Cape Town Partnership in South Africa --- a 
cross-sector collaboration initiative between the City of Cape Town municipality, the private sector and 
civic organizations to tackle social and environmental challenges illustrates this mode of non-hierarchical 
steering (Hamman and April, 2013).  According to Börzel and Risse (2005) collective private regulation can 
be divided into four categories: cooptation; delegation; co-regulation and self regulation in the shadow of 
hierarchy (table 2.2). Furthermore, the authors indicate that these partnership initiatives can also be 
distinguished according to their purpose and function: rule and standard setting; rule implementation and 
service provision. 
 
Cooptation is a process in which an actor with regulative powers, mostly state actors incorporates non-
state actors in the provision of governance services to provide knowledge, expertise, moral authority and 
legitimacy. For example, the private sector has been involved in international climate change negotiation 
regimes. On many occasions, governments and international organisations increasingly incorporate the 
private sector and other non-state actors as official members of their delegations in the Kyoto climate 
change negotiations to discuss new rules and how to implement those rules in mitigating and adapting to 
the impacts of climate change (Kulovesi, 2007; Kolk and Pinkse, 2007). As a result, the Kyoto Protocol has 
received some levels of legitimacy and success in responding to a complex global issue due to the 
participation of business and other non-state actors. Börzel and Risse (2005) indicate that the cooptation 
of the private actors has extended beyond international issues into international economy and security. 
Multinational corporations have gained formal and legitimate access to international negotiations and 
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organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to 
the extent that they have formal observer status which include the right to make statements (for example, 
at the Otawa negotiations to ban anti-personnel landmines) (Mekata, 2000). Whilst cooptation gives non-
state actors access to information and influence the direction of policy; it also allows state actors and other 
international organisations to control non-state actors and compel them to be responsive to these social 
and environmental issues (Dickson, 2000; Backstrand, 2008; Pattberg and Stripple; 2008) 
Table 2.2: The different forms of collective self regulative initiatives based on type and purpose (adapted 
from Börzel and Risse, 2005). 
                           Purpose Rule setting Rule Implementation Service Provision 
Type 
Cooptation Climate change 
negotiations 
Governments through the 
Kyoto Protocol System 
UN Development 
Agencies (e.g. UNEP) 
Delegation Environmental 
standardization (e.g. 
ISO14001) 
Executive Outcomes International associations 
or groupings e.g. WBCSD  
Co-regulation Energy Efficiency Accord Kyoto Protocol Market 
Based Mechanisms e.g. 
Clean Development 
Mechanisms (CDM). 
Business Associations 
Self-regulation in the 
Shadow of Hierarchy 
Montreal Protocol on 
Substance that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer 
UN Global Compact Rating Agencies 
 
 
In cases where the state or regulative bodies are unable to co-opt non-state actors, the state will delegate 
certain governance functions to the non-state actors. Delegation of the governance functions vary from 
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instances where the private actors are held accountable by the state, for example, “contracting out“ the 
standardization of vehicle emissions to instances where the government tolerates, supports and 
acknowledges the outcome of a self regulation initiative taken by the private actors (Börzel and Risse, 
2005; Heritier and Eckert, 2008, 2009). An example of this implicit form of delegation will be voluntary 
commitment by the private sector to a set of environmental principles such as the Equator principles (a 
framework by which banks manage environmental and social issue in project financing). The transport 
exhausts emission standards which are developed by the International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO) also illustrate a form of delegation when a non-state actor active in standardization is given 
responsibility to develop standards to govern a particular issue, in this case vehicle emissions (Heritier, 
2003; Lutsey and Sperling, 2008). The delegation of rule setting and implementation responsibilities to 
non-state actors tends to improve the efficiency and acceptance of the policy or standards by the private 
sector because the regulations are developed by their peers, hence, high levels of legitimacy (Green and 
Colgan, 2012). In humanitarian situations international organisations such as the United Nations are 
increasingly contracting private actors and other non-state actors in the provision of aid and health 
services because these non-state actors have more resources and capabilities to provide these services. 
For example, in Afghanistan most of the humanitarian aid and security is provided by non-state actors 
(Schwatz, 2010; Schwartz and Swain, 2011).   
However, due to the limited capacity of the state to cast an effective shadow of hierarchy in areas of 
limited statehood, it is difficult for the state to monitor the non-state actors if they are complying with the 
delegated contract and performing as agreed (Börzel and RIsse, 2005). As a result, the state provides extra 
incentives and disincentives to discourage non-compliance to the delegated private actors to ensure that 
they maximise their efforts in setting rules and implementing them (Karagiannies, 2006). For example, the 
state might allow the private sector to implement emission reduction standards and meet the set targets 
over a longer period of time than might be expected. 
In addition to the cooptation and delegation, business firms have also participated in collaborative 
regulatory structures in which they share different levels of responsibility in rule setting and 
implementation with the state and, at times with other non-state actors (Hönke , et al, 2008). These co-
regulatory mechanisms are usually created by civil society and business organisations and at times involve 
the participation of intergovernmental organisations (Cutler, 1999; Braithwaite and Dahos, 2000). These 
efforts have also led to the development of corporate participation in global public policy networks (GPPN) 
(Detomasi, 2007), for example, the Global Reporting  Initiative (GRI) which connects business, civil society, 
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governments, industry associations, the UNDP and the media to develop uniform reporting standards to 
assess the environmental and social impact of organisational activities (Brown, 2011). In comparison to 
cooptation, co-regulation raises the status of non-state actors to equal and legitimate partners (Börzel and 
Risse, 2005).  
Finally, in areas with improved levels of statehood which enables the state to develop and enforce 
regulations, companies have the option to self-regulate in the presence of a shadow of hierarchy (Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2011; Heritier and Eckert, 2007). For example, in the European Union, industry engages in 
self-regulation through “Voluntary Environmental Agreements” (Vas) which allows them to use their 
superior expertise in shaping the measures. This form of self-regulation allow for immediate 
implementation by the private sector and can be changed easily if need arises (Heritier and Eckert, 2007). 
However, to ensure that the private sector implements these rules, the state cast its shadow of hierarchy.  
In some cases, public campaigns by NGOs attacking businesses’ climate change and environmental record 
might impact upon an ensuing business action, for example, Greenpeace’s campaigns against Shell’s Arctic 
drilling activities (Tsoukas, 1999; Betsill and Corell, 2001). These campaigns very often negatively affect 
companies’ reputations resulting in the willingness of industry to engage in self-regulation. NGO campaigns 
may also trigger a legislative threat from public actors which might incentivise industry to self-regulate 
(Heritier and Ecker, 2007). This phenomenon is not exclusive to areas with higher levels of statehood, as 
illustrated in NGO campaigns against Shell’s water pollution in Nigeria. Therefore, state actors in areas of 
limited statehood might also threaten the private sector with legislation prompting them to self-regulate 
as they pre-empt the consequences of regulations. 
Collective private regulation includes public-private partnerships (PPPs) which covers a variety of potential 
cooperative arrangements which have been highlighted above (Börzel and Risse, 2005). However, this 
definition often excludes certain forms of public-private interaction which focus on corporate political 
activities. These political activities are aimed at influencing and shaping policy outcomes through activities 
such as lobbying and advocacy. Private actors who are not active participants in governance arrangements 
or negotiating systems may engage in different forms self-coordination through the markets to influence 
governance systems. In the US, between 1989 and 2002, the Global Climate Coalition, a group mainly of US 
businesses used aggressive lobbying and advocacy to oppose actions to reduce GHG emissions (Levy and 
Egan, 2003; Levy and Kolk, 2002). On the other hand, in recent years, a group of leading global investment 
private actors, the Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change have formed a coalition to conduct shared 
initiatives on climate change policy (Nelson and Pierpont, 2013). To further understanding these political 
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strategies, this study aims to explore the different activities that businesses are engaging in to influence 
climate change policy.  
2.4 Private sector involvement in public regulation    
  
When climate change became an important policy issue for companies, mainly in developed economies in 
the early 1990s following the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, corporate efforts to influence the direction 
and shape of the debate started taking place (Kolk, 2001; Levy, 1997; Grubb et al, 1999). Initially, 
companies, mostly large multinationals in the oil and energy industries opposed any regulations regarding 
climate change (Newell and Peterson, 1998). However, the corporate political strategies have evolved 
from being antagonistic to be more cooperative in many cases (Kolk, 2001; Levy and Kolk, 2002; Levy and 
Rothenberg, 2002).Nevertheless, the absence of a concrete international agreement after the expiry of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2012 means that corporate political activities on climate change can be expected to 
continue. 
 Whilst climate change is still a global issue governed by international policy regimes (Kyoto Protocol), 
variations between regions and countries in the policy design and implementation will also have serious 
ramifications for companies, particularly, multinationals (Kolk and Pinkse, 2007; Hamilton et al, 2003). This 
means multinationals’ corporate political strategies will tend to be less global and more “multi-domestic” 
as they attempt to respond to how different countries they have operations in are designing their climate 
change policies (Baron, 1997). This challenge was most notable in the case of non-European (EU) firms that 
were confronted with the EU emissions trading scheme (Pinkse, 2006). 
According to Hillman and Hitt (1999), companies do not formulate political strategies in response to a 
specific salient issue. The authors argue that companies usually adopt two approaches: (a) transactional 
approach where they wait for the development of an important public policy issue before building a 
strategy to affect this issue or (b) a relational approach where they attempt to build relationships across 
issues and over time and so that when a public issue arises that affects their operations, the contacts and 
resources needed to influence this policy are already in place. With regard to these two strategies, 
companies target specific actors to influence policy: the state government and other interest groups such 
as business associations, NGOs, media and research groups. 
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The main traditional types of political strategies which companies adopt to influence policy as argued by 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) are: information, financial incentive and constituent building strategies (figure 2.4). 
Companies which adopt the information strategy provide policymakers with specific information about 
their view on public policy using tactics such as lobbying or using think tanks to produce research outputs 
which support their views (Rothenberg and Levy, 2011). Notable examples are the American Tradition 
Institute and Heartland Institute which are mostly funded by the Koch brothers and the oil industry in the 
US to oppose any climate change policies. It is important to note that companies might lobby for stricter 
climate change policies to exclude foreign competitors with low regulatory standards (Börzel et al, 2010). If 
successful such lobbying could improve the market position of the forerunner firm (Porter, 1980). A 
financial incentive strategy is also aimed at policy makers, but it uses financial inducements. A common 
tactic is making financial contributions to a political party or policymaker. In contrast, the constituency 
building strategy uses tactics such as newspaper advertisements or press conferences to persuade voters 
and the public to support the firm’s cause, with the aim that these voters will express their opinion to 
policymakers (Hillman and Hitt, 1999)  
Figure 2.4: A taxonomy of corporate political strategies (from Hillman and Hitt, 1999) 
Strategy Tactics Characteristics 
Information strategy -Lobbying 
-Commissioning research projects 
-Testifying as expert witness 
-Supplying position papers or technical 
reports 
Targets political decision makers by 
providing information 
Finance incentive strategy -Contributions to politicians or party 
-Paid travel, etc 
-Personal service (hiring people with -
political experience or having affirm 
member run for office) 
Targets political decision makers by 
providing financial incentives 
Constituent building strategy -Grassroots mobilization of employees, 
suppliers, customers etc 
-Advocacy advertising 
-Public relations 
-Press conferences 
-Political education programs 
Targets political decision makers 
indirectly through constituent support 
 
However, according to Bonardi and Keim (2005), corporate political strategies for widely salient issues such 
as climate change differ from activities for narrowly salient issues which mostly apply to Hillman and Hitt’s 
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typology. They argue that these strategies are likely to be less effective on an important issue such as 
climate change because salient issues are deemed important by the public and applying strategies such as 
the constituency building strategy, which tries to influence the public itself, can bring about a negative 
reputation effect (Kolk and Pinkse, 2007). As an alternative strategy, Bonardi and Keim (2005) suggest that 
in the early stages of the issue life cycle it will be more effective to change opinion of experts and the 
media who have an important role in the development of policies of salient issues. In the later stages of 
the issue life cycle companies self-regulate because it is more timely than trying to influence experts (Kolk 
and Pinkse, 2007).  
 
2.5. Characterisation of companies’ contributions to climate change 
governance 
 
Much of the scholarly literature has placed more focus on the role of business in climate change mitigation 
rather than adaptation. This is partly because most mitigation efforts require less time and effort in terms 
of commitment of resources and do not require significant adjustments or the transformation of the 
organisational system (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). Furthermore, there has been a lack of a “common 
definition” of what adaptation entails for business (Pinkse and Kolk, 2012).   
 
Mitigation and adaptation are also markedly different because their impacts refer to “different temporal 
and spatial scales” (Klein et al, 2005: 14). The effects of mitigation are usually short term, but it operates 
on a global scale (Pinske and Kolk, 2012). For example, a lot of companies from industrialised and to a 
lesser extent developing countries are participating in the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) which 
has a global reach but has short term impacts (Winkler et al, 2005). On the other hand, adaptation 
operates on a local scale and relates to activities such as land use, agriculture, water management, and 
desertification and ecosystem integration. The local nature of adaptation also makes it difficult for 
companies to implement because it often involves a lot of organisational learning and engagement with 
vulnerable and affected communities  (Tompkins and Edgar, 2004; Wilbanks and Kates, 2010). 
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2.5.1 Business contribution to climate change mitigation 
 
Climate change mitigation encompasses “human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks 
of greenhouse gases” (UNFCC, 1997:4). Kolk and Pinkse (2005) developed a typology of companies’ 
strategic responses to climate change with a strong focus on mitigation. They argue that companies’ 
contributions focus on two overarching strategic aims: innovation and compensation. Innovation involves 
the development of technologies or services to reduce emissions whilst compensation leaves a company’s 
own technological competences unaltered as the company uses emission reduction technologies 
developed by other companies. Companies that innovate for the purpose of climate change mitigation 
develop company specific capabilities or competences which could be difficult to create, substitute or 
imitate often giving the company a competitive advantage (Grant, 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Compensation entails that companies do not primarily aim to reduce greenhouse emissions in their own 
operations through process or product innovations, but rather focus on transferring emissions to other 
jurisdictions or entities, or on purchasing carbon credits or engaging in offset projects. In addition to this, 
companies can identify opportunities from their innovation and compensation activities, for example, 
product innovation to assist them to adapt to climate change.  
When these two overarching strategic aims are combined with different levels of organizational activities 
and interactions, a matrix is developed to outline the strategic options in contributing to climate change 
governance (Kolk and Pinkse, 2005). In the resulting typology (see Figure 2.2) six strategic options emerge 
that could be part of a comprehensive strategy for climate change in which companies combine several 
options. The vertical axis distinguishes the three different levels of organizational activities and 
interactions: within the individual company (internal); within the value chain (vertical); and with other 
private or public actors (horizontal). The horizontal axis consists of the two main drivers (innovation and 
compensation) of corporate responses to climate change.  
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Figure 2.2: Typology of strategic options for corporate responses to climate change (with a focus 
on mitigation), according to Kolk and Pinkse (2005) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation processes within companies usually focus on process improvement to not only reduce 
emissions but also reduce production costs (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). These efforts mostly 
contribute to companies’ private self regulatory governance contributions by implementing standards and 
guidelines agreed collectively either at the global and national level. Low GHG emitting sectors such as 
telecommunications and banking which have limited opportunities to contribute to mitigation focus on 
implementing management programmes to conserve energy for example, systems that control heating 
and reduce electricity usage. This is often combined with programmes to increase staff awareness of 
energy conservation and restrictions on business travel (Kolk and Pinkse, 2004). However, energy intensive 
sectors such as mining, heavy industrials and oil and gas which have more pressure to reduce their GHG 
emissions mainly focus on improving production processes by adopting standards on energy efficient 
technologies (op.cit; Weinhofer and Hoffman, 2010). In some countries (e.g. South Africa), companies in 
the energy intensive sectors participate in co-regulation by signing up to voluntary energy efficiency 
agreements with governments which set targets on energy reductions (Tyler, 2009). Furthermore, 
companies which have more resources will have more options to acquire advanced technologies to 
develop renewable energy. 
Innovation processes can also focus on development of new products and services, mostly  in partnership 
with the supply chain providing inputs as customers adopt new practices (for example, Toyota’s Prius 
hybrid car). Hence, these efforts mostly involve collective self-regulation in partnership with the supply 
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chain in to develop the technologies. Product development is not only prevalent in technology intensive 
industries which means a sector such as insurance can provide services such as index insurance for farmers 
to respond to climate change risks (Barnett and Mahul, 2007). Finally, companies can collaborate beyond 
the supply chain to form strategic alliances with other companies to develop new products and market 
combinations. A case in point is BP’s partnership with Daimler Chrysler in piloting fuel cell vehicles as part 
of the US’s Department of Energy’s fuel cell vehicle and infrastructure validation program. These strategic 
alliances allow for inter-firm knowledge transfers and assist companies in accessing new markets (Mowery 
et al, 1996; Simonin, 1999). 
With regard to compensatory activities companies focus on measuring their GHG emissions as a widely 
expected first step in contributing to mitigation. This is a predominantly private self-regulatory 
contribution as companies use their internal resources to implement globally set standards on reporting. 
Whilst not necessarily a compensatory activity, companies usually set their emission targets after 
accounting for their emissions. GHG accounting involves “measuring exclusive total amount of carbon 
dioxide emissions that are directly and indirectly caused by an activity or is accumulated over the life of a 
product” (Widemann and Mix, 2007: 4). This process encompasses measuring the scope 1 (direct emissions 
from owned or controlled sources), 2 (indirect emissions from generation of purchased energy) and 3 (all 
indirect emissions not included in scope 2 that occur in the value chain of the reporting company, including 
both upstream and downstream emissions) (WBCSD and WRI, 2004). After the GHG accounting process, 
companies will set targets for reducing GHG emissions. A third aspect of a company’s internal 
compensation strategy is  transfer of GHG intensive activities to other parts of the company, mostly those 
which operate in jurisdictions with less stringent climate change regulations and this may also involve the 
use of carbon markets (Kolk and Pinkse, 2009; Hoffman, 2007).  
Companies may also engage the collective self-regulatory efforts within the supply chain to reduce their 
GHG emissions. Sectors such as retail and food and drink manufacturing, which engage with their suppliers 
regularly, opt for this strategy as they get to reduce emissions right through the supply chain. Companies 
in these sectors also adopt the role of “inspector” by monitoring their suppliers to ensure they meet 
certain standards and acquire certification such as the ISO 14001 and ISO 14067. Companies such as 
Unilever have benefited from participating in the CDP Supply Chain which allows them to share 
information and solutions with other companies with regard to climate change risks and opportunities 
within the supply chain. As part their supply chain compensatory strategy, some companies also outsource 
their GHG intensive activities, such as transportation (Andrews, 2009).  
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Finally, compensatory collective self-regulatory initiatives may extend beyond the supply chain to include 
carbon trading. The Kyoto Protocol resulted in two project based mechanisms: the Clean Development 
Mechanisms (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)4. These mechanisms allow companies to achieve 
reductions of GHG emissions by trading emission credits in partnership with other companies or 
developing country governments (Kolk and Pinkse, 2004). Some companies prefer to participate in the 
voluntary carbon markets which allow business to invest in climate related projects to offset the carbon 
impact of their organisation because these voluntary markets don’t have the bureaucracy and transaction 
costs associated with CDM and JI. For example, compared to the Kyoto regulatory markets, the voluntary 
markets are currently the only source of carbon finance for avoided deforestation (Hamilton et al, 2007; 
Bayon et al, 2012). However, the voluntary carbon markets still lack credibility because of a lack of 
accountability (Dhanda and Hartman, 2011; Dhanda and Murphy, 2011). 
  
2.5.2 Business contribution to climate change adaptation 
 
As highlighted above, there seems to be no common definition of adaptation (Kolk and Pinkse, 2012). It is 
difficult to define adaptation because it has a long and multidisciplinary history and meanings of the term 
differ by field (Ekstrom et al, 2010). According to Moser and Ekstrom (2010) climate change adaptation is 
more aligned to the social-ecological system:   
“Adaptation involves changes in social-ecological systems in response to actual and expected impacts of climate change 
in the context of interacting non-climate changes. Adaptation strategies and actions can range from short-term coping to 
longer term, deeper transformations, aim to meet more than climate change goals alone, and may not succeed in 
moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities” (p.1) 
Berkhout et al (2006) argue that adapting to climate change is somewhat similar to the process of 
organisational learning. This process of organisational learning challenges and adjusts organisational 
“routines” – “a repetitive, recognisable pattern of interdependent actions involving multiple actors” 
(Fieldman and Pentland, 2003: 96; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, changes in organisational routines 
will result in changes in organisational behaviour—“a process often referred to as adaptation” (Berkhout et 
                                                          
4 The Kyoto Protocol has two project based mechanisms that allow Annex 1 countries (mostly developed countries) to meet their GHG emissions 
reduction commitments by acquiring emission reduction credits. The credits are acquired by an Annex 1 country financing projects that reduce 
emissions in non-Annex 1 countries (mostly developing countries) and other Annex 1 countries or by purchasing credits from Annex 1 countries 
with excess credits. Through the JI, Annex 1 countries can invest in emission reduction projects in any other Annex 1 country as an alternative to 
reducing emissions domestically. On the other hand, through the CDM, countries can meet their domestic reduction commitments by purchasing 
credits in projects in non-Annex 1 countries 
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al, 2006: 137). Altering these routines will require certain resources and capabilities which will enable the 
company to change and adapt its operational activities (Collis, 1994; Zollo and Winter, 2002). However, 
before an organisation can adapt, in this case to climate change, they should be able to understand and 
interpret the signals from their experiences of changing climatic conditions (for example, water shortages). 
Research has indicated that due to various factors such as scarcity of evidence, blindness to evidence and 
uncertainty in assessing the relevance of the changing climatic conditions companies might fail to 
significantly interpret evidence from their experiences (Levitt and March, 1988). 
Due to the fact that various sectors and companies are affected by climate change differently they are 
bound to opt for varying adaptation strategies. Furthermore, many sectors and companies have different 
adaptive capacities which are necessary pre-conditions for an organisation to be able to adapt (Nelson et 
al, 2007). Moser and Ekstrom (2010) argued that organisations have three main adaptation options: coping 
strategies; systemic adjustments and deep systemic transformations (figure 2.3). It is apparent that each 
type of adaptation strategy will require a different set of resources and capabilities, with system 
transformation likely to demand greater levels of learning and flexibility. Companies which adopt the 
coping strategies usually have reactive and short-term initiatives. These organisations use a “wait and see” 
approach which is “a strategy of deferral, based on scepticism or uncertainty about the possible impacts of 
climate change and about the benefits of adaptation” Berkhout et al, 2006: 151). 
  
Figure 2.3: Scope and scale of climate change adaptation (according to Moser and Ekstrom, 2010) 
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System adjustments involves a process which aims to “reduce risks and improve the level of adaptedness” 
of an organisational system, and this may include activities such as improving agricultural systems, 
redesigning the built environment or implementing new management decisions (Nelson et al, 2007: 400). 
For example, due to water shortages some companies will enter into partnerships and form water 
management groups to implement water demand management strategies (Kranz, forthcoming). Even 
though some of these system adjustments are long term they are reactive in nature (Nelson et al, 2007). 
Nelson et al (2007) define transformation as “a fundamental alteration of the nature of a system once the 
current ecological or economic conditions become untenable or undesirable” (p. 397). Transformational 
change results from crossing ecological or social thresholds (Nelson et al, 2007). In the context of a 
business organisation this could mean that due to the impacts of climate change, an ecosystem can no 
longer support certain activities such as farming owing to shortages of water or degradation of soils. 
Through an adaptive learning and planning process the agricultural company (for example, a wine estate) 
might have to transform its organisational system to shift to eco-tourism. Literature from social ecology 
indicates that when the transformation is associated with the “effects of inadvertently crossing 
thresholds”. It will most likely result in an undesirable system with low productivity (Adger, 2006; Adger et 
al, 2007; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006; Nelson et al, 2007).  
2.6. Drivers and constraints to climate change governance 
 
2.6.1. Institutional drivers 
Numerous organisational studies have addressed the key question of why companies are responsive or 
non-responsive to climate change or environmental issues (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Okereke, 2007; 
Hoffman, 1999; Pinkse and Kolk, 2009; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). A relatively large section of this 
literature argues that the institutional context of a company influences its environmental strategies. The 
core insight of institutional theory is that organisations are embedded within the institutional fields with 
important cultural, normative and regulatory dimensions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
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From an institutional perspective, despite considerable attention given to the potential economic 
opportunities for some companies in responding to climate change, the normative, cultural-cognitive and 
regulatory elements also play an important role (see table 2.3) (Jones and Levy, 2007; Rothernberg and 
Levy, 2012). The normative pressures, which usually result in homogeneity, come from similar attitudes 
and approaches of professional groups and associations transferred mostly through hiring. The cultural-
cognitive factors are based on the “subconsciously accepted rules and customs as well as some taken-for-
granted cultures” gained through socialization (Scott, 2001: 38). Finally, a shadow of hierarchy cast by the 
state through regulations consists of “explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring and 
sanctioning” (Scott, 1995: 35). These perspectives are mostly influenced by institutional actors such as 
competitors, industry associations, consumers, NGOs, regulatory agencies, media and journals which 
constitute an “organisational field”. After a period of time, the organisational field will establish norms, 
policies and standards of accepted behaviour that will shape companies’ climate change practices (Powell, 
1991; Scott and Meyer, 1994). 
Table 2.3: The three pillars of institutions (adapted from Scott, 1995) 
 Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social Obligation Taken for granted 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, laws, sanctions Certification, 
accreditation 
Prevalence, isomorphism 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported, conceptually correct 
 
Corporate responses to climate change can also be influenced by normative pressures which stem from 
“professionalization” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The authors interpret professionalization as “the 
collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work to 
control the production of producers and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their 
occupational autonomy” (p. 54). This means managers’ environmental values are influenced by education 
systems they attend. Therefore, they will most likely have similar worldviews about climate change with 
managers who have similar training and in the same practice. Furthermore, these organisational strategies 
will be influenced by professional networks which can span organisations through industry and 
professional associations that can diffuse knowledge and values rapidly (Perrow, 1974). As result, these 
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professional and trade organisations will create a pool of “interchangeable individuals who occupy similar 
positions across a range of organisations and possess similar orientation and disposition that may override 
variations in tradition and control that might otherwise shape organizational behavior” (Perrow, 1974: 87). 
More so, many professional career tracks are so closely guarded, both at the entry level and throughout 
the career progression that individuals who make it to the top are virtually indistinguishable (MIzruchi and 
Fein, 1999). In addition, individuals in an organizational field undergo anticipatory socialization to common 
expectations about their personal behaviour, appropriate style of dress and organizational vocabularies.  
Kanter (1977: 34) refers this filtering of personal approaches as “homosexual reproduction of management 
to the extent that managers and key staff are drawn from the same universities and filtered on a common 
set of attributes…….they will tend to view problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures 
and structures as normatively sanctioned and legitimatised and approach decisions in much the same 
way”. 
2.6.1.1 The shadow of hierarchy  
The shadow of hierarchy is generated “when state actors credibly threaten the unilateral adoption and 
enforcement of collectively binding rules on the provision of common goods and their unilateral provision, 
respectively, if non-state are not willing to engage in governance” (Börzel, 2012: 8). This threat usually 
provides a major incentive for non-state actors to engage in non-hierarchical private and collective self-
regulation (Scharpf, 1997). In many cases the private sector, particularly, low GHG emitting industries are 
unwilling to incur the transaction costs associated with climate change governance especially if the policy 
outcomes do not correspond to their strategic interests. Therefore, it will take the threat of a hierarchically 
imposed decision to compel non-state actors to engage in self-regulation (Heritier et al, 2008).  Moreover, 
the continual threat of hierarchical intervention will reduce the possibility that non-state actors reneging 
their voluntary commitments such as emission targets.  This is very often the case in collective 
arrangements involving business associations which have minimal sanctioning capabilities to firstly, to 
monitor and punish  private actors who do not conform  to agreed voluntary arrangements and secondly, 
to deter their members who opportunistically implement voluntary agreements (free-rider problem) 
(Albanese and Fleet, 1985; Bennet, 1998). Regarding the later, it is also difficult for the state actors to 
deter and sanction companies from free-riding. However, Börzel (2012) argues that the free-riding 
problem by non-state actors is often unlikely to occur if the state is a participant in the voluntary 
agreement and reviews the negotiation outcomes to ensure they correspond to the common good. This is 
very important when business is involved because unlike state actors and non-profit organizations (for 
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example, public pressure groups), they are not legally bound by formal institutions to purse the common 
good such as global climate change governance (Börzel, 2012).  Nevertheless, it will be valuable to 
understand the extent to which the state actors can provide this service in areas where the state 
institutions are inherently weak, for example, the Energy Efficiency Accord in both South Africa and Kenya. 
Several authors have empirically shown that the shadow of hierarchy cast by a consolidated statehood is 
key in driving the governance contributions of non-state actors (Heritier and Rhodes, 2010; Heritier and 
Lehmkuhl, 2008; Börzel, 2009). However, in areas of limited statehood, multinationals are often hosted by 
states which loosely adhere to global social and environmental rules and are neither willing nor capable of 
ensuring that private actors comply with these rules (Börzel and Hönke , 2011; Muchlinski, 2007; Zerk, 
2006).  Therefore, the lower the state’s capacity to develop and enforce regulations, the greater the need 
for non-state actors to participate in non-hierarchical self-regulations. However, the literature indicates 
that the weak shadow of hierarchy often results in non-compliance by non-state actors possibly because of 
the higher transaction costs involved in contributing to environmental governance and the lack of 
correlation between their strategic interests and reducing the impacts of climate change (Börzel, 2010). 
The level of non-compliance is even higher if international institutions and the home countries of 
multinationals are also unwilling and incapable of compensating for weak governance structures (Börzel, 
2010). This is very prominent in human rights violations in conflict zones (Sacharoff and Brook, 1997; 
Alston, 2005; Börzel and Hönke , 2012).   
 
2.6.1.2. Functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy 
 
Governance literature discusses the existence of functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy which 
can act as drivers to non-state actors’ engagement in provision of governance services (Börzel and Risse, 
2010; Börzel, 2010; Jessop, 1995). These functional equivalents can be conceptually distinguished 
according to the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1998; 1996). The 
logic of consequence argues that “self interested and utility-maximizing actors are likely to contribute to 
governance given the right incentives and/or if those actors are embedded in institutional settings 
constraining them” (Börzel and RIsse, 2010: 120). The two alternatives to the shadow of hierarchy using 
the logic consequences are the risk of anarchy or the involvement of external actors able to cast a shadow 
of hierarchy (Alxelrod and Keohane, 1985). The risk of anarchy or shadow of anarchy refers to a situation 
where if companies’ competitiveness or profitability highly depends on the provision of certain goods such 
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as a stable climate and collective binding rules to ensure that, then they have an incentive to step in and 
contribute to climate change governance. As an example, in the insurance industry, due to the frequency 
of extreme weather events insurance companies are forced to pay large amounts of money in claims. 
Therefore, to reduce these claims they are forced to find innovative solutions to adapt to these extreme 
weather events (Skees, 1999; 2008). This indicates that governance is possible even in absence of a 
credible shadow of hierarchy. 
However, in other cases external actors such as international organizations and foreign governments can 
compel non-state actors to contribute to governance (Metherson, 2001; Weiss, 2000). International 
organizations such as the United Nations and foreign governments may intervene to provide governance in 
states which have failed or are unable to provide some levels of statehood (Weiss, 2000). This is very 
common in areas which are experiencing conflicts, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan when at some point 
the state was unable to provide security. In response, foreign governments intervened to provide security 
in certain areas with the countries (Dobbins, 2003; Rubin, 2007). However, there is a lot of uncertainty on 
how effective external actors are effective in providing governance in these circumstances (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2004; Paris, 2004; Schneckener, 2010). Whilst climate change might not be as critical as national 
security, it is still worthwhile attempting to understand how external actors, particularly international 
organizations act as a functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy in states where the government 
does not have the capacity to develop and enforce climate change regulations. It will be even more 
interesting to understand how external actors complement states when the shadow of hierarchy is not 
completely absent but the state cannot enforce regulations. 
In addition, companies and other non-state actors can be obliged to comply with standards of good 
governance in areas of limited statehood (Börzel and RIsse, 2010). This obligation compels non-state actors 
to contribute to governance in principle because the state is unable to take necessary action (Buhring and 
Hufken, 2008). Furthermore, non-state actors are also accountable to international laws which compel 
them to provide governance in areas of limited statehood. However, the challenges in the effectiveness of 
this, particularly, the enforcement of international law in areas of limited statehood need to be further 
investigated (Börzel and Risse, 2010). Finally, multinationals can also be compelled to contribute to 
governance in areas of limited statehood by regulations in their home country (Kolk and Pinkse, 2009; 
Prakash and Potoski, 2007; Thauer, 2009; Greenhill et al, 2009). Most often these home countries were the 
MNCs have headquarters have consolidated statehood which enables the state enforce the regulations. As 
an example, the EU Emission Trading System compels companies which have headquarters and operations 
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in Europe to participate in the carbon trading system even most of their GHG emitting activities are located 
in other areas which have no climate change regulations.  However, limits still exist regarding the extent to 
which home country regulations can be used to induce firms contribute to governance in areas of limited 
statehood because it difficult to monitor activities beyond supply chains  (Börzel and Risse, 2010; Flohr et 
al, 2010; Heritier et al, 2009). This is even made more difficult if the areas of limited statehood were these 
MNC operate are in a “race to the bottom” to attract FDI. 
According to the logic of appropriateness actors are “embedded in normative structures that induce them 
to “do the right thing” and to follow “social rules” (Börzel and Risse, 2010: 120). Many areas of limited 
statehood are occupied by communities with their own social norms of appropriate behavior. Customers, 
local communities, environmental interests groups usually develop “societal rationalized myths” about 
what organisations should look like and do (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer and Salincik, 2003). 
Therefore, managers can avert negative public attention and build stakeholder support by being 
responsive to certain environmental myths espoused by these stakeholders (Doh and Guay, 2006; Weigelt 
and Camerer, 1988). This usually results in improved reputation and legitimacy. The South African mining 
industry has been exposed to this process regarding workers rights and pollution. During the apartheid the 
state was complicit in undermining the human rights of local workers and degrading the natural 
environment (Hamman, 2004). However, in the post-Apartheid era local communities have very often 
partnered with NGOs to expose mining companies and demand them to respect their social rights and 
clean up the environment (Hönke  et al, 2010; Hamman, 2004; Mueller-Debus and Thauer, 2009).  Local 
communities do not necessarily provide a shadow of hierarchy, but they have the potential to link with 
advocacy networks such NGOs to put pressure on companies to contribute to governance (Edwards et al, 
1999; Gough and Shackley, 2001; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Due to the impact of these advocacy campaigns 
on companies’ reputation, firms are forced to respond corporate social responsibility (CSR). Whether these 
CSR activities make a difference is an issue which has been debated extensively (Hamman, 2006; 2007; 
Idemudia, 2011). 
In some instances, NGO and social movement campaigns often induce companies to integrate these social 
and environmental issues into their core strategy, particularly, companies which have a brand name to 
defend (Lai et al, 2010; Nan and Heo, 2007). These campaigns also affect companies which have huge 
markets mostly in areas of consolidates statehood were the consumers often purchase products  based on 
their level of sustainability (Potoski and Prakash, 2006; Heritier et al, 2009; Flohr et al, 2010). As an 
example, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economics (CERES), an NGO that represents 
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investors initiated a campaign requested Nike to disclose about its contract factories (Reid and Toffel, 
2009). These pressures induce firms with strong brands such as Nike to integrate environmental and social 
sustainability issues in their production, management and business practices (Thauer, 2009; Dunn and 
Flavin, 2002). 
The increased pressures from advocacy groups and society on companies to contribute to the provision of 
governance services in areas of limited statehood indicates that the markets in which companies operate 
are socially embedded (Uzzi, 1997; 1999). Companies which have been able to recognize the social 
embeddedness of markets have been able to self-regulate themselves to the extent of acting as inspectors 
to their suppliers (Heritier et al, 2009). In addition to this, several companies have also started to 
participate in sustainability indexes such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, an activity which also 
enhances their reputation (Pruzan, 2001; Kolk, 2004). This implies that reputational concerns about socially 
accepted behavior induces firms to take norms more seriously (Börzel and RIsse, 2010). Norm compliance 
can then turn into a strategic advantage in competitive markets leading to a “race to the top” regarding 
regulatory standards (Börzel et al, 2011). 
Institutional theorists argue that in certain circumstances these “societal rationalized myths” might not 
comprise an efficient solution for a company to respond to climate change or competing rational myths 
could exist simultaneously (Boxembaum and Jonsson, 2008; Ruef and Scott, 1998). For example, there 
could be certain sections of the society who are climate change sceptics and advocate companies to adopt 
different strategies. Furthermore, institutional pressures might be at odds with the strategic interests (for 
example, profits) of an organisation (Grilly et al, 2012). Firms in these circumstances tend to decouple, 
which means they respond superficially to institutional pressures and adopt new structures without 
necessarily implementing the practices advocated by large sections of the society (Boxembaum and 
Jonsson, 2008; Westphal and Zajac, 2001). Some organisations might make a strategic choice to become 
institutional entrepreneurs – “actors who have interests in particular institutional arrangements and who 
leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones” (Maguire et al, 2004: 657; 
Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). This strategy could be common in an emerging 
institutional field on issues such as climate change, especially in areas were the governance and 
institutional frameworks are still weak, and also given the significant business interests at stake in the 
climate change policy area, for example, the issue of carbon tax (Börzel asnd Hamann, forthcoming). 
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 Organisations might also adopt strategies autonomously from the influence of the external drivers 
(Hoffman, 2001). This means that companies which belong to the same organisational field might adopt 
different climate change strategies (Greenwood, 2010; Delmas and Toffel, 2004). Levy and Rothenberg 
(2002) describe several mechanisms by which institutionalism can encourage heterogeneity. First, they 
argue that institutional forces permeate an organisation’s boundaries because they are filtered and 
interpreted according to the firm’s unique history and culture. Secondly, they describe how an institutional 
field may contain conflicting institutional pressures that require prioritization by managers. Third, they 
describe how multinational and diversified organisations operate within several institutional fields at both 
the societal and organisational levels-which expose them to different sets of institutionalized practices and 
norms. 
This means that institutional drivers need to be seen in conjunction with organisational strategies and 
capabilities (Hamman and Börzel, 2013). This is because organisations operate in an organisational field 
which is driven by both institutional and organisational drivers. For example, companies’ competitive 
drivers that motivate innovation are complemented by institutional factors that ensure that such 
innovations are adopted by companies more widely. This interaction between institutional and 
organisational drivers also means that companies’ strategies can neither be characterised as 
competitiveness or legitimacy (Hamman and Börzel, 2013). Rather, these issues are likely to be intrinsically 
enmeshed. For instance, in areas of limited statehood where there is regulatory uncertainty, companies 
will tend to mimic companies considered successful. Through the mimicry, companies will gain a 
competitive advantage and increase their legitimacy. 
 
2.7. Organisational drivers 
There have also been theoretical approaches emphasising companies’ legitimacy and competitiveness 
based on market and internal resources as a driver to corporate responses to environmental issues. While 
companies in the carbon intensive sectors receive much attention in the climate change debate because 
they are significant emitters, they at the same time also possess significant capabilities to develop climate 
friendly products (PInkse and Kolk, 2009; Hall and Vredenburg, 2003). 
Strategic management theory argues that some companies are able to respond to climate change and gain 
competitive advantages and legitimacy because they possess unique resources and capabilities which are 
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difficult to imitate or substitute (Barney, 2001; Grant, 1991). A company develops these unique capabilities 
in a systematic manner based on routines that they have developed over time (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). The 
capabilities have strategic value because they help companies maintain a first mover advantage due to the 
fact that their routine based nature inhibits instant imitation (Barney, 1991). The extent to which a 
company is able to benefit from opportunities from climate change does not only depend on existing 
capabilities, but their flexibility to develop new capabilities (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). Since climate change is 
an emerging organisational challenge, one capability that will enhance the development of a competitive 
climate change strategy is organisational learning (Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998). It means a company 
has to have the capability to learn how climate change affects its core business and which strategy 
adjustments are required to manage these impacts optimally (Kolk and Levy, 2004; Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). 
Sustainability-specific capabilities such as the ability to understand the signals and impacts of climate 
change are not necessarily the main driver behind a competitive strategy to climate change (Pinkse and 
Kolk, 2009). Instead, these capabilities must be tied to other functional capabilities in R&D, product design 
and marketing (Judge and Douglas, 1998). As a result, the climate change strategy will have to build on 
existing resources and capabilities which will enable the company to be competitive. As Porter (1996:3) 
points out “competitive strategy is about being different. It means deliberately choosing a different set of 
activities to deliver a unique mix of value”. There is no one size fits all approach to climate change. Each 
company’s approach will depend on its particular business and should mesh with its overall strategy 
(Porter and Reinhardt, 2007). Much of this analysis is based on advice to practitioners which leaves an 
empirical gap to understand how these organisational drivers influence companies’ climate change 
strategies, particularly firms in areas of limited statehood who have other socio-economic challenges to 
respond to.  
Managerial perceptions and leadership commitment also play a role in companies’ response to climate. 
(Hoffman and Barnett, 2008; Levy and Kolk, 2002). The top management team sets the strategy of the 
organisation and embodies its culture (Hoffman, 2010). Therefore, if the senior leaders do not support a 
climate change initiative, then it will most likely fail.  Furthermore, the company’s leadership also 
determines the strategies a company is likely to pursue. For example, if climate change is viewed as a 
regulative risk, the company leadership will focus on corporate political action, but if it tends to be viewed 
as physical impacts of weather related events, the company will focus their strategy internally.  
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In addition, organisational culture and a company’s specific history shape the perception of climate change 
in a company (Hoffman, 2010). One of the reasons that ExxonMobil has been rather reluctant to invest in 
renewable energy was because it made a huge loss on such investments in the early 1980s when the 
Reagan administration suddenly stopped granting large subsidies instigated by the president Carter (Pinkse 
and Kolk, 2009). Research has also shown that organisational culture could play an influential role in 
driving a company to innovate (Amabile, 1998; Amabile, 1996; Kanter, 1988). This could mean that 
companies will be innovative in finding climate change solutions, for example, if there is frequent 
communication among individuals in different departments (Martin, 2002). In this environment, there 
should be group cohesiveness which will allow for open debates (Mclean, 2005). However, the level of 
innovation will ultimately depend on whether climate change is a material issue for the company.  
Business contributions to climate change governance can be also be influenced by asset specificity (Thauer, 
2013). Asset specificity characterises a transaction if the related investments (for example, human and 
physical resources; brand name and dedicated assets) are non-redeployable, specialised and unique to a 
task (Williamson, 1992). Actors that are “dependent on each other are vulnerable because suppliers can 
redploy the specialised assets to their next best use only at a loss of productive value” Williamson, 2002: 
176). As a result buyers could face transaction exit costs because they will have to search for new suppliers 
(Williamson, 2000; 2002). Therefore, to avoid contractual hazards which occur in these transactions, some 
firms devise governance rules which guide the transactions between partners. These governance rules 
guide the transactions in case uncertainties and conflicts arise. Normally, one of the main transaction 
partners will take the responsibility of an inspector to monitor the abidance of the rules (Brousseau and 
Fares, 2000). 
 In their study of the automobile and textile industry in South Africa, Heritier et al (2009) argued that the 
higher the mutual investment in the exchange relationship between two firms, that is, the higher the asset 
specificity of the relationship, the more a firm behaves as an inspector towards their supply chain. Firms 
that maintain high asset high asset specific relations with their suppliers, as measured by investments in 
personnel training, skills, expertise and capital investment tend to a to act as inspectors towards their 
supply chain (Heritier et al, 2009). In addition to being inspectors manufacturing firms such as BMW 
identified functional equivalents whom they delegated certification functions (that is, ISO 14001).  
On the other hand, intra-firm relations regarding asset specificity could also influence how business firms 
self-regulate (Thauer, 2013; 2012). Within organisations, the deployment of resources to one department 
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creates pockets of expert knowledge inside the company which could result in information asymmetries 
between managers in the department and those in other departments or at the head office (Theaur, 2013; 
2012). However, as illustrated by Thauer (2013, 2012), management that will have an asset specific 
relationship with a production department which makes it difficult for them to redeploy the investments 
and shift its strategic focus, will implement strict environmental standard to reduce its vulnerability to local 
institutional pressures such as NGO protests.  
 
2.8. Conclusion 
A summary of the literature review is illustrated in figure 2.5 which outlines how and why companies in 
areas of limited statehood contribute to climate change governance. The emerging organisational field 
around climate change provides various pressures and incentives for business governance contributions, 
and at the same time open it to influence through firms’ individual or collective political activities (figure 
2.5). The literature review showed that there are different aspects of the climate change domain from 
which companies can select as part of their strategy. These different aspects can be broadly characterised 
as mitigation or adaptation, with mitigation focusing on efforts to reduce GHG emissions whilst adaptation 
aims to cope with the current and forecasted climate change impacts. Existing institutional and 
organisational drivers lead companies to contribute to mitigation and adaptation through various forms of 
governance contributions. Firstly, the private sector could engage in private self-regulation were at times 
they impose stricter self-regulatory standards or even press governments for stricter public regulation. In 
addition to this business firms can adopt a role as “inspector” by deploying supervision activities over their 
supply chain. Secondly, the private sector can participate in self-regulation through partnerships. This form 
of collective self-regulation occurs in different forms. Companies could be coopted by the state to provide 
expert advice, moral authority and legitimacy. The state can also delegate some governance functions to 
the private sector. Finally, the private sector can have shared responsibilities in setting and implementing 
rules (co-regulation) or they can be involved in public regulation through corporate political activities.  
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Figure 2.5: An outline of expected drivers and conditions for business contributions to climate change 
governance in areas of limited statehood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 also outlines the main drivers and conditions which influence business contributions to climate 
change governance, particularly in areas of limited statehood. Some of these areas of limited statehood 
have emerging climate change policies which present some form of “shadow of hierarchy”. On the other 
hand, the absence of stringent regulations might also create a “shadow of anarchy” when there is no 
political order in the organisational field which allows firms to operate and compete. This will create 
incentives for the companies to participate in governance. As a result, companies will weigh the option of 
collaboration or voluntary commitments to fill the governance gap in order to avoid the danger of not 
having a common good at all (Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2006). The private sector together with different actors 
might provide functional equivalents to the state. These functional equivalents to the state result in non-
hierarchical “new modes of governance” such as voluntary partnerships. Furthermore, due to stock 
exchange listings, international standards and home country regulations, multinationals can be obliged to 
comply with standards of good governance in irrespective of where their operations are located. 
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Institutional theory also discusses the role of “professionalization” which could result in isomorphic 
behaviours in responding to climate change as managers who belong to similar social networks such as 
professional and industry organisations will have similar values and perceptions about climate change. In 
addition, companies might mimic the behaviour of those companies that are considered successful, 
especially in the context of uncertainty in areas of limited statehood in emerging economies. NGO activism 
and customer pressures are also important in influencing firms’ responses to climate change. However, 
there are instances when certain companies have their own strategic interests which do not conform to 
the “rationalized myths” or the current norms and standards on climate change. In these circumstances, 
companies might decouple or aim to change or develop new institutions. Finally, the model discussed the 
role of organisational capabilities, leadership and culture influencing a company’s climate change 
strategies. These institutional and organisational drivers are usually inter-related as companies aim to gain 
a competitive advantage and legitimacy. Competitiveness and legitimacy are inherently enmeshed as 
companies avoid losing customer loyalty and their reputation, and consequently, their market share. In 
addition to this, the some organisations might have high asset specific relationships with their supply chain 
which might compel them to adopt the role of an inspector. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a conceptual discussion on how and why companies contribute to 
governance of public goods in areas of limited statehood. The framework outlined that in areas were 
regulations are weak or absent, companies engage in private self-regulation and collective self-regulation 
with other actors, particularly with government and NGOs. Currently, these contributions focus on climate 
change mitigation with limited efforts on adaptation. These climate change strategies are influenced by 
specific organisational characteristics and a company’s organisation field which is shaped by the regulative, 
normative and cognitive pressures. In reverse, the companies can also influence the organisational field to 
ensure that the institutions meet their strategic needs, be they competitiveness or legitimacy. Therefore, 
the research object is defined as the climate change organisational field, in which organisations and 
institutions interact with reference to climate change (see figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of interactions between organisations and the organisational field 
in tackling climate change (adapted from Hamann and Börzel, 2013)   
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
field  
Organisation 
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To investigate the organisational and institutional interrelationships in the emerging climate change 
organisational field as highlighted in figure 3.1, the following research questions are developed: 
(1) What are the predominant climate change governance contributions adopted by companies in 
areas of limited statehood? 
(2) What are the conditions and drivers that give rise to these governance contributions? 
The first question on how companies contribute to climate change governance is concerned with 
understanding companies’ governance contributions in areas of limited statehood, with a focus on climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. The question acknowledges that organisations are not passive 
respondents to institutional pressures, but have diverse strategic interests. As a result, organisations may 
participate in public policy formulation, often times through political activities such as lobbying to 
influence their organisational field (bottom arrow figure 3.1). 
The second question on drivers and constraints relates to the incentives and limitations for corporate 
climate change governance contributions and is interpreted in terms of the roles and inter-relationships 
between the organisational and institutional drivers. Companies which are capable to utilise their existing 
capabilities or learn and develop new capabilities to respond to climate change are most likely going to 
gain first mover advantages over their competitors. At the same time, climate change has led to diverse 
changes in regulative, normative and cognitive institutions and these exert pressures on companies to 
respond. In emerging markets were regulations are absent or weak, organisations engage in self regulation 
or collaborate with other actors.  The organisational capabilities which are usually seen as the main to 
driver to competitiveness by strategic management authors need to be analysed in conjunction with 
institutional pressures because institutional factors can also be important determinants of economic 
competitiveness of a company.  
To extensively explore how and why companies in areas of limited statehood contribute to climate change 
governance, the research selected South Africa and Kenya as the case study countries as they illustrate 
countries with varying levels of limited statehood. This research is carried out using a mixed method 
approach which utilised a survey through content analysis and a case study approach to “allow for value 
laden opinions; subjectivity and people’s personal views to come out in the research process as it is this 
richness of expertise and experience that provides depth to the research”(Jick, 1979: 603).  
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3.2 Mixed Method Approach 
In an effort to capture a more complete and holistic portrayal of the inter-relationships between the 
organisations and the organisational field in areas of limited statehood, the research utilised a mixed 
method approach. According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 17) mixed methods research is a class of 
research “where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, 
methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study”.  
In this research, the survey and the case study approach complemented each other in increasing the 
robustness of the results. Firstly, the two methods complement each other conceptually. The typology by 
Kolk and Pinke (2005) adapted for the data generation process of the survey has a strong focus on climate 
change mitigation, with limited focus on adaptation. This is partly because there is no common definition 
of adaptation among business due to lack of understanding of the concept (Kolk and Pinkse, 2012). This 
limited understanding could result in fewer companies reporting about climate change adaptation. 
Furthermore, most of the empirical research on business contribution to climate change governance has 
revealed that companies focus their efforts mostly on mitigation (Jeswani et al, 2008; Kolk and Pinkse, 
2007; Pinkse and Kolk, 2009; Weinhofer and Hoffman, 2010) Due to this gap, the case studies are utilised 
to investigate companies’ adaptation contributions and mitigation efforts which are not fully explored in 
the content analysis. This does not mean that the survey was less valuable because the configurations that 
emerged from the cluster analysis of the survey data are used to define the preliminary themes of the 
main governance contributions (figure 3.2). The case study is used to further investigate, cross-validate 
and develop the initial themes. The fact that the content analysis is conducted in an inductive manner 
helps the commensurability of this particular sequential mixed method approach. If the survey was carried 
out in a deductive manner (hypothesis testing), then it would have been carried out after the case study.   
The two approaches also complemented each other in that the survey guides the sampling and data 
collection strategy for the case study. The survey reveals that co-regulation through the energy efficiency 
accords is a common governance contribution among companies, particularly, the energy intensive 
companies in both countries. To further investigate this issue and its drivers and constraints, the case study 
selected sectors which implemented energy efficiency guidelines and standards at varying magnitudes. As 
a result, heavy industrials and food and drink manufacturing sectors which predominantly adopt process 
innovation as a mitigation strategy were selected. On the other hand, the banking and finance sector 
which is less energy intensive was selected. The content analysis also revealed the role of organisational 
factors in influencing firms’ climate change contributions. Company reporting does not comprehensively 
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reveal some of the underlying values and cultures which shape these contributions, hence, the case study 
utilised in-depth interviews to further investigate these organisational drivers. 
The ability of the case study approach to cross-validate the results from the survey enhanced the “belief 
that the results are valid and not a methodological artefact” (Bouchard, 1976: 277; Johnson et al, 2003). 
The mixed method approach had the ability to capture a complete portrayal of the inter-relationships in 
the climate change organisational fields in both Kenya and South Africa which otherwise may have been 
neglected by single methods (Creswell and Clark, 2007; Jick, 1979). It is here that the case study played a 
prominent role by eliciting data and suggesting conclusions to which would be unclear and unconvincing 
with the use of the survey only. In this sense, mixed methods may be used not only to examine the “same 
phenomenon from multiple perspectives but also may be used to enrich [the] understanding by allowing 
for new or deeper dimensions to emerge” (Jick, 1979: 603). Although it has been observed that each 
method has its own “assets and liabilities”, a mixed method approach purports to “exploit the assets and 
neutralize, rather than compound the liabilities” (Jick, 1979: 604; see also Brewer and Hunter, 1989). 
The research process for conducting this mixed method approach is outlined in figure 3.2. The data from 
the content analysis is analysed using cluster analysis to identify configurations of the main governance 
contributions adopted by companies in responding to climate change. These configurations and some of 
the related drivers are used to develop themes on the main climate change governance contributions by 
the private sector. These emerging themes are further refined using different data collection methods 
from the case study approach. The final output from the research is a discussion outlining the main 
governance contributions in areas of limited statehood and the variation in these governance 
contributions at different levels between countries, sectors and different companies.  
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Figure 3.2 Outline of the research process adopted in this study (The dotted lines reflect the iterative 
process between data collection and data analysis and conceptual framework development)  
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The case study research process was inductive in nature which means there was a back and forth process 
between data collection and data analysis.  According to Flick (2002: 43) “the close link between collecting 
and interpreting data on the one hand and the selection of empirical material on the other, unlike in the 
traditional linear method of proceeding, allows the researcher not only to ask the following question 
repeatedly but also to answer it: how far do the methods, categories and theories that are used do justice 
to the subject and the data?” 
 
3.2.1 Exploring the “Paradigm Wars”  
The researcher embarked on a mixed method approach well aware of the “paradigm wars” (Lincoln et al 
2011; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) which commenced with a challenge to the dominance of the mono 
method era of the 1960s. The concept of paradigm refers to a shared belief system that influences the 
ontology (form and nature of reality), epistemology (nature of relationship between the knower or would 
be knower (inquirer/researcher) and what can be known) and methodology (how the inquirer finds out 
whatever he/she believes can be known) (Morgan, 2007; Guba and Lincoln, 1994).The paradigm 
incompatibility perspective asserts that the conflict between qualitative and quantitative research is so 
fundamental that it is impossible to combine them without violating philosophical principles (Bryman, 
2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Sale et al, 2002). A number of authors (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979) suggest that the human mind can only work within one type of paradigm at any one 
time and that mixing paradigms is suicidal research. Therefore, they argue that quantitative research (the 
survey) which is mainly aligned with the positivist and post-positivist paradigms should never be mixed 
with qualitative research (case studies) which is mainly aligned to the constructivist paradigm (Lincoln et al 
2011).  
Historically, there has been heavy emphasis on quantification in organizational studies research 
(Abrahamson, 1996; Daft and Lewin, 1990; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Lee, 1991). The quantitative purists 
believe that the social observations should be treated as entities in physical science and the observer 
should be separated from entities that are subject to observation (Maxwell and Delaney, 2004; Schrag, 
1992). This paradigm argues that researchers should eliminate all biases, remain emotionally detached and 
uninvolved with objects of study and test or empirically justify their stated hypothesis (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). This positivist approach involves the “manipulation of 
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theoretical propositions using the rules of formal logic and the rules of hypothetic-deductive logic” (Lee, 
1991: 333).  
 On the other hand, the qualitative purists (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Martin and 
Mehra, 1997; Schwardt, 1994; Smith, 1983) argue that the constructivist paradigm has multiple-
constructed realities and that “context free generalizations” are not possible (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 
2004). These varying constructions are interpreted using conventional “hermeneutical” techniques and are 
compared and contrasted through a “dialectical interchange” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The qualitative 
purists argue that research is value-bound; hence, it is impossible to differentiate the causes and the 
effects (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). In relation to this project, the constructivist paradigm suggests that the 
multiple constructed realities can be elicited and refined only through the interaction between the inquirer 
and the respondents in an iterative process of data collection and analysis to explain the multiple and 
complex inter-relationships in the organisational field which influence corporate climate change strategies. 
Despite these arguments, the research still utilised an inductive survey because it was very useful in 
implementing a sampling and data collection strategy for the case study approach. The configurations from 
the survey were helpful in refining the preliminary model and guide the case study approach investigate 
the important thematic questions for the research. 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 15) argue that “epistemological and paradigmatic ecumenicalism” is 
possible, which means that it is reasonable to mix the survey and the case study approach. This entails that 
the key issues which were major points of philosophical disagreement can reach a consensus. Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004: 16) noted that numerous authors such as Reichardt and Rallis, 1994; Johnson et al, 
2004; Sechrest and Sidani, 1995 have reached a consensus on certain methodological philosophical issues, 
for example, (i) what appears reasonable can vary across persons; (ii) what we notice and observe is 
affected by your background knowledge, theories and experiences; (iii) hypotheses cannot be tested in 
isolation because they are embedded in a holistic network of beliefs, and alternative explanations will 
continue to exists; (iv) humans can never be completely value free and values affect what we choose to 
investigate. This emerging harmony among methodology authors suggests that differences in 
epistemological beliefs should not prevent the mixing of the survey and case study research because the 
logic of justification does not dictate the specific data collection and data analysis method researchers can 
use (Creswell, 2003; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Darlington and Scott, 2002; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
2003).  
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The support for mixed method research resulted in the emergence of a third set of beliefs or approach 
which was   utilised in this research---the “philosophy of pragmatism” (Creswell, 2003; Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Greene, 2008; Morgan, 2007). Biesta (2010) cautioned against using pragmatism as a 
philosophical framework for mixed methods, but rather as a set of philosophical tools that can be used to 
address problems related to mixing methods.  Beista argued that one of the central ideas of pragmatism in 
engagement of philosophical activity is that of addressing problems and not to build systems. As a result 
Biesta (2010) described this approach as the “philosophy of pragmatism”. The main argument of the 
“philosophy of pragmatism” is that when judging ideas the empirical and practical consequences should be 
considered (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
 
3.3 Context of the Research 
 
This research sets out to investigate how and why companies in areas of limited statehood contribute to 
climate change governance, with South Africa and Kenya as the case study countries. Much of the blame 
on GHG emissions has been placed on the private sector resulting in climate change being referred to as 
the greatest market failure the world has ever seen (Stern, 2007). As part of a global response, 
governments have been engaged in negotiations through the Kyoto Protocol to agree on efforts to curb 
these emissions and adapt to their impacts at the same time. At the regional and national level, states in 
areas with consolidated statehood for example, the European Union have responded by subjecting the 
private sector with stringent regulations such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme. Due to the presence of a 
shadow of hierarchy in these developed economies corporate responses to climate change involve a 
combination of compliance to the regulations and self-regulatory initiatives which at times involve sharing 
the governance responsibilities with the state.  
However, in developing countries, particularly in Africa, the role of business in environmental governance 
is not very clear. The literature indicates that most African countries lower their environmental standards 
in a “race to the bottom” in competition for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Chan, 2003; Singh and 
Zammit, 2004). As a result, multinationals relocate their GHG emitting activities to Africa (Kolk and Pinkse, 
2009). Even though there is no convincing empirical evidence to support the “race to the bottom” theory, 
this argument puts to the forefront the role of business in environmental governance. This also introduces 
the academic debate on the interplay between business and environmental regulations in developing 
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economies (Hönke  et al, 2008). This research aims to fill this gap by exploring the role of business in 
climate change governance in South Africa and Kenya, which are areas with varying levels of limited 
statehood.  These two countries have varying levels of limited statehood. On one hand, South Africa has an 
emerging set of climate change regulations and policies but it still has  limited administrative capacity to 
enforce the regulation (Hönke  et al, 2008), and on the other hand, Kenya has virtually no explicit climate 
change regulations to influence companies’ strategies. Therefore, it is expected that companies in South 
Africa are more responsive to climate change than Kenyan firms as they pre-empt impending regulations 
and respond to pressure from various stakeholders such as consumers and NGOs. 
In the past few years, South Africa has managed to initiate the development of an emerging climate 
change policy framework. The National Climate Change Response Policy was approved by cabinet in 2011 
providing a clear roadmap of how the country must respond to climate change. In addition the treasury in 
its 2012/13 budget announced that it will introduce a carbon tax of R120 (US$ 14) per ton of CO2e for 
emissions above set thresholds. The tax will come into effect in 2013/14 and increase by 10 per cent a year 
until 2020. Furthermore, South Africa has a string of environmental regulations for air pollution. However, 
despite these fairly strong emerging policies, South Africa still has a weak administrative capacity for 
implementing regulations and securing compliance (Börzel et al, 2010; Hönke  et al, 2008).  
Despite this progress, the state still has limited capacity to effectively implement environmentally related 
regulations. However, the different levels of weaknesses do not apply to all policy fields because there 
some policy fields, for example, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) which are generally implemented 
and monitored effectively. The BEE legislation sets specific targets for companies on issues such as 
employment, procurement and ownership and these targets are closely monitored by the Department of 
Labour using score cards (Ponte et al, 2007; Seekings and Nattrass, 2011). According to DEAT (2000): 
quoted in Hönke  et al, 2008), most of the implementation deficits are mainly attributed to two factors: 
(i) vertical and horizontal fragmentation: “The confusing, complex and sometimes contradictory 
arrangement of institutions at the national, provincial and local levels and the allocation of 
responsibilities in the environmental sector to many institutions render an effective 
implementation of environmental provisions very difficult” (Hönke  et al, 2008:12). In addition to 
this, there is no coordination within government departments with regard to environmental 
policies. For example, the Department of Agriculture is responsible for the regulation of pesticides, 
fertilizers and genetically modified organisms whilst the Department of Energy is mainly 
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responsible for renewable energy generation. This has left the Department of Environment, which 
is responsible for coordinating all environmental policies in a weaker state because it can’t 
influence or coordinate the implementation of policies. 
(ii) Limited administrative capacity: The institutional capacity at the national, provincial and local level 
are severely hampered by the lack of experienced staff, lack of financial support and the lack of a 
broader public involvement in environmental policies (Hönke  et al, 2008). As a result when 
policies are devised at the national level, they cannot be effectively implemented and enforced at 
the local level (op.cit, Rampedi, 2006). Furthermore, the bureaucratic procedures at the provincial 
level, for example the implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) tend to 
discourage companies to comply with these regulations (Pisani and Sandham, 2008; Sandham and 
Pretorius, 2008).  
In contrast, Kenya does not have any explicit climate change regulations or policies. The National Climate 
Change Response Strategy (NCCRS), which was penned in 2010, has not been developed into any 
meaningful policy. These efforts are being undermined by an intense socio-economic growth orientation in 
the government regulations and policies which has resulted in misaligned incentives and priorities for 
business. This is worsened by an uncoordinated bureaucratic system resulting in inherent conflicts 
between the fragmented agencies in government (Kivuti, interview). 
There are numerous assumptions that due to the absence of explicit environmental and climate change 
regulations, some developing countries have turned out to become “pollution havens”(Birdsall and 
Wheeler, 1993; Nahman and Antrobus, 2005). This literature postulates that pollution intensive industries 
relocate from developed to developing countries specifically to take advantage of less stringent 
environmental regulations (Cole et al, 2006; Silva and Zhu; 2009). However, such assumptions have found 
little evidence that trade flows respond to these differences:  
 “a common result from these studies is that measures of environmental stringency have little effect on trade flows. This 
result immediately casts doubts on the pollution haven hypothesis, which holds that trade in dirty goods primarily 
responds to cross-country differences in regulations” (Antweiler et al, 2001: 879-880).  
Even though there is not enough evidence to support the “pollution haven” hypothesis, Hönke  et al (2008) 
argue that the concept marks an important starting point for the expansion of the academic debate on the 
interplay of business and environmental regulation in developing countries. This discussion could also be 
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expanded to include efforts by business to interact with governments in lowering or relaxing 
environmental regulations (Cho et al, 2006; Hönke  et al, 2008, Levy and Egan, 2003). 
3.4 Survey 
The survey is based on a content analysis of annual reports, sustainability reports and web-based content 
(all of which will be referred to as ‘reports’) of the 45 listed companies on the NSE and the top 100 
companies listed on the JSE. The sectoral composition of this sample is illustrated in Figure 3.3a and b. To a 
large extent, the survey responds to research question one of the study which aims to investigate the 
climate change governance contributions of firms in areas of limited statehood. The survey responds to 
this question by developing configurations in describing corporate contributions to climate change in 
Kenya and South Africa. However, to a limited extent, some companies explicitly or implicitly discuss the 
main drivers of their actions. Therefore, some of these drivers are discussed together with the 
configurational descriptions of company strategies.  
 
Figure 3.3a: Sectoral respresentation of sample companies on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (Kenya)5 
 
                                                          
5 The categories are based on the company listings on the stock exchange. 
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Figure 3.3b: Sectoral respresentation of sample companies on the Johanesburg Stock Exchange (South 
Africa)6 
 
 
Organisational configurations can be defined as commonly occurring clusters of attributes of 
organisational strategies, structures and processes (Mintzberg, 1983; Miles and Snow, 1978). The intention 
of the configurational approach is to increase the understanding of organisational phenomena by 
identifying a distinct and internally consistent set of firms (Ketchen et al, 1997). Configurations have 
prominently been used in exploring the determinants of performance. Similarly, improved understanding 
of corporate responses to climate change can be achieved by identifying distinct and coherent sets of 
firms.  
As discussed in the mixed methods section, the survey mainly focuses on mitigation which is a limitation 
for the study. Even though adaptation is emerging to be an important aspect of climate change 
governance, there is still a perception that adaptation is not really relevant to a lot of sectors and 
companies have a peculiar view of what adaptation is, if they refer to it publicly at all (Ans Kolk, October 
2012, email communication). However, there is evidence that some companies, mostly the “sustainability 
leaders”, for example. Unilever have started reporting about their adaptation contributions. Therefore, the 
                                                          
6 The categories are based on the company listings on the stock exchange 
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survey captured these adaptation contributions for companies that respond to them. Nevertheless, to 
address this limitation, the case studies are used to investigate companies’ adaptation activities. 
The variables for the content analysis data were generated using a selection of climate change indicators 
linked to the six strategic options presented in the typology by Kolk and Pinkse (2005) in chapter two (see 
Figure 2.2 in Chapter two). Kolk and Pinkse’s (2005) typology of companies’ strategic responses to climate 
change focuses on mitigation only. According to the typology, companies’ governance contributions to 
climate change focus on two overarching strategic aims: innovation and compensation. When these two 
overarching strategic aims are combined with different levels of organisational activities and interactions, a 
matrix is developed to outline the strategic options in response to climate change (Kolk and Pinkse, 2005). 
In the resulting typology six strategic options emerge that could be part of a comprehensive strategy for 
climate change in which companies combine several options (op cit.). The vertical axis distinguishes the 
three different levels of organisational activities and interactions: within the individual company (internal), 
within the value chain (vertical), and with other private or public actors (horizontal). The horizontal axis 
outlines the two main drivers (innovation and compensation) of corporate responses to climate change. 
Table 3.1 outlines a combination of the six strategic options in the Kolk and Pinkse typology and the 
indicators used in this study. The categories in Table 3.1 are related to the main strategic aims of 
Innovation and Compensation in the typology which have a strong emphasis on climate change mitigation. 
Organisations that have a strong internal focus through improving their dynamic capabilities and view 
climate change as an opportunity will tend to emphasise innovation in their GHG management. This means 
they will focus on improving their environmental technologies and services to reduce their emissions As a 
result, these companies will focus on process improvement, product development and new product and 
market combinations. On the other hand, there are companies that do not have the technical and 
organisational capabilities to innovate. Instead, these companies will focus on compensation by borrowing 
emission reduction technologies from other companies through GHG accounting and internal transfers, 
supply chain measures and acquisition of emission credits or political activism. 
The first category process improvement focuses on understanding the degree to which the company is 
developing its resources and capabilities to tackle climate change through different internal processes. 
Process improvement mainly focuses on a company’s self-regulatory efforts which often involve 
implementing standards and guidelines set from collective initiatives such as energy efficiency accords. 
Hence, the indicators are meant to identify the level of executive commitment to enhancing process 
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efficiencies in the company to reduce GHG emissions and whether staffs have concrete incentives to do 
this. In addition, the category includes indicators measuring the specific investment in equipment and 
resources to reduce emissions and whether such initiatives in process improvement are making a 
difference. The category in GHG accounting and internal transfers provides indicators that are meant to 
measure the internal compensatory measures within the company. They address the extent to which the 
company measures and discloses its GHG emissions and its targets and plans to internally transfer these 
emissions to other companies or business units in different locations. As the case with process 
improvement, GHG accounting involves implementing mostly collectively agreed global standards on 
measuring and reporting GHG emissions, in particular the GRI and the WRI/WBCSD GHG corporate 
accounting and reporting standard. 
The product development and supply chain measures categories comprise indicators exploring the 
companies’ collective self-regulatory initiatives along the supply chain. The product development indicators 
explore a company’s innovation initiatives to develop new products and services within particular 
industries and the review of progress and status of these products and services in reducing GHG emissions. 
The supply chain measures’ indicators focus on the compensatory activities of the companies within their 
supply chain. The new product and market combinations and acquisition of emission credits and political 
activity categories focus on different forms of collective self-regulation such as co-regulation and 
delegation of governance functions. The new product and market combinations category focuses on how 
the company evaluates and influences its supply chain to develop new products and enter new markets by 
developing and marketing climate change friendly products and services. In addition, the category explores 
the role of different stakeholders in influencing how the company develops new product and market 
combinations. Finally, the acquisition of emission credits and political activity category is meant to 
understand how the company responds to the regulations, surrounding norms and cognitive forces and 
the level of participation in carbon offset projects and the extent to which it collaborates and negotiates 
with a variety of stakeholders from different sectors and backgrounds in participating in public regulation 
often to influence the direction of the policy 
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Table 3.1: An outline of the strategic options and indicators used in the content analysis (Adopted from Kolk & Pinkse, 2005) 
Organisational Level Strategic aim 
  Innovation Compensation 
Internal (company) Process improvement GHG Accounting and Internal Transfers 
  
 The company builds and develops resources to enhance 
its process efficiencies 
 The company measures and discloses its scope 1, 2 and 
3 GHG emissions 
   The company invests in new equipment and initiatives 
to enhance process efficiencies and resource 
productivity to reduce its GHG emissions 
 The company has specific internal emission reduction 
targets over a certain period of time 
   The company has an executive board or committee 
responsibility to align the company’s goals and its 
process improvement initiatives to reduce GHG 
emissions  
 The company has an internal emission reduction plan to 
achieve the set targets 
   The company provides incentive mechanisms for 
individual management of climate change issues 
 The company has a pilot project(s) to internally transfer 
its emissions 
   The company mentions concrete results of process 
improvement initiatives that have been achieved 
 The company has an operational internal emission 
transfer scheme 
Vertical (supply 
chain) 
Product development Supply chain measures 
  
 The company has a product innovation policy to develop 
climate friendly products and services to respond to 
 The company outsources its GHG intensive activities 
(e.g. transportation) 
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climate change 
   The company participates in the development of climate 
friendly products and services 
 The company procures its electricity from renewable 
energy sources 
   The company has mechanisms to review its progress and 
status in the development of climate friendly products 
and services 
 The company sets emission reduction targets for its 
supply chain 
   The company participates in marketing of green/climate 
friendly products and services as part of its core business 
 The company evaluates the supply chain’s emission 
reduction performance using industry standards and 
certification (ISO 14001)  
   The company accounts for the GHG emissions reduced 
from its climate friendly products and services 
 The company is a member of a professional/industrial 
association which influences its response to climate 
change 
Horizontal (beyond 
supply chain) 
New product and market combinations Acquisition of emission credits and political activity 
  
 The company explores the possibility of partnerships in 
developing climate friendly products and entrance of 
new markets 
 The company participates in carbon offset projects (e.g. 
CDM) 
   The company has a policy and targets to participate in 
cross-sectoral collaborations to develop new product 
and market combinations 
 The company reports carbon credits or allowances 
traded 
   The company has concrete partnerships with private 
sector partners to develop new climate friendly product 
and market combinations (specify) 
 The company responds to different regulations, norms 
and cognitive forces related to climate change 
   The company has concrete partnerships with public  The company has explicit political strategies/activities to 
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sector partners to develop new climate friendly products 
and entering new markets 
influence climate change policy (e.g. lobbying) 
   The company has concrete partnerships with civil 
society partners to develop new climate friendly 
products and entering new markets 
 The company negotiates and collaborates with its cross-
sectoral partners (e.g. government, civil society) to 
shape climate change policy 
   The company has concrete partnerships with the private 
sector, public sector and civil society partners to develop 
new climate friendly products and entering new markets 
 The company has explicit strategies to influence its 
stakeholders’ views on climate change. 
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Each company was given a score between 0 and 3 depending on how systematically and rigorously 
the indicators derived from the categories were reported on. The scoring schematic is provided in 
Table 3.2. The scores are a reflection of the company’s diligence in public reporting on their climate 
change policies. A requirement of the scoring schematic is that there is relative consistency between 
the scores for different indicators and for different companies. To enhance the reliability of the 
scoring process, an inter-coder reliability test was carried out. The first scorer carried out the scoring 
for all the companies and a second scorer conducted the scoring for 20 per cent of the sample using 
the scoring system used in Table 3.2. These two sets of scores were compared to ensure inter-
temporal and inter-scorer reliability (Lombard et al, 2002). The Krippendorff alpha (Hayes and 
Krippendorff, 2007), used to measure the degree of agreement between these scoring sets was 0.81, 
representing sufficient reliability (Krippendorff, 2004). 
It is apparent that data derived from content analysis is based on company disclosures, not actual 
policies and practices. This implies that reliance on disclosure will result in missing some important 
initiatives by companies.  Most sustainability disclosures are voluntary and unaudited which does 
not seem to provide enough motivation to avoid distortion of disclosures, to the extent that these 
disclosures reflect aspects of the company’s performance (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Weshah et al, 
2012). For the disclosures to be useful there should be correspondence between disclosures and 
actual events. If external users do not perceive this correspondence, they might discount 
environmental disclosures (Ingram and Fraziers, 1980). There is empirical evidence which indicates 
that interested stakeholders such as investors would like to see environmental disclosures being 
independently audited because these users mistrust management and do not rely on unaudited 
reports (Cho et al, 2010; Epstein and Freedman, 1994). 
   Table 3.2: Scoring system used in the content analysis 
Score Criteria 
0 No information about the indicator is provided 
1 
 
Basic information relevant to the indicator is provided, but there is no link to 
company strategy or operations 
 
2 
Information is provided about the indicator, including basic  
information about strategic intent and operational aspects 
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3 
Comprehensive information is provided on the company’s approach  to that 
indicator, including strategic intent, implementation and monitoring 
 
There has been mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate environment 
performance and the level of disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri et al, 2004; Hughes et al, 2001; Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2011). For example, Hughes et al (2001) found out that disclosures varied between sectors 
and individual companies; therefore, disclosures in their current form do not fully convey the actual 
environmental performance level of firms. However, there is evidence that heavy polluting 
companies make more disclosures because they are subjected to more remediation than those 
companies which do not engage in environmental degradation (Clarkson et al, 2008; Hughes et al, 
2001). Nevertheless, the heavy polluters make soft claims to being committed to the environment 
because their environmental legitimacy is being threatened (Clarkson et al, 2008). 
Furthermore, many of the categories and indicators discussed in this content analysis may not be 
considered as material issues for sustainability reporting. For example, there could be a perception 
that investors might not be very much interested in reading information on the climate change 
partnerships beyond the supply chain because their focus is the internal operations and profitability 
of the company. In addition to this, companies might not disclose certain climate change information 
due to fears of free-riding by their competitors (Delmas and Keller, 2005). Therefore, to support the 
climate change disclosures, the study also integrates data from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
in South Africa because it requests a broader array of climate change information from companies 
than that which is provided through company reporting. Unfortunately, the CDP is not yet active in 
Kenya, hence, the study primarily relied on the company disclosures and the case studies. 
 
3.4.1 Data Analysis 
To identify the different organisational configurations of business responses to climate change in 
Kenya and South Africa, cluster analysis is carried out using SPSS software. The clustering process is 
used to identify “any multidimensional constellations of conceptually distinct characteristics that 
commonly occur together” (Meyer et al, 1993: 1175). The configurational approach in this study 
took an inductive; empirically based approach in that the “causality flows from the empirical 
manifestations to the construct” (Fiss, 2009: 419). This gives the researcher the opportunity to refine 
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the preliminary model from the literature review, nevertheless, with a strong focus on climate 
change mitigation.  
The cluster analysis was conducted in two stages: first, a hierarchical clustering procedure was 
applied to determine the appropriate number of clusters and in the second step; the clustering was 
re-run with only a chosen optimum number of clusters in which to place all the cases. Using the SPSS 
software, the hierarchical clustering in the first stage, used a Ward Method applying Squared 
Euclidean Distance as the distance or similarity measure to determine the optimum number of 
clusters that fit the content analysis data. This process starts with each case as a separate cluster, 
that is, there are as many clusters as cases, and then combines the clusters sequentially, reducing 
the number of clusters at each step until only one cluster is left. The clustering method uses the 
distances between data points in terms of the specified variables. The Ward Method is used to get 
some sense of the possible number of clusters.  
The second stage of the cluster analysis involved carrying out a k-means cluster analysis with the 
selected number of clusters which enabled every company to be allocated to a particular cluster. 
Appendix 1a, 1b and 1c illustrate the tables showing the final cluster centers for each of the 32 
variables/indicators for the three data samples. The mean values of the final clusters for each of the 
six strategic options in table 3.1 were then calculated using the cluster centers of the 
variables/indicators. The final clusters centers and graphs for the combined data sample, South 
Africa and Kenya samples are presented in figures 4.1; 4.2 and 4.3, respectively in chapter 4.  
 
3.5 Case study approach 
As highlighted in the mixed methods section above, the case study approach was utilised to further 
investigate the major themes emerging from the content analysis. Therefore, the case study 
approach complements the survey by investigating how and why companies in South Africa and 
Kenya, countries with varying levels of limited statehood contribute to climate change. This 
complementary role is very useful in developing final conceptual discussions and conclusions 
because case studies are frequently used in theory building research (Edmondson and McManus, 
2007; Eisenhardt, 1989, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
To develop theory that is empirically grounded, the case study utilised an analytic inductive 
methodology as it accommodates existing theories (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Manning, 1982). Using this approach, the researcher went back and forth between data collection 
and theory generation, beginning with a review of literature to develop a preliminary model which 
68 
 
was further refined by the content analysis survey to show the emerging climate governance 
contributions (see figure 3.2). The case study reviewed the emerging governance contributions from 
the content analysis to develop the final arguments on how and why companies in areas of limited 
statehood contribute to climate change governance.  
 
3.5.1 Sampling of case study companies 
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) if the purpose of the research is to build theory, then theoretical 
sampling is appropriate. This means that cases are selected because they are particularly “suitable 
for illuminating and extending relationships and logic among constructs” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007: 27). As a result, the eighteen case study companies were selected in both South Africa and 
Kenya from three different sectors (banking and finance; food and drink manufacturing and heavy 
industrials and allied) (see table 3.3). Selecting different sectors allows the researcher to identify 
patterns within and across sectors.  
Firstly, due to different sectoral institutions firms in different sectors are most likely to have varying 
contributions to climate change. Research (for example, Kell and Ruggie, 1999; Meuller-Debus et al, 
2009) indicates that sectors which have strong associative structures and memberships are more 
likely to support firms in those sectors in self-regulation. On the other hand, sectors with low 
associative structures and memberships are not expected to extensively engage in self-regulation. 
For example, in South Africa, the food and drink manufacturing sector is characterised by “a large 
number of firms of different sizes, a high degree of market fragmentation and weak associative 
structure across the different sub-sectors” (Hönke  et al, 2008: 17). As a result, many firms, 
particularly, the smaller firms are not expected to have extensive climate change contributions 
because they do not have the sectoral support. Furthermore, due to the fact that climate change 
and other related problems such as energy supply are salient among large and energy intensive 
heavy industrials firms, they are likely to engage in climate change governance. Therefore, this 
sampling strategy enabled comparisons that clarified whether an emergent finding is simply 
“idiosyncratic“to a single case or consistently replicated by several cases (Eisenhardt, 1991).  
In addition to the sectoral variation, companies’ climate change actions could vary between 
companies within certain sectors. This variation often occurs between multinationals, large listed 
companies and smaller companies which are often not listed and have mostly local operations (Kolk 
and Pinkse, 2004; Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). Multinationals and large companies, particularly, the 
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manufacturing sector has more extensive operations crossing national boundaries often resulting in 
significant negative externalities from the GHG emission (Kolk and Pinkse, 2009). Therefore, they are 
most likely to face more external pressure from regulators and civic organisations to contribute to 
the governance of climate change. Furthermore, these large corporations are more visible than 
smaller companies which tend to increase their reputational risks. In contrast, smaller and non-listed 
companies do not have resource intensive operations which cause high negative environmental 
externalities. As a result, they do not have any institutional pressures to contribute to climate 
change governance. Thus, the three companies in each sector in each country were selected based 
on the following criteria: (i) dual listed (multinational); (ii) large company listed on the national stock 
exchange (that is, Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) or Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) (iii) small-
medium non-listed company with national operations. This sampling strategy usually identifies 
extreme cases which helps the researcher observe contrasting patterns in the data (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
Table 3.3: Case study companies in Kenya and South Africa (based on sector and firm size) 
  Sector South Africa Kenya 
Banking and finance Standard Bank Standard Chartered 
Nedbank Kenya Commercial Bank 
Capitec Family Bank 
Food and drink manufacturing Unilever Unilever 
Illovo Sugar Mumias Sugar Co 
Orley Foods Kuguru Foods Complex Foods 
Heavy industrials and allied  Sasol Total Kenya 
Pretoria Portland Cement Athi River Mining 
Devra chemicals PZ Cussons 
 
The theoretical sampling strategy also provides opportunities to carry out a comparative analysis of 
climate change strategies of companies that experience different institutional pressures. For 
example, Unilever was selected as a case study company in both countries so as to compare how the 
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company’s strategies are influenced by the country variation in the different climate change 
institutional processes and organisational fields in South Africa and Kenya.  
  
3.5.1.1 Banking and finance sector 
Among the three sectors selected, the banking and financial sector is the least carbon intensive, but 
probably one of the most important sectors with regard to financing climate change initiatives. 
Furthermore, the sector is one of the most crucial sectors to the continent’s economy. Its 
significance can be assessed in terms of the size of their assets which are predominantly loans and 
advances to the private non-bank and government sectors. PwC (2012) reported that the total 
banking assets as a percentage of GDP for South Africa and Kenya was 106% and 51%, respectively. 
With the exception of Family bank which is a private bank, all the other selected banking firms are 
publicly listed banks which means the shares to the company are owned by investors (shareholders) 
and decisions are made by a board appointed by the shareholders (see table 3.4). The public listed 
companies are able to raise funds and capital through the sale of their securities as debt or equity. 
Therefore, public listed banks have more capital which could be used to invest in renewable energy. 
The ownership structure of the publicly listed banks entails that they are compelled to disclose more 
information about their operations, which could include their lending practices to carbon intensive 
companies. Whilst some of these disclosures are not public, it means shareholders have enough 
information in their decision making process (Kolk, 2004).  
Table 3.4: Characteristics of the selected banking and finance firms 
Company Ownership Operations Listings Number of 
employees 
Market 
cap (US$) 
Total Assets 
(US$) 
Products/services 
South African companies 
Standard 
Bank 
public Regional 
(Africa) 
JSE, 
Namibian 
Stock 
Exchange 
53 350 24 billion 201.9billion Commercial 
banking, 
Investment 
banking, 
Investment 
management 
Nedbank Public South 
Africa, 
Namibia 
JSE 22 416 12 billion 73 billion Commercial 
banking, 
Investment 
banking, 
Investment 
management 
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Capitec 
bank 
Public South Africa JSE 7 194 2.8billion 3.1billion Retail banking 
Kenyan companies 
Standard 
Chartered 
Bank 
Public Global LSE, 
SEHK, 
NSE 
86 865 65billion 624 billion Consumer 
banking, 
corporate 
banking, 
investment 
banking, 
mortgage loans, 
private banking, 
wealth 
management 
Kenya 
Commerc
ial Bank 
Public East Africa NSE 5 492 1.25billion 4.2billion Retail banking, 
corporate 
banking, loans 
Family 
Bank 
Private Kenya - 1 003 80million 317.7million Retail banking, 
loans 
 
As outlined in table 3.4, South African banks have more assets and their shares have more value 
than Kenyan banks. It is usually assumed that banks with higher share values have more liquidity 
which allows them to make more investments (Naidoo, 2009; Smith, 2007). This presents them with 
opportunities to participate in the renewable energy market through private equity, fund 
investments, underwriting of initial public offerings, debt offerings and ownership of green 
companies (Cogan, 2008). Furthermore, South African banks provide more corporate banking 
services which means that they have more potential to influence their carbon intensive customers 
through their lending policies. The size of the bank also determines their level of influence and 
comprehensiveness of their climate change strategies, for example Standard Chartered Bank in 
Kenya is a multinational bank with over 90 000 employees and operations in over 70 countries 
across the globe. This exposes them to more institutional pressures to respond to climate change 
either through listings such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index or NGO pressure (Hamann et al, 
2009; Missbach, 2004; Spar and Mure, 2003). On the other hand, a privately owned bank such as 
Family Bank in Kenya with only 1000 employees does not have any external pressure to respond to 
climate change. 
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3.5.1.2 Food and drink manufacturing sector 
The food and drink manufacturing sector is intrinsically linked with the agricultural and retailing 
sector, therefore, it tends to have a high GHG emission factor (Hönke  et al, 2008). With the 
commodification and industrialization of food production in recent decades, the impact of these 
production processes on natural resources such as water has been substantial (Hönke  et al, 2008). 
More so, the diversified nature of the industry with includes a variety of crops and products entails 
that it has a higher climatic and environmental impact (table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: Characteristics of the selected food and drink manufacturing sector 
Company Ownership Operation
s 
Listings Number of 
employees 
Market 
cap (US$) 
Total Assets 
(US$) 
Products 
South African companies 
Unilever Public Global Euronex
t, UNA, 
LSE, 
NYSE 
171 000 118.2billi
on 
61billion Foods, 
beverages, 
cleaning agents, 
personal care 
products  
Illovo Sugar Public Regional 
(Africa) 
JSE 5 400 1.5billion 1.28billion Sugar, sugar 
marketing 
Orley Foods Private 
(family 
owned) 
South 
Africa 
- 300 - - Confectionary 
products 
Kenyan companies 
Unilever Public Global Euronex
t, UNA, 
LSE, 
NYSE 
171 000 118.2billi
on 
61billion Foods, 
beverages, 
cleaning agents, 
personal care 
products  
Mumias 
Sugar 
Public Kenya NSE 1 500 90 million 320million Sugar, sugar 
marketing 
Kuguru Food 
Complex 
Private Kenya - 800 3.2million - beverages 
 
Foreign wholly owned subsidiaries tend to dominate the food and drink manufacturing sector in 
Africa and seem to respond to broader head office visions with regard to environmental issues such 
as climate change (Fig, 2007). In South Africa, the sector contributes 3.2% to the GDP, making it the 
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third largest contributor to GDP after chemicals and metals (DTI, 2012). However, only ten 
companies of the 4000 companies in the sector account for 70% of the industry’s turnover (STASSA, 
2012). This leaves a lot of pressure on the few dominant companies to respond to climate change, 
leaving out the majority of small-medium enterprises (Fig, 2007). With the exception of Unilever, 
many of the case study companies have slightly lower share value and assets. This could imply that 
many of these national and local companies do not have adequate capital to invest in process 
improvement or other substantial climate change initiatives.  
 
3.5.1.3 Industrial and allied 
Over the past two decades, the industry and allied sector in Africa has experienced a considerable 
decline as compared to the tertiary or services sector contributing only 15% and 10% to the GDP in 
South Africa and Kenya respectively (PwC, 2012). However, in South Africa it remains the third 
largest sector by gross value of production (18%) after metals (23%) and petrol refining (20%) 
(STATSSA, 2012). The nature of the products which are produced by this sector entails that these 
companies are carbon intensive (table 3.6). This tends to attract a lot of external pressure from civil 
society and regulators (Kolk and Levy, 2004). 
Table 3.6: Characteristics of the selected industrial and allied firms 
Company Ownership Operations Listings Number of 
employees 
Market 
cap (US$) 
Total Assets 
(US$) 
Products 
South African companies 
Sasol Public Global NYSE, 
JSE 
34 000 29billion 24billion Oil & gas 
exploration and 
production, 
chemicals 
production 
Pretoria 
Portland 
Cement 
(PPC) 
Public Regional JSE 3 087 2.3billion 900million Cement 
production 
Devra 
Chemicals 
Private South Africa - 100   Chemicals, 
detergents, 
soaps 
Kenyan companies 
Total Public Global Euronex
, NYSE 
96 104 117billion 218 billion Oil & gas 
exploration and 
production, 
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natural gas 
transportation, 
oil refining 
Athi River 
Mining 
Public Regional 
(Kenya, 
Tanzania, 
South 
Africa) 
NSE 5 000 3.7billion 1.9billion Cement 
manufacturing 
PZ Cussons 
Kenya 
private local - 250 - - Imperial Leather, 
soaps, shampoo, 
detergents, 
healthcare 
products 
 
Dual-listed multinational companies such as Sasol and Total face more regulatory pressures in 
different countries they operate in, for example the EU Emissions Trading System. Furthermore, the 
nature of their businesses, particularly the multinational energy firms, provides for high turnovers 
and share price values resulting in high levels of liquidity (see table 3.6). The high level of liquidity 
provides these companies with more capital, hence, more investment options in developing 
comprehensive climate change strategies.   On the other hand, privately owned and non-listed 
manufacturing firms such as Devra Chemicals have a low asset base which does not allow them 
make meaningful investments in climate change. 
 
3.6 Data Collection 
3.6.1 Interviews 
To obtain information that is broad and deep enough to ensure a rich accumulation of data from 
which to draw inferences, the case study approach used in-depth interviews. Structured and semi-
structured interviews were conducted with individuals within the companies who are responsible for 
developing and implementing the climate change strategies. In South Africa, due to pressures to 
address corporate sustainability issues (Arya and Bassi, 2011; Hamann et al, 2009; Idemudia, 2011), 
many companies have corporate sustainability managers who are responsible for implementing and 
communicating the company’s sustainability strategy. Hence, in South Africa most of the interviews 
were carried out with these sustainability managers (see Appendix 2 for a list of all the respondents). 
However, there are other senior managers and other individuals in influential strategy positions who 
influence implementation of a company’s climate change strategy. These individuals were also 
interviewed were possible, particularly,  for Devra Chemicals, Orley Foods and Capitec bank which 
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do not have sustainability managers, for example, at Capitec bank, in depth interviews were carried 
out with the marketing manager. In Kenya, the private sector has been slow in adopting 
sustainability issues; therefore, mostly multinational companies have sustainability managers. As a 
result, most of the interviews with the case study companies were conducted with individuals in 
senior management and strategy departments who at times are not very familiar with certain 
sustainability issues, for example, at Family Bank, interviews were carried out with a lawyer and an 
economist.  
In addition to the respondents within companies, the researcher also interviewed consultants, 
government officials, academics and industry organisation representatives who are knowledgeable 
about the companies’ climate change activities. The advanced nature of the corporate sustainability 
and climate change discipline in South Africa meant that there were more respondents in South 
Africa than Kenya (see Appendix 2).  
Identifying interviewees was not a structured or systematic process. Many of the individuals or 
organisations were known to the researcher through a review of internet material and personal and 
work networks. When l was carrying out my initial interviews, some of my respondents referred me 
to other interviewees which allowed for snowball sampling (Flick, 2002). Furthermore, some 
relevant contacts were made through personal contacts. For instance, when l was in Kenya, one of 
the ladies l was staying with had a brother who was a strategy manager at Standard Chartered Bank. 
When l met the strategy manager at a church service he gave me the contact details of the 
corporate governance manager responsible for sustainability issues at the bank. I was also able to 
meet a lot contacts by attending conferences and workshops. For instance, the Energy Efficiency 
Awards in Nairobi, Kenya, is an important occasion to meet individuals both in the private sector and 
civil society who are working on climate change.  
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews were utilised as both entail a level of flexibility, 
informality and openness (Myers and Neuman, 2007). The semi-structured interviews were valuable 
to explore facts, behaviour, and beliefs or attitudes, as a means of seeking to understand how and 
why the companies respond to climate change (Bryman, 1988; Robson, 2002). The interviews were 
mostly open-ended questions guided by key themes of the researcher derived from the emerging 
themes which came out of the content analysis. A total of 57 interviews were carried out in both 
countries; 34 in South Africa and 23 in Kenya lasting between 45 minutes and two hours (table 3a 
and b). Prior to the interviews, interviewees were informed about the objectives of the research and 
research questions through email communication. This allowed the interviewees to prepare for the 
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interview, in some instances gathering valuable data, for example, company reports and analyses 
which was valuable for the researcher. With regard to respondents within the companies, the 
researcher kept the initial conversations broad in scope in an effort to expose a wide range of 
motivations and guiding themes (Bansal and Roth, 2000). The researcher started each interview by 
asking what the company was doing to respond to climate change and then asked the respondent to 
trace the history of each initiative he/she mentioned and explain why the initiative was adopted 
(Bansal and Roth, 2000). In cases were more than one respondent was interviewed in a company, 
the issues raised by one respondent were further discussed with other respondents as this helped in 
building internal validity (Eisenhadrt, 1989). Interviewees were also asked about the relationship 
with other stakeholders and other aspects of the company’s structure and operations which could 
have a bearing on the company’s climate change strategy. As the discussion went on, other 
questions relating to the research were presented to the respondent.  
Table 3.7a: List of formal interviews in South Africa 
Organisation Number of interviewees 
Standard Bank 2 
Nedbank 3 
Capitec Bank 1 
Unilever 3 
Illovo Sugar 1 
Orley Foods 1 
Sasol 2 
Pretoria Portland Cement 1 
Devra Chemicals 1 
Total 14 
Respondents outside the companies 
Consultants 8 
Academia 4 
Industry Association 4 
Government  3 
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Other 4 
Sub-total 23 
TOTAL 37 
 
Table 3.7b: List of formal interviews in Kenya 
Organisation Number of interviewees 
Standard Chartered 2 
Kenya Commercial Bank 1 
Family Bank 1 
Unilever 2 
Mumias Sugar Co 2 
Kuguru Foods Complex Foods 1 
Total Kenya 1 
Athi River Mine 2 
PZ Cussons 1 
Sub-total 13 
Respondents outside the companies 
Consultants 2 
Academia 1 
Industry Associations 6 
Government  2 
Sub-total 13 
TOTAL 26 
 
The interview protocol for respondents outside the firm was similar to that of interviewees within 
the companies. The only difference was the questions which were asked. The researcher started by 
informing the respondent the case study companies in the study. Then the interviewee was asked 
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how they would characterise the climate change responses of these companies, that is, companies 
or sectors they have knowledge about. Initially, the interview questions were broad, but as the 
discussions went on, we focused on specific issues which the respondent was more informed about, 
for example, the interview with a government official at the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) in 
Kenya focused on the regulatory and institutional processes in Kenya and how they were influencing 
companies’ climate change actions.  
In addition to the formal interviewees, an important source of information was informal 
(unstructured) interviews with various informants in the form of discussions during workshops and 
conferences, telephone conversations and email conversations. As the research progressed, these 
informal interactions were very helpful in refining some of the emerging research findings. For 
example, the configurations from the content analysis survey were continually refined through these 
informal interactions. During these interactions l would outline my research aim to the respondent 
or present to them my preliminary findings and we would discuss these findings. In most instances, l 
would make a transcript of these conversations. 
3.6.2 Carbon Disclosure Project reports  
In addition to the interviews, the Carbon Disclosure Project reports for South Africa from 2007 to 
2012 were reviewed. Since its inception in South Africa in 2007, every year the CDP sends a 
questionnaire to the top 100 companies listed of the Johannesburg stock exchange asking them to 
measure and disclose what climate change means for the business (CDP SA, 2012). The data from 
the questionnaire responses in analysed and compiled into the CDP report by Incite Sustainability, a 
consulting firm based in Cape Town, South Africa, in partnership with the National Business Initiative 
(NBI).  
The information from the CDP report served to complement data from the interviews. The CDP 
report provides valuable contextual information on how and why different sectors and companies in 
South Africa are responding to climate change. In addition to this, the CDP uses the disclosed 
information to rank companies on the levels of performance and disclosure. It is a daunting task to 
measure and validate the performance of companies by relying solely on the disclosed information. 
The CDP acknowledges this challenge and addresses it in the report:  
“In assessing the companies that have qualified for the CDLI [Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index] it is important 
to note that the scoring is based solely on the information disclosed in the company’s CDP response, it does not 
consider other carbon or wider sustainability disclosures provided by the companies through their sustainability 
reports, annual reports or through meetings and engagements with stakeholders and policymakers. While a high 
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CDLI score is an indication of the company’s transparency and accountability, it is not a metric of a company’s 
performance in relation to climate change management. The scoring makes no judgement over absolute levels of 
emissions, emission reduction achievements or carbon intensity……....The performance scores for the CDPLI 
[Carbon Performance Leadership Index] provides an indication of the extent to which companies are addressing 
the potential opportunities and risks presented by climate change. It is important for investors to keep in mind 
that the carbon performance band simply recognises evidence of action. The CDPLI is not a measure of how “low 
carbon” a company is, nor does it provide an assessment of the extent to which a company’s actions have 
reduced its intensity relative to other companies in the sector……… [However], the results are seen to be 
sufficiently robust to provide an indication of those companies leading the way” (CDP SA, 2012: 32-33). 
To analyse the information in the CDP report, the researcher firstly read the executive summary to 
understand the general response rate of the respondents and the main climate change issues the 
companies are focusing on in their response. After that, l went on to read and evaluate sections with 
responses from the sectors that this research focuses on (that is, financials, consumer discretionary 
and energy and materials).  An understanding of the sectoral context in which each company 
operates enhanced the assessment of company disclosure and performance and facilitated a more 
meaningful comparison between companies (CDP SA, 2012). These sector analysis snapshots contain 
the following:  
“• A brief analysis of the broad implications of climate change for that sector (this analysis reflects the judgement of 
the authors of this report, and not the responses of the companies). 
• A summary of the key risks and opportunities reported by the companies (this reflects what the companies reported 
and is not intended to be a detailed account of the actual sectoral risks and opportunities). 
• The CDP sectoral response rate over the past four years. 
• A breakdown of the sectoral disclosure scores by questionnaire section, comparing the sector against the JSE 100 
average and the CDLI.  
• A graphical representation of individual company disclosure scores and performance bands 
• A brief review of the scope 3 categories reported within the sector.  
• A summary of the company response type, emissions data (scope 1 South Africa, scope 1 Global, scope 2 Global and 
emissions intensity) and information on targets and verification” (CDP SA, 2012; 38). 
 The researcher then summarised this information with data from the interviews providing some 
complementarity using quotes from the respondents. Since Kenya does not participate in the CDP, 
chapter five which presents the findings from South Africa only integrates the CDP responses.   
3.6 Case study data analysis  
Analysing data is the heart of building theory from case studies, but it is the most difficult and the 
least codifies part of the process (Eisenhardt, 1989). Even though it is difficult to account for every 
detail of the process how a researcher got from several hundred pages of field notes to the final 
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conclusions, several key features of the analysis can be identified (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). The analysis of the case study companies was done separately for each country. 
The first stage of this process was within-case study analysis which involved analysing data 
generated from interviews for each of the three sectors. This analysis was carried out to further 
complement and rectify the refined preliminary model developed after the content analysis survey. 
The within-case study analysis involved detailed write ups describing the climate change activities 
and drivers for each of the companies in each sector. This process enables the researcher to be 
familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity and develop unique patterns of each case to emerge 
before generalising patterns across sectors (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the write up process for each 
company, l had to identify patterns of the climate change activities and drivers through the process 
of coding. Coding represents “the operations by which data are broken down, conceptualised and 
put back together in new ways” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 57). To respond to the first research 
question of how each company is responding to climate change, l developed three tables, with table 
one and two describing the company’s mitigation and adaptation strategies, respectively. The third 
table described the company’s political activities to influence climate change policy. A forth table 
was developed describing the drivers to these responses. These thematic responses and drivers 
were continually related to the conceptual framework in the chapter two and the refined conceptual 
model from the content analysis survey. 
The second stage of the analysis was the search for cross-case patterns which involved identifying 
similarities and differences within the companies in each sector and across sectors. This was done by 
selecting different types activities (for example, mitigation) and then look for similarities and 
differences within each sector. This resulted in a categorised set of climate change activities and 
drivers for each sector. These categories were then compared within the different sectors. With 
continual reference to the preliminary model and the refined preliminary model, l was able to 
identify specific activities which were recognisable with low carbon emitters and those recognisable 
with high carbon emitters. For example, it emerged that Kenyan companies in the industrial and 
allied and food and drink manufacturing sectors mainly adopt energy efficiency initiatives. Various 
anecdotes, perceptions and other pieces of information were hence grouped and conceptually 
linked to develop and consistent theoretical explanations of how and why these two sectors in 
Kenya are predominantly adopting energy efficiency initiatives. These conceptual linkages were 
tested with the refined conceptual model from content analysis survey and other existing data 
transcripts in order to check for consistency.   
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This stage of the thesis was an iterative process, with the researcher continuously going back and 
forth between data collection and data analysis to continually test and further develops the 
concepts (Flick, 2002). To help with refining the concepts emerging from the data, l presented the 
preliminary conceptual outputs of the research at international conferences and workshops (Box 3.1 
list some of the papers that were presented at conferences and workshops and received comments 
from various participants). 
As the iterative process of within-company analysis and cross-sectoral comparison continued, 
tentative themes, concepts and possibility even relationships between variables between the two 
countries began to emerge (Eisenhardt, 1989). This process continued until theoretical saturation 
was reached (“Theoretical saturation is simply the point at which incremental learning is minimal 
because the researchers are observing phenomena seen before” Glaser and Strauss, 1967: quoted in 
Eisenhardt, 1989: 545). The output from this process was a final conceptual framework which 
explains how and why companies respond to climate change in areas of limited statehood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3.1: Various research outputs leading to the thesis 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ORGANISATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
FOR DESCRIBING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the organisational configurations which can be used to categorise corporate 
governance contributions to climate change in South Africa and Kenya. These results are based on 
the content analysis survey of company reports of the 45 listed companies on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange in Kenya and the top 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South 
Africa. The case study interviews are used to substantiate the findings from the survey. Kolk and 
Pinkse’s (2005) typology discussed in figure 2.1 of chapter two was adopted in the data generation 
process of this content analysis survey.  
4.2 The main climate change configurations in South Africa and Kenya 
  
The results of the cluster analysis are shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, which summarise the mean 
values of the final cluster centres for the six categories used. The results show that four 
different strategy configurations for climate change can be identified in South Africa (visionaries, 
efficiency drivers, emergent planners and laggards), while in Kenya three clusters emerged 
(efficiency drivers, emergent planners and laggards). The ‘visionaries’ are the companies, mostly 
large multinationals which have understood the risks and opportunities presented by climate 
change. Therefore, they are engaging in private self-regulation internally and collective self-
regulation within the supply chain and through collaboration with relevant stakeholders. The 
‘efficiency drivers’ involves companies which internally implement the set energy effiency standards 
and guidelines agreed upon mostly through co-regulation in the form the Energy Efficiency Accord 
(EEA).  This cluster is mostly occupied by energy intensive sectors.  The ‘emergent planners’ are 
those companies that are starting to explore different climate governance contributions, while the 
83 
 
‘laggards’ do not respond to climate change or adopt cosmetic initiatives to contribute to climate 
change governance. 
 
Even though the clusters in both countries use the same labels for the three identical clusters in the 
country specific analysis, they cannot be compared directly because, as illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 
4.3, the characteristics of the clusters are often not the same in the two countries. In addition, the 
Kenyan sample dominates the companies that are non-responsive to climate change, while the 
South African sample dominates the responsive companies. This suggests that, in addition to other 
organisational and institutional factors discussed below, South African companies are gradually 
starting to respond to the slow introduction of policies that address threats of climate change in the 
country. On the other hand, the absence of a credible threat of a shadow of hierarchy could imply 
that the state is not capable or willing to steer the private sector to contribute to climate change 
governance. More so, evidence from the research indicates that even though some parts of Kenya 
are going to be severely affected by climate change, the discourse on the issue within the private 
sector and general public is not far reaching as the case in South Africa.    
 
In addition to these country differences, the results also reveal in-country differences along sectors. 
Due to the varying sectoral institutions and issue salience, the energy intensive sector in South 
Africa, for example, is more responsive to climate change than the banking sector because climate 
change directly affects their operations and manufacturing companies are surrounded by 
institutions within their industry associations, which will tend to influence them to become energy 
efficient. Finally, within the sectors, multinationals and large listed companies have more extensive 
governance contributions than smaller firms. For example, in the retail sector, Woolworths is an 
industry leader with its climate change mitigation and adaptation contributions because of its asset-
specific relationship with its supply chain and company specific capabilities and culture which are 
less prominent in other retailers. In the following sections, each of the clusters will be discussed in 
more detail. 
 
 
4.2.1 Laggards 
The ‘laggards’ represent the largest proportion (68 per cent) of companies in both countries, 
indicating that a large proportion of the private sector, particularly in Kenya is still struggling to 
participate in climate change governance. As shown in Figure 4.2 and 4.3, a larger proportion (84 
per cent) of the Kenyan sampled companies belongs to this cluster compared to the South African 
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sample (61 per cent). The companies in this cluster have very low scores (below 0.5) on all the 
indicators in both countries. Therefore, they share the same attributes. These low scores indicate 
that these companies do not have any specific private or collective self-regulatory mitigation 
or adaptation initiatives.  
 
Companies in this cluster include Kenya Commercial Bank, Access Kenya, Datatec (Kenya) and Tiger 
Brands in South Africa (see Table 4.1 for a summary of the companies’ strategies). Many Kenyan 
companies, particularly those in the commercial and services sector, focus on “green washing” 
collective efforts such as planting trees as their main contribution to climate change governance. 
This is mostly driven by the logic of appropriateness, as the companies attempt to avert negative 
attention from local communities which expect them “to do something good for the community”. 
According to the Governor of Siaya County “the government is unable to absorb the huge number 
of unemployed youths into the county so we expect the private sector to play a part. This project 
with KB is a sign that companies can do something for the community”.  
 
These tree planting activities are normally implemented in collaboration with civic groups because 
these groups enhance the legitimacy and reputation of these companies in the society. As a result, 
the companies will collaborate with reputable civic groups. In Kenya, the United Nations 
Environmental Program sets the implicit “rules” by providing guidelines on tree planting as part of 
the “Billion Tree Campaign”.  In response, the private sector signs pledges on the number of trees 
they will commit to plant.  Even though these are intentional efforts by the private sector, tree 
planting does not form a fundamental climate change contribution by these companies, 
particularly, the banking sector because they could use their resources and capabilities in trading to 
develop more comprehensive contributions such as carbon trading or innovative financing towards 
tackling climate change. While afforestation assists in increasing the carbon sink, which absorbs 
GHGs, it does not help the companies reduce their direct scope 1(direct) and 2 (indirect) emissions; 
hence they had low scores in all the indicators.   Despite this, the state still acknowledges these 
initiatives through the participation of government officials at these tree planting events. For 
example, Siaya County governor supported Kenya Commercial Bank tree planting project. 
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Figure 4.2: Cluster Centers for Strategic Climate 
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Figure 4.3: Cluster Centers for Strategic Climate 
Change Configurations in Kenya 
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In Kenya, the absence of both a shadow of hierarchy and anarchy related to climate change acts as 
a constraint for companies in this cluster not contributing to climate change governance. The state’s 
regulative focus is on pro-growth policies, which do not adequately integrate climate change, for 
example, Vision 2030 which is the blueprint of Kenya’s socio-economic development. These pro-
growth policies are sending ‘misaligned incentives to a majority of companies operating in Kenya’ 
(Kivuiti, interview). As a result, many companies, particularly, the less energy intensive companies 
in the financial and services and information technology industries which represent most 
companies in the Kenya sample do not have incentives to tackle climate change. This explains the 
fact that less energy intensive sectors which do not have sectoral institutions to influence 
companies to contribute to climate change governance are unlikely to be responsive to climate 
change. Climate change is not a salient issue in the financial and services industries, hence, business 
associations in these industries are unlikely to engage the companies in any collective regulatory 
schemes. 
 
In addition, the alignment challenges within the bureaucracy, resulting in inherent conflicts 
between the fragmented government agencies and the absence of external pressure from 
different actors such as civil society results in inaction on climate change issues (Marguis et al, 
2012). Furthermore, whilst many arid and semi arid communities in south-eastern Kenya 
continually face the risks of drought and food insecurity linked to climate change, many of the 
laggards in less carbon intensive sectors do not face the danger of not having a common good at all. 
Their profitability or strategic operations are not directly linked to a stable climate. Therefore, these 
laggards do not have any direct incentive to contribute to the governance of climate change.  
 
In South Africa, through the white paper on the National Climate Change Response Strategy and 
the introduction of carbon tax in the 2013/14 financial year by treasury, the state is showing its 
ability to enforce binding decisions on the private sector. However, the shadow of hierarchy 
linked to these regulations targets the energy intensive companies. This means that the less 
polluting industries, particularly the financial services, IT and consumer services which constitute 
the majority of companies in this cluster, do not face any direct threats of regulation. This is shown 
by the absence of many South African financial services firms in the carbon trading markets such 
as the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM). Companies in this cluster such as Access Kenya 
and Tiger Brands, which recognise climate change as an emerging strategic issue for them avoid 
implementing any concrete strategies to respond to the issue, but rather adopt cosmetic initiatives. 
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4.2.2 Emergent planners 
 
This cluster consists of companies that have recognised the risks and opportunities that climate 
change presents to their operations. In South Africa, these contributions are mostly driven by the 
shadow of hierarchy whilst in Kenya they are mostly driven by the shadow of anarchy.  Therefore, 
they have put targets in place and are in the early phases of comprehensively developing internal 
firm self regulatory strategies. In both countries, companies in this cluster had a moderately low 
score, between 1.3 and 0.5, which indicates that they are in the initial phases of their self-
regulatory contributions. As emergent planners these companies first focus on their internal 
competences in the self-regulation. For example, South African companies such as Group Five, a 
construction company are attempting to internalize the negative externalities from the emission of 
GHGs by advancing technologies which produce renewable energy.  In Kenya the cluster has a very 
low score of 0.19 on GHG accounting and transfers. Nonetheless, the companies have started to 
conduct their own practises which do not rely on any agreed rules or guidelines, for example, BOC 
Kenya is attempting to borrow hydrogen technologies from its parent company the Linde Group. As 
emergent planners these companies have not yet expanded their developing internal activities into 
collective self regulatory contributions such as partnering with their industry associations. As 
alluded to by one the respondents: “we are still learning so we need to understand the complexity 
of this issue internally, how it affects us, what options do we have as a company then start 
implementing the optimal options internally first. After this stage, the we can consider who and 
how we partner with them” [BOC Kenya, 2011]. 
 
The ‘emergent planners’ in both countries are represented by a mixture of companies from 
different sectors. However, South African companies dominate the composition of this cluster (17 
per cent) compared with Kenyan companies (6.7 per cent). This reflects the general trend which 
shows that South African companies have more significant self regulatory contributions than 
Kenyan companies. As is the case with the South African ‘efficiency drivers’ and ‘visionaries’, the 
‘emergent planners’ are reacting to the threat and potential impact of the proposed carbon tax in 
2013/14 by the treasury in South Africa and anticipated regulations emanating from the white 
paper on the National Climate Change Response Strategy, which was approved by cabinet as policy 
in November 2011. ‘Companies will need respond to the risks posed by the carbon tax because, 
according to our research, if the FTSE/JSE top 40 companies were to pay the proposed carbon tax of 
R120 (US$ 14) per ton of CO2eper tonne of CO2 for all their direct operational emissions, their 
carbon costs could amount to almost US$974 million’ (Kikate, interview).  
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The shadow of anarchy is a major driver for the emergent planners in Kenya. Companies such as 
Kakuzi and Rea Vipings plantations which are in the agricultural sectors are starting to recognise the 
risks presented by climate change, for example shortages of water and high temperatures in the 
Rift Valley (Kabubo-Mariara and Karanja, 2006). This has massive potential to disrupt their business 
models and competitiveness on the world markets because their business models rely on producing 
high quality horticultural products and tea. Since the Kenyan government is not capable of 
providing collective binding rules regarding mitigation and adaptation of climate change, the 
shadow of anarchy rooted in the loss of competitiveness and profitability provides the emergent 
planners with a major incentive to step in and start self-regulating themselves. To fill this 
governance gap, Rea Viping plantations is reportedly recruiting analyst from Europe to help them 
set targets and plan for these forecasted scenarios internally and along their supply chains 
(Opondo, interview).  
  
 
4.2.3 Efficiency drivers  
This cluster encompasses companies which are driven by a combination of organisational drivers, 
shadow of hierarchy and anarchy by engaging in collective self regulation. In both countries, through 
co-regulation, the state and business associations and the respective individual companies, mostly 
energy intensive companies set the rules and targets for the Energy Efficiency Accord. In South Africa, 
as part of the accord, the voluntary signatories agreed to a collective energy demand reduction target 
of 15% by 2015. Due to the emphasis on energy efficiency, the ‘efficiency drivers’ have a strong 
internal focus resulting in significantly higher scores on indicators that are driven by  resource 
efficiencies, innovation, managerial capabilities and the structure and culture within the company 
(see figure 4.1; 4.2 and 4.3). As part of the strategy, the ‘efficiency drivers’ who are signatories of the 
accord “agree to collaborate with each other and government to promote the development of sector 
specific strategies and targets that contribute to the overall energy efficiency target; negotiate 
industry contracts to manage energy demand; develop common reporting requirements for energy 
use” (NBI, 2005). 
Many of the ‘efficiency drivers’ implement the agreed rules and targets of the accord by focusing on 
in-house strategies which are centred on measuring their GHG emissions and focusing on energy 
and resource efficiency. Since most the energy efficiency contributions are collective initiatives they 
are not often driven by organisational drivers. For example, The Kenya Association of 
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Manufacturers (KAM) supports the EEA signatories with energy audits and funding to implement 
some energy efficiency projects. As a result, both Kenyan and South African samples have average 
scores on product development and product and market combinations indicators (1.67-1.87). 
Furthermore, this cluster performed poorly on compensatory activities in collaboration with 
stakeholders w i t h i n  o r  beyond the supply chain, resulting in low scores on supply chain 
measures and acquiring emission credits and political activity. The self-regulatory contributions 
which the ‘efficiency drivers’ received low scores often require substantial organisational resources 
and time to implement. Commenting on the challenges to developing innovative products and 
services to adapt to climate change Sasol’s sustainability manager argued that 
 
 “it is difficult for the company to promptly change its manufacturing process which has been 
financially viable for decades and innovate new climate change friendly products because 
“innovation depends strongly on long term investments in research and development (R&D), a 
process where the outcome is always uncertain.........for us to innovate means we have to develop 
new capabilities and technologies other than the ones which we have” (Goede, interview). 
 
These challenges relating to innovation point to the absence of climate change adaptation 
governance contributions within the ‘efficiency drivers’ and the majority of South African and 
Kenyan samples. Whilst many of these ‘efficiency drivers’ are also exposed to changes in water 
availability or extreme events, such as droughts and floods, at present most of them do not possess 
the required organisational capabilities to adapt to the impact of climate change. Due to the fact that 
adaptation options which include coping measures, organisational adjustments and system 
transformation require organisational learning and “ecological sensemaking” internally and at times 
along the supply chain, collective self regulatory initiatives such as the Energy Efficiency Accord are 
unlikely to contribute to climate change adaptation (Berkhout et al, 2006; Whiteman and Cooper, 
2011). 
 
Due to the limited organisational resources available to many of the ‘efficiency drivers’, the business 
associations play an influential role in monitoring the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Accord. 
The ability of the National Business Initiative (NBI) in South Africa and the Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers (KAM) in Kenya to solve some of the collective action problems faced by individual 
firms allowed many of the ‘efficiency drivers’ to commit to the accord. Hence, the monitoring role of 
the NBI and KAM helps them in mitigating the free-rider problem (Hönke  et al, 2009). To curb this 
problem the accord has clear guidelines regarding information sharing of technologies which enables 
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the ‘efficiency drivers’ to reduce their emissions. In addition to the monitoring from the NBI, the 
Department of Energy casts its shadow of hierarchy by carrying out three year interval reviews of the 
energy efficiency contributions of the companies. The threat of potentially stricter regulations from 
the state for not meeting the energy efficiency targets acts as an incentive for the ‘efficiency drivers’ 
to commit to the accord. “We got a good and realistic deal from the government. So we don’t want to 
force the government’s hand by missing these targets” (Marais, interview). 
The abundance of energy intensive companies in this cluster also illustrates the role of sectoral 
institutions (business associations in this case) in influencing firms in specific sectors to contribute to 
governance.   More so, companies in different sectors face different pressures and opportunities for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Firms in “high salience sectors” such as mining, utilities 
and manufacturing which dominate this cluster of ‘efficiency drivers’ have their core activities at 
stake, “with their fossil-fuel based business models being threatened” (Kolk and Pinkse, 2012: 3). 
Hence, these energy intensive firms focus their governance contributions on mitigation (energy 
efficiency in this case). An early change in business models for these companies could be a source of 
competitive advantage in terms of pre-empting regulations, markets and consumer preferences in 
some cases. As a predominantly co-regulatory governance contribution, the Energy Efficiency Accord 
has the potential to reduce costs and regulatory risks for the ‘efficiency drivers’ which could end up 
being a source of competitive advantage.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of strategies adopted by example companies representing the corresponding 
clusters 
 
Cluster 
 
Company 
 
Strategy 
 
Laggards 
Access Kenya The internet and technology company reports its ‘continued excellence, 
leadership and stewardship in tackling climate change’, but there is no 
evidence in their reporting that they measure their GHG emissions, 
forecasted future emission or energy use to develop a mitigation plan or any 
of the strategic options in Figure 2.2 
ABSA bank The bank does not have a notable strategy to respond to climate change. 
According to a risk analyst at the bank ‘there is not enough data on how 
climate change will affect their corporate clients in terms of risks to the 
bank to enable them to make important decisions’ (Engel, interview). 
 
Emergent Planners 
BOC Kenya BOC Kenya, a supplier of industrial, process and specialty gases has outlined 
plans to adopt climate change strategies from its parent company, the Linde 
Group. Part of the plans include capitalising on the rise in demand for large 
scale thin film photovoltaic modules by supplying specialty gases ‘that help 
keep production as climate neutral and cost effective as possible’. The Linde 
Group has been involved in ‘the evolution of hydrogen technology covering 
the entire hydrogen value chain from generation and liquefaction through 
transport solutions to vehicle fuelling’ (Linde Group annual report, 2010). 
Group Five This construction company has been participating in the South African 
Carbon Disclosure Project since 2009, which allowed it to measure its GHG 
emissions using the Greenhouse Gas Protocol. Therefore, it is in the process 
of setting targets based on the data from Green Gas Protocol. In an effort to 
reach these targets the company has started being involved in green 
buildings and renewable energy. However, the company acknowledges that 
‘it still has to develop in-house skills and a comprehensive strategy to 
accommodate climate change’ (Mobane, interview) 
 
Efficiency drivers 
Mumias Sugar Mumias Sugar, a Kenyan milling company, has been implementing energy 
efficiency initiatives through the Energy Efficiency Accord championed by 
the Kenya Association of Manufacturers’ CEEC unit. Through its energy 
efficiency project, the company has identified and corrected energy 
consumption levels using ‘medium voltage variable frequency drives’ and 
modified its fuel and fleet management system. In addition, the company 
recently completed its bagasse cogeneration plant, which has enables the 
company to supply 26 megawatts of renewable energy to the national grid. 
As result of cogeneration, the company does not have to rely on energy 
sources such as coal, which emit large amounts of GHGs. 
Sappi The global pulp and paper company based in South Africa has been carrying 
out numerous climate change mitigation efforts which earned them a score 
of 75% in the South Africa Disclosure Leadership Index of the CDP in 2010. 
Through production and energy efficiency programmes the company has 
managed to reduce its CO2 emissions by 25% over the past five years. Sappi 
is currently generating 38% of its electricity from renewable sources in 
South Africa through its cogeneration plants using black liquor, bark, sludge 
and biomass from its operations 
 
Visionaries 
Woolworths South African retailer, Woolworths launched its first CO2 refrigerant pilot 
store together with a eco-fridge truck refrigeration in 2010 as part of its 
plans to reach its target to reduce its carbon footprint by 30% by 2012. 
Adaptation strategies such as sustainable farming practices through the 
Farming for the Future programme have enabled the retailer to reduce its 
farmers’ water consumption. In addition, the company is driving innovation 
in clothing by selling a range of bamboo products, a plant which doesn’t use 
fertilisers, helps improve soil quality and absorbs moisture three times 
better than cotton (see Methner, forthcoming). 
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As illustrated in figure 4.2 and 4.3, the attributes of the cluster are slightly different as South African 
companies scored significantly higher than Kenyan companies on process improvement and GHG 
accounting and transfers. These country level variations are mainly a result of the differences in the 
levels of shadow of hierarchy cast by the state. In Kenya, whilst KAM has the shared responsibilities 
with the Ministry of Energy to monitor and implement the accord, there credible threat of 
punishment or stricter regulations if the companies do not fully implement the Accord. More so, in 
comparison to accord in South Africa which has been functional since 2005, the Energy Efficiency 
Accord in Kenya was recently launched in 2011 and has been beset by funding constraints (KAM 
official, interview). Furthermore, companies in South Africa face greater threats of punitive measures 
and regulations if they fail to self-regulate.  The numerous environmental regulations and the recently 
introduced carbon tax indicate that the South African government is slightly capable to cast a shadow 
of hierarchy despite capacity challenges (Hönke  et al, 2009).  
  
4.2.4 Visionaries 
 
The ‘ visionaries’ cluster, which is only present in South Africa, represents companies that are 
explicitly emphasising and addressing the opportunities and risks presented by climate change. They 
therefore scored fairly well on all the indicators (Figure 4.2). Many of these firms have self-
regulatory strategies internally and within the supply chain and partnerships.  Woolworths, which 
had a score of 83 per cent in the CDP Leadership Index, is a good example of a visionary (see Table 
4.1). Like many visionary companies, Woolworths’s leadership has committed financial and 
technical resources to self-regulate themselves through their ‘Good Business Journey’, which aims 
to improve the company’s sustainability performance. Due to the competitive nature and fear of 
free-riders in the retail industry (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003; Singley and Williams, 1995), Woolworth’s 
self-regulatory efforts are internal and within their supply chain. Their mitigation and adaptation 
efforts have significantly given them a competitive advantage and enhanced their reputation. 
Hence, the Woolworths is considered a standard bearer in the retail industry setting the 
benchmarks regarding how the retail sector should respond to sustainability issues in general. As an 
illustration, the supermarket’s green format showcases the supermarket of the future with an 
emphasis on fresh food and sustainable technology.  As the case with many ‘visionaries’, 
Woolworths derives its ability to self-regulate from pressure exerted by its consumers. Woolworths 
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caters for the high end market which is knowledgeable and concerned about climate change. The 
internal mitigation responses focus on reducing its negative externalities from GHG emissions. 
These efforts include setting carbon reduction strategy which aims to reduce carbon emissions from 
their facilities by 40 percent by 2015. The Director of Corporate and Public Affairs, Andrew Hall, 
summarised one of their in-store initiatives: “Energy efficient lighting and low energy refrigeration 
is used throughout the store. Meanwhile, blinds descend over the fresh produce fridges at night 
trapping the cold air inside, hot air from fridges is used for heating and air conditioning is better 
regulated throughout the store”.  
 
With regard to climate change adaptation, Woolworths has also played the role of “inspector” over 
its supply chain (Heritier et al, 2009). This is mainly evident with its “Farming for the Future” (FfF) 
program which was developed to foster and verify sustainable land use and water management 
practices of its supplier farms. In addition to the supplier farms, the audits are also conducted at 
pack houses and processing plants (Methner, 2013). Annual farm and processing facility audits 
identifies and prioritizes risk areas at the farm level, explores their causes with the farmer and in 
discussion with the farmer makes recommendations for improving or changing existing practices 
based on priority. Woolworths pays for the audit but the farmer has to cover the costs of the 
measures to be implemented. According to Justin Smith, the shadow hierarchy casts by the state 
through regulations does not seem to be a major driver in their climate change adaptation 
initiatives: “business leadership for sustainability requires not waiting for the government to make 
changes, but rather going forward ---- the government will catch up” (Smith, interview). Hence, the 
high asset specificity in the relationship between Woolworths and its farmers seems to compel the 
retailer to assume the role of inspector who sets and monitors the rules through the FfF program. 
Firstly, Woolworths provides highly qualified personnel and training to support the farmers grow 
high quality farm produce. Considering the high end market that Woolworths targets, the retailer 
requires high quality farm produce. For the farmer this also means that they make huge investment 
regarding technology, personnel and training to ensure their yields are high quality. This 
characterises a relationship in which both the retailer and farmer have investments which are non 
re-deployable and specialised for a particular task. 
 
Furthermore, the ‘visionaries’ also contribute to climate governance through collective self-
regulation. For example, SABMiller is involved in the Water Futures Partnership in collaboration 
with WWF and GIZ. Even though the government did not explicitly delegate the functions of water 
management to SABMiller or WWF it acknowledges the governance functions that the private 
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actors are engaged in. Through the Water Futures Partnership the non-state actors involved are 
playing crucial role in climate change adaptation through the management of water catchment 
areas. As a collective self-regulatory approach, every partner has a shared responsibility. According 
to the report “the success of our partnership stems from the fact that each partner brings different 
skills and competences to promote water security, despite differing underlying motivations”. 
Through the partnership, a risk assessment of hop farms (a key resource for brewing beer) found 
out that invasive trees were reducing surface water available to grow these crops and putting stress 
on the rest of catchment. The partnership is now working with other local stakeholders to remove 
alien species and replace them with indigenous, less water intensive vegetation in the region, as 
well as introduce ground water monitoring and establishing a Water User Association. 
  
In conclusion, there is a strong representation of multinationals in this cluster o f  visionaries in. 
Based on the logic of appropriateness laws and policies such as the EU Emission Trading scheme 
in which these multinationals have their operations require them to comply with these 
regulations irrespective of where they operate and invest (Kolk and Pinkse, 2009; Prakash and 
Potoski, 2007). For example, SABMiller adopts a holistic approach to energy and carbon 
management, which applies to all their global operations. This holistic approach is embedded in 
their climate change target (that is, to be 50 per cent carbon efficient by 2020 over a 2008 base) 
which is strongly linked to phase 3 of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (SABMiller annual report, 
2011). Multinationals such as Unilever and SABmiller in this cluster are also continuously targeted 
by NGO campaigns because of their strong brand names, which they have to defend (Hönke  et al, 
2008; Thauer, 2009). As a result, they are always proactive in responding to climate change 
because of concerns about their reputation.  
 
4.3 Conclusions 
This chapter presented results from the content analysis survey which explored business 
contributions to climate change governance in “areas of limited statehood”, with a focus on South 
Africa and Kenya. Kolk and Pinkse’ s (2005) typology in chapter 2 (figure 2.1) was adapted for the 
content analysis of the annual reports from the top 100 companies on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange and the 45 companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Cluster analysis gave rise to 
four organisational configurations in South Africa (visionaries, efficiency drivers, emergent planners 
and laggards) and three main configurations in Kenya (efficiency drivers, emergent planners and 
laggards). The results suggest that companies’ governance contributions are similar across the 
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various dimensions of the typology but there is variation in responses between the countries, 
across sectors and within sectors (figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4: A characterisation of the variation in business contributions to climate change 
governance and the drivers to those efforts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies’ climate governance contributions within the efficiency drivers, emergent planners and 
laggards vary between the two countries primarily because of the different levels of statehood 
which influenced by the shadow of hierarchy cast by the state through regulations or the shadow of 
anarchy. The cluster analysis revealed that the ‘efficiency drivers’ mainly contributed to climate 
change mitigation through co-regulation and private self regulation in the shadow of hierarchy 
whilst the ‘emergent planners’ in the initial phases of private self-regulation in the shadow of 
hierarchy. However, the ‘efficiency drivers’ in South Africa performed slightly better than those in 
Kenya because the credible threat of punishment or stricter regulations for companies that did not 
meet their Energy Efficiency Accord set targets in Kenya was much lower than that in South Africa. In 
contrast, the presence of numerous environmental regulations and new climate change regulations 
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such as the carbon tax meant that companies could face harsher punitive measures if they failed to 
meet their set targets as agreed in the EEA.  The absence of a credible threat cast by state 
regulations with regard to climate change also explains the fact why there are significantly more 
‘laggards’ in Kenya and fewer ‘emergent planners’ who self-regulate.  
In addition to the country variations, there is sectoral variation between the ‘laggards’ and the 
‘efficiency drivers’. Whilst most of the energy intensive companies in both countries participate in 
collective self-regulation through the Energy Efficiency Accord, the majority of less energy intensive 
companies in the banking, telecommunications and services industries belong to the predominantly 
non-responsive cluster of ‘laggards’. The main reason for this sectoral variation is that highly carbon 
and energy intensive sectors face more regulatory, physical and economic risks from climate change 
as compared to a low carbon intensive sector. Due to the fact that climate change is a salient issue 
for energy intensive sectors, they are likely to face more consumer and civil society pressures. In 
addition to this, business associations such as the National Business Association (NBI) in South Africa 
and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) have been influential in driving the ‘efficiency 
drivers’ cluster in both countries to adopt energy efficiency initiatives.   
The variation in the clusters also extends within the sectors. Some companies within the same sector 
could be more responsive than their peers due to their market orientation, reputational concerns 
and NGO activism.  For example, there are ‘visionary’ companies such as Woolworths in South Africa 
which have a high-end market orientation which prompts them to contribute to climate change 
governance than their peers because their customers put pressure on them. The high-end market 
orientation could mean that these firms have an image to protect which makes them more 
vulnerable to NGO and local community pressure. Furthermore, there is a distinguishing feature 
among the visionaries cluster which relates to explicit leadership commitment to climate change and 
sustainable development. Some of these ‘visionaries’ have high asset specific relationships with the 
supply chain which compels them to act as inspectors to ensure that their suppliers also comply with 
their set rules. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BUSINESS RESPONSES TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of how and why South African companies are contributing to 
climate change governance. The results of this chapter also complement the climate change 
configurations in chapter 4. The first section discusses the main mitigation and adaptation 
governance contributions by the case study companies and the following section discuss the main 
drivers for these different modes of governance.  
5.1 Climate change governance contributions 
5.1.1. Self-regulation 
 
Evidence from the research indicates that the most of the case study companies engage in self-
regulation. As a first step to contributing to climate change governance, self-regulation focuses on 
their internal strategies.  This involves internally implementing standards or rules agreed collectively 
at the global and national level. These contributions focus on GHG accounting, setting emission 
targets and energy efficiency projects. The GHG accounting and reporting guidelines for the majority 
of companies are based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Corporate Accounting and Reporting 
Standards. The GRI is a multi-stakeholder partnership of business, NGOs, government and others 
convened by the WBCSD and WRI with the aim of “developing internationally accepted accounting 
and reporting standards and/or protocols and to promote their broad adoption (WBCSD and WRI, 
2004). The Carbon Disclosure Project which is a collective effort by a group of private actors to 
request climate change information from listed companies has also been influential in companies’ 
GHG accounting and reporting initiatives. In addition to this, sustainability indices such as the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index and JSE Social Responsibility Index have requirements on companies to 
report on sustainability issues which include climate change. The King governance reports which 
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have been endorsed by various industry associations also adds to this pressure. The King reports 
recommend all JSE listed companies to  provide a sustainability integrated report and failure to do 
so, they are required to provide an explanation why they could not produce the integrated report. 
In response to these collectively set guidelines, the case study companies in the three sectors 
accounted and reported their GHG emissions with different levels of intensity (see table 5.1). John 
Hanks from Incite indicated that GHG accounting is usually the first step towards action on climate 
change (interview). Whilst many multinationals and listed large companies measure their GHG 
emissions, the smaller unlisted companies (Capitec, Orley Foods and Devra Chemicals) which 
resemble the characteristics of “laggards” do not have any notable inventories on their GHG 
emissions. A Devra Chemicals engineer indicated that they did not have enough resources to 
develop GHG inventories and there was no motivation to do so because developing the inventories 
did not have a significant impact on their profit margins (Marais, interview). At Capitec bank, the 
marketing manager argued that they assess climate change differently than other companies 
because of their clientele base which largely focuses on retail banking. As a result, they focus on the 
strategic opportunities linked to their banking products and services to their clients who are not 
carbon intensive (Silber, interview).  
Table 5.1: Summary of GHG emissions and emission targets by the case study companies (source 
CDP SA, 2012) 
 Scope 1 
direct 
emissions 
(tCO2e) 
Scope 2 
indirect 
emissions 
Scope 3 
emissions 
Target year Target 
Standard Bank 11,119 149,365 Yes No No 
Nedbank 1,668 165,313 Yes 2015 12% reduction per FTE employee from 
base year (2007). (9.15 tCO2e reported in 
base year). 82.3% of target emissions 
reductions achieved 
Capitec Bank No No No No No 
 
Unilever (global) 
 
1,048,797 
 
1,443,174 
 
yes 
 
2020 
Halve the greenhouse gas impact of our 
products across the lifecycle by 2020 
Illovo Sugar 180,086 174,429  2012 25% reduction from base year (2009). 
(109,171 tCO2e reported in base year). 
0% of target emission reductions achieved 
Orley  Foods No No No No  No 
     
30% reduction on the base year coal-to-
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Sasol 
 
64,166,000 
 
10,815,000 
Yes 2030 liquids design. (30,000,000 tCo2e in base 
year-2005) 
 
Pretoria Portland 
Cement 
 
 
4,765,280 
 
 
575,369 
 
 
yes 
 
 
2017 
5% reduction in tCO2e per unit of 
production from base year(2011). 
(5,311,112 tCO2e reported in base year). 
Target includes lime and dolomite plants. 
0% of target emissions reductions 
achieved 
Devra Chemicals No No No No No 
 
The companies that accounted for their GHG emissions (that is, Standard Bank, Nedbank, Unilever, 
Illovo Sugar, Sasol, and PPC) noted that this was an important step in the process of managing risks 
and identifying GHG reduction opportunities, for example, Sasol, a notable “efficiency driver” 
indicates that 
“Reducing GHG forms part of the risks profile of all new projects exceeding R150 million and 
influences final investment decisions.........for the last two years, we have been using a carbon 
calculator to assess the GHG footprint of all new projects. This enables project teams to factor the 
cost of carbon into overall project costs” (Sasol, 2011).  
In addition, Unilever argues that “compiling a comprehensive GHG inventory improves our 
understanding of our emissions profile and the potential liability or exposure” (Unilever, 2011). For 
low energy intensive “emergent planners” such as Nedbank which emits minimal amounts of GHG 
emissions, accounting for their emissions had different benefits which include brand building, 
improved stakeholder and investor relations and costs savings (Burnet, interview). In the case of 
Unilever and Sasol which have complicated value chains, increased emissions in a value chain may 
increase costs or reduced sales. Therefore, it is important to measure even the indirect emissions.  
Despite the guidance of the GRI, evidence from the research indicates that it is not easy to produce 
good and reliable inventories.  The GHG accounting process for many companies has evolved over 
the years. For example, Nadine Watson from Illovo Sugar noted that 
“At first when we started measuring our GHG emissions using the Protocol it was not easy for our 
technical staff to adopt the methodology because  there was no understanding of the value of 
accounting for our emissions, so very few technical staff responsible with developing our GHG 
inventory took the initiative seriously. Getting to apply the methodology to our operations, employees 
and value chain was difficult. So, we had to hire external consultants who did not understand our 
operations to help us with the process. This shows you that developing a reliable GHG inventory takes 
years and years to achieve and it’s a complex process. Even up to today we are still learning and 
improving” (Watson, interview).  
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Furthermore, even though some multinationals and large national companies had their own GHG 
inventory initiatives it took time for the WBSCD/WRI GHG Protocol to filter through to many South 
African companies after the first GRI version was introduced in 2001. As highlighted above by Nadine 
Watson from Illovo Sugar many companies with regional operations had to filter through the 
methodology from the head office to their subsidiaries all over the country and the region. Standard 
Bank currently does not account for emissions from Stanlib which it has an equity share, which 
means Standard Bank does not have a complete account of its indirect scope 3 emissions. 
Furthermore, due to some of these complexities in accounting for the carbon footprint, a lot of 
companies still exclude some emissions within their operations. 
As a follow up to developing a GHG inventory, the responsive companies set emission reduction 
targets (see table 5.1). Even though the government has not set the emission targets for different 
industries, many respondents indicated that as part of South Africa’s contribution to the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations, the government is going to set GHG emission targets as part of its plans to 
have a green economy. According to Barnie Kgope from the National Business Initiative (NBI),  
“setting emission targets is a business practice that helps ensure an issue is kept on senior 
management’s “radar screen” and factored into relevant decisions about what products and services 
to provide and what technologies to use” (interview). As a company which is constantly under civil 
society pressure to be more responsive to climate change, Sasol has been proactive in setting and 
reporting its emissions targets. In 2008, Sasol’s GEC approved the company’s GHG policy and 
environmental roadmap for the next decade until 2018. The roadmap includes reducing the GHG 
emissions intensity of all its operations by 15% by 2020 on a 2005 baseline and to reduce their 
absolute GHG emissions by 20% for all Coal To Liquids (CTL) plants commissioned before 2020 and 
by 30% for plants commissioned before 2030. Whilst setting emission targets is a sign of 
commitment to reducing GHG emission, it is not an indication that the targets will be met. As in the 
case of Sasol, whilst they have a clear roadmap regarding their emission targets, they do not have a 
comprehensive strategy as yet to meet these targets. At present the company tasked the GEC 
subcommittee which is chaired by the CEO to develop a company-wide coordination review and 
planning mechanism to respond to climate change. 
Most large companies, particularly, those which have high carbon footprints face more pressure 
from NGOs and consumers to report extensively. Hence, companies such as Sasol, Unilever and PPC 
produce separate sustainability reports. These sustainability reports contain varying levels of detail 
on sustainability issues relevant to the company. Nadine Watson elaborated on Illovo’s reporting 
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strategy: “our report focuses exclusively on issues that are deemed material to the business and for 
which sufficient data is available across all Illovo operations” (Watson, interview). Sasol reports that 
they have been facing requests from stakeholders for more information on the nature and extent of 
their capital and operational expenditure on climate change. 
In addition to the significant increase in developing GHG inventories, adoption of GHG targets and 
improved climate change disclosure, there has been an accompanying increase in the level of 
emission reduction activities within the companies. However,” Sasol, PPC, Illovo and Unilever have 
extensive internal process improvement activities mainly focusing on energy consumption 
reductions. These internal process improvement activities are mostly based on the rules and 
guidelines from the Energy Efficiency Accord. At Illovo, a number of factories have adopted “green 
cane harvesting” which decreases agricultural emissions caused by the burning of sugar cane prior to 
harvesting. During the “green cane harvesting”, green biomass is stripped off the cane, either 
mechanically or by hand as an alternative to the traditional practice of burning. Trash removed from 
the cane is either left infield to render back into the soil, potentially improving soil moisture 
retention, nutrient levels and carbon sequestration or used as a renewable boiler fuel. Whilst the 
companies have been able to account for the cost and energy savings from these initiatives, they 
have not been able to account for the amount of GHG emissions reduced. Therefore, it is difficult to 
assess the value of these energy efficiency initiatives in contributing to climate change mitigation. 
For the low carbon intensive companies such as Nedbank and Standard Bank, process improvement 
entails the implementation of management programmes for energy conservation. This is often 
combined with programmes to increase staff awareness of energy conservation. However, the 
presence of low energy intensive activities means that their potential to mitigate climate change is 
more limited through internal strategies. This entails that low carbon emitters’ climate change 
strategies such as banks have more impact when they collaborate with external partners, for 
example through carbon trading and financing renewable energy projects.  
There is evidence that “laggards” such as Devra chemicals and Capitec bank have been implementing 
some process improvement initiatives. Devra Chemicals, a low carbon emitting manufacturing 
company has been installing lighting retrofits, smart energy meters, motion sensors, waste heat 
recovery systems and heat pumps. Capitec bank which has not been very proactive in developing 
climate change solutions revealed that they implement energy saving settings and remote shutdown 
of computers, lighting and temperature control. However, it is evident that these efforts by Capitec 
bank and Devra Chemicals are not intentional efforts to contribute to mitigation because firstly, the 
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companies do not measure their GHG emissions and secondly, they do not have any explicit climate 
change strategies. Instead, as noted by Devra Chemicals manager: “these are valuable and welcome 
cost saving measures to us as our energy bills come second in our cost expenditure after 
wages”(Marais, interview).  
It is also very evident that the majority of South African companies regardless of size and resources 
have some form of process improvement strategy, mainly energy efficiency, even though they did 
not result in significant emission reductions.  This is largely because many of these efforts do not 
require a lot of effort, time and resources or any significant organisational transformation. For 
example, installing equipment such as motion sensors, geysers and extraction fans can be done with 
existing assets with limited external assistance from consultants. These initiatives easily receive buy-
in within the company, even among individuals who would usually oppose them.  To support this 
argument, Dr Marco Lotz from Nedbank noted that:  
“When we carried out the first pilot project in 2007, the guys in finance who are usually resistant to 
these things welcomed it because it made sense financially. There was buy in from the general staff 
too because this was something which they understood easily and they were active participants” 
(Lotz, interview). 
Evidence from previous research indicates that with regard to climate change adaptation, companies 
normally engage in innovating new products and services as a first move towards internally 
responding to the effects of climate change (Ekvall, 1996). However, there is no clear evidence that 
the case study companies are engaging in this form of coping mechanism. . For example, PPC said 
there are certain forms of cement like limestone cement which release fewer emissions, but they 
are very expensive to produce, so there is no market for them at present. Instead, the company 
presently focuses on insuring themselves from any losses from climate change (Govender, 
interview). Therefore, climate friendly technologies will only become a success when the companies 
posses capabilities to bring these technologies to the market in the form of products and services in 
a cost effective manner. In addition, Sasol noted that it is difficult for the company to promptly 
change its manufacturing process which has been financially viable for decades and innovate new 
climate change friendly products because “innovation depends strongly on long term investments in 
research and development (R&D), a process where the outcome is always uncertain....for us to 
innovate means we have to develop new capabilities and technologies other than the ones which we 
have” (Goede, interview). 
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Regardless of the above mentioned challenges, energy intensive companies will continue to receive 
pressure to innovate and adapt to climate change because they possess the key to finding 
technological solutions. “For these companies, the question is, are they willing to do something? And 
how far are they willing to move away from their current technologies?”(Roberts, interview).  As a 
first step to adapt to climate change, Sasol invested over R1 billion in R&D in 2011 for its Sasol New 
Energy Unit to research and develop improved renewable energy and other low carbon ventures. 
New projects from the Unit include generating electricity from natural gas in South Africa and 
Mozambique. The company has also been able to advance its knowledge with respect to carbon 
capture and storage as well as underground coal gasification through its partnership with the 
European CO2 Technology Centre Mongstad in Norway. Sasol also partnered with the Bright Source 
Energy Inc., to advance concentrated solar power technology in South Africa. To show their 
commitment to adaptation Sasol said that “we are committed to using our proven skills particularly 
in technology innovation and commercialisation, to contribute to find solutions to this challenge of 
climate change” (Sasol, 2012). 
5.1.2. Collective   self- regulation  
 
In addition to self-regulation at the company level, many of the case study companies participate in 
transnational collaborations which often spill over to the national level and at times the supply 
chain. An example is the Carbon Disclosure Supply Chain program which Unilever is a member. The 
initiative “is designed to promote information sharing and innovation between CDP Supply Chain 
members” (CDP, 2013). Through this network companies can share information on how to 
implement successful supplier engagement strategies and reduce supply chain emissions. Even 
though the program does not have codes of conduct, it provides a platform for companies to share 
innovative strategies. According to the CDP Supply chain report there remains a significant gap in 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions between multinational corporations and their suppliers. Whilst 
Unilever has sophisticated management systems to manage their climate change risks their suppliers 
are smaller and less mature. Therefore, through the information sharing platform, Unilever has been 
able to develop a Supplier Code which defines the company’s responsible sourcing requirements 
which include climate change. 
Within the banking sector, Nedbank and Standard Bank have been signatories of the Equator 
Principles which are facilitated by the World Bank. Whilst the banking and finance sector do not 
contribute to any significant GHG emissions, they have faced extensive criticism regarding their 
financing of polluting industries (Tristen Taylor, Earthlife Africa project coordinator; interview). The 
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Equator Principles illustrates a form of collective response by multinational banks. The Equator 
Principles “is a risk management framework adopted by financial institutions, for determining and 
managing environmental and social risks in projects and is primarily intended to provide a minimum 
standard for due diligence to support responsible risk decision making” (UNEP, 2011). The principles 
apply to four financial products: project finance and advisory services; project finance; project 
related corporate loans and bridge loans.  As voluntary members of the Equator principles, Nedbank 
and Standard Bank commit to implement the principles in their internal policies, procedures and 
standards for financing projects and not to provide project finance to projects where the client will 
not or is unable to comply with the principles. Even though the initiative is voluntary and has no 
penalties for non-compliance, there is a steering committee and working groups which provide 
support and training to other financial institutions which join the initiative. More so, the Principles 
have no formal mechanisms to screen or monitor the corporate practices of the members which 
implies that Equator banks gain some reputational benefits irrespective of their actual practices. 
Nonetheless, Standard Bank indicated that it had benefited from Equator Principles and is putting 
into practice many of the principles: 
“with guidance from the principles we have been able to develop the Environmental and 
Social Appraisal System which provides a risk management measure to protect against 
possible financial, credit, reputational, regulatory and operational risks and links directly with 
the lender liability associated with environmental and social mismanagement. The system is 
designed to identify the risks associated with a client’s ability to manage environmental 
issues. This assessment is used as input into the credit granting process. During 2011, 
approximately 245 employees across the Group were trained on the use and application of 
the new Environmental and Social Appraisal System. These employees include the credit risk 
officers, legal and compliance officers”. The Equator Principles Performance Assessment tools 
are applied to all project finance loans of R10 million (US$ 1.3million) or more. All category A 
(high risk) and were relevant Category B (medium risk) projects financed are monitored to 
ensure that the project specific conditions set as part of the loan agreement are adhered to. 
In 2011, the bank financed nine Equator Principle projects and played an advisory role in a 
further 20 projects” (Standard Bank, 2012). 
In addition to the CDP Supply Chain program and the Equator Principles, there are other global 
collective self regulative initiatives which are not sector-specific. These global multi-stakeholder 
collective initiatives usually spill over to the national level. The Global Reporting Initiative and 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) illustrate these partnerships. Illovo Sugar’s Nadine Watson said that 
“these initiatives are of value to us because it improves the accuracy, transparency, relevance and 
consistency of our GHG reporting” (Watson, interview). 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard Initiative is a 
multi-stakeholder partnership of businesses, NGOs, governments and others convened by the World 
107 
 
Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and World Resource Institute (WRI) with the 
aim of “developing internationally accepted GHG accounting and reporting standards and/or 
protocols and to promote their broad adoption” (WBCSD and WRI, 2004). The Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) requests listed companies to respond to a questionnaire on climate change risks and 
opportunities and their strategies to respond to these issues. Even though the GRI and the CDP are 
voluntary initiatives, there are organisational bodies which have the responsibility to develop the 
guidelines on how the listed companies should report their GHG emissions and their responses. In 
the case of the GRI, the WBCSD and the WRI develops these reporting guidelines with contributions 
from business, civic society and academia. 
 In response, companies implement these reporting guidelines without any threat of penalties. 
However, the effect of these reporting standards have spilled over to the national level through 
reporting awards which tend to put pressure on companies. Hence, the effect of the rankings on 
companies’ reputation will compel them to fully implement the reporting guidelines. According to 
Nicola Robins from Incite, “South African companies love be ranked, so they will do anything to 
improve their rankings” (interview). The most prominent reporting awards are the Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) and the Ernest and Young sustainability reporting awards. 
Furthermore, every year SustainAbility and UNEP undertake an assessment and ranking of 
sustainability reports. Standard Bank, Nedbank and several mining companies have featured 
prominently on top of these rankings over the past few years. Due to the continuous high rankings 
of Nedbank, the bank has carved an image as “South Africa’s green bank”. Despite the impact of the 
rankings on companies’ reputation they have been criticised: 
 “perhaps unsurprisingly, public opinion does not tally with opinions of the experts. The latest 
Markinor Top Brands Survey asked 3,488 respondents in both rural and urban areas, “which 
companies they thought has done most for community upliftment”. Their answer? Cocal Cola and 
Nike hands down. While community upliftment is not a direct substitute for sustainability, the 
findings of this survey tell us of two important things: firstly, who South Africans think are the good 
guys and secondly, that there is a confusion between companies’ philanthropic gestures and the 
social contribution of its core business activities—a dangerous misunderstanding that arguably still 
persists among a number of current leaders in the business community. The danger of these ratings 
systems is that they often reward those companies who have adopted a compliance mindset, rather 
than the challenging mavericks and innovators who challenge the current business models” (John 
Hanks, interview) 
To support Hanks’ assessment, there are many companies who just ticked boxes to ensure their 
listing on the JSE SRI, failing to recognise opportunities for value creation associated with the 
sustainability agenda. Furthermore, most of these companies operate within the constraints of 
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publicly listed companies where the pressure for short term results may impede the delivery of more 
innovative longer term performance. 
It is evident from the research that there are more collective private sector initiatives at the global 
level as compared to the national level. This illustrates the more prominent role of multinationals in 
contributing to climate change governance than locally based companies. Valerie Green, from NBI 
indicated that “unlike local companies, multinationals have a history in responding to sustainability 
issues. This history has allowed them to experiment and identify solutions which work....obviously 
we can’t ignore the fact that multinationals face more institutional pressure than local companies 
and they have more resources” (interview). In some cases multinational and large companies serve 
as models to smaller firms, for example on reporting and GHG accounting. However, some of the 
institutionalised programs such as the CDP do not integrate smaller firms outside the JSE top 100. 
Therefore, non-listed firms will continue to be marginalised in these collective self-regulatory 
initiatives.  
 At the national level, the variation in these climate change governance contributions is also sectoral. 
Whilst Unilever significantly contributes to climate change governance much of the food and drink 
manufacturing sector’s collective self-regulation is fragmented. In addition to the less cohesive 
nature of the sector as a result of several sub-sectors, the industry also has weak and fragmented 
institutions (Hönke  et al, 2009). For example, there is no recognisable business association in the 
industry which can influence the companies at the national level to contribute to climate change 
governance. More so, the competitive nature of the food and drink manufacturing sector which 
leads to fear of free-riding discourages companies in the sector from collectively contributing to 
climate change governance .The increased fears of free-riding are higher in the sector because 
regulations are poorly enforced. 
“Many environmental regulations and agreements are poorly enforced and the individual liabilities 
are imprecisely defined. The detection and prosecution of offenders is expensive and never adequate. 
So some companies will choose to wait and free-ride on others. As a market leader that is why we are 
always hesitant to collectively respond to social and environmental issues with our competitors” 
(Rohitesh, interview). 
At the local level, another form of collective self-regulation which is prominent in climate change 
governance in South Africa is partnerships between business and civil society and academia. These 
partnerships are evident in all the sectors. However, as the case with other forms of self-regulation 
discussed above, smaller companies are not very much involved in these partnerships. One of the 
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most prominent private-NGO partnerships in the country is the WWF-Nedbank Green Trust 
partnership which was formed in 1991.Through the partnership Nedbank provides funding to 
conservation projects which are managed by WWF-SA.  Examples of these projects include the 
National  Climate Change Policy and Outreach project which makes input  to government policy and 
programmes by engaging constituents’ such as  local communities which are rarely consulted in 
policy formulation.  Another project linked to climate change adaptation is the Sustainable Fruit 
Initiative which aims to develop guidelines and best practice for sustainable farming within the fruit 
sector in Western Cape.  Since Nedbank is not involved in the rule setting and implementation of the 
projects, this Green Trust partnership  mainly serves to enhance Nedbank’s reputation: This is 
illustrated in Nedbank’s focus on their marketing philosophy: “Our commitment to the environment 
and sustainable conservation forms part of of the bank’s broad holistic marketing philosophy” 
(Nedbank, 2011). Through its partnerships with business, WWF aims to assist companies in changing 
how their products and services are used and consumed in a way that supports the ecosystem 
(Mthembu, interview).  
In fact, most of the partnerships with NGOs involving the case study companies were CSRI projects in 
which the company provided funding (one way charitable giving) and the NGO implemented the 
project. Even though some of these CSI projects contribute to the governance of public goods such 
as sustainable access to water and biodiversity conservation; they are driven by need to gain 
legitimacy and enhance corporate reputation (Earth Africa, 2011). However, Unilever’s collaboration 
with Oxfam resembles some form of transactional partnership (two way exchange of resources) in 
which they worked together to improve the sustainability of Unilever’s supply chain (mainly the 
smallholder farmers). Through the Sunrise partnership with Oxfam, Unilever developed livelihood 
assessment methodologies which are “simple, quick and affordable” to assist communal farmers in 
Kwazulu Natal to adapt to extreme weather events which could be linked to climate change. 
Through this partnership they have expanded their initial programme by engaging with a number of 
smallholder farmer programmes which are run by Unilever’s suppliers. According to Unilever CEO, 
Paul Polman “the aim of this partnership is to develop clear blueprints for inclusive business models 
which deliver both commercial success and help improve social, environmental and economic 
conditions”. Barbra Stockings from Oxfam also commented about the partnership: 
“Historically, companies in the food and drink sector have tried to improve efficiency and minimise 
costs by simplifying and standardising their international supply bases.....Our ongoing work with 
Unilever shows that business is starting to consider how they source their produce to have an impact 
on their lives of people living in poverty. New ethical business models which incorporate marginalised 
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farmers are an exciting step forward and a solution to that can bring business benefits too. Unilever is 
among the first global food manufactures to make a commitment to that scale” (Barbara Stocking, 
Oxfam CEO).  
 
In addition to this the private sector is also partnering with academic institutions to provide a 
platform to develop technologies which contribute to mitigating or adapting to climate change. The 
technological cooperation allows for the generation of new innovations which increase the 
effectiveness of climate change governance. Sasol’s partnership with the University of Stellenbosch 
in renewable energy research and University of Pretoria on the performance of synthetic diesel fuels 
illustrates this form of cooperation. ‘Through this collaboration universities will be able to leverage 
Sasol’s research resources, while Sasol will be able to complement their own research efforts and 
capabilities by leveraging academic excellence to assist with the effective execution” (Sasol, 2011).  
5.1.3. Co-regulation 
 
At the global level, the trend has been that of corporations reacting to new stakeholder demands, 
particularly increased regulations. However, in emerging economies such as South Africa which has 
low levels of statehood, the challenge has been on who should design and monitor such regulations, 
particularly, for a complex problem such as climate change. Instead of seeking to regulate and 
monitor multinationals, international regulatory bodies, mostly the United Nations has been a 
driving agent in engaging multinationals at the global level in rule setting and implementation. This 
engagement has extended to climate change. In the context of this research, the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and Standard Bank launched the Africa Carbon Asset Development 
(ACAD) facility to stimulate the growth of Africa’s carbon markets through investor outreach and 
seed capital. In this partnership the UN is no longer performing the task of a regulator but they are 
best described as “brokers between regulatory and self- regulatory initiatives”. This means that 
UNEP and Standard Bank have shared governance responsibilities designing and implementing 
ACAD. The partnership brings together UNEP’s long standing capacity building expertise in 
environmental policy and finance and the financial know-how and regional reach of Standard Bank. 
According to Geoff Sinclair, head of Carbon Sales and Trading at Standard Bank, “Standard Bank 
believes that it has a duty and an interest to build the carbon market in Africa. We are committed to 
growing carbon literacy amongst bank managers and credit officers not only in our own 
organization, but in other banks across the continent” (interview).  
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The Africa Carbon Development Facility does not have a legal framework with explicit sanctions in 
the event that Standard Bank does not commit to its responsibilities of training and supporting 
project owners and developers. Instead of issuing strict sanctions, the initiative depends upon 
“commitment, credibility and visibility” (Sinclair, interview). In this sense this governance framework 
is similar to the Global Compact which Sasol, Nedbank, Standard Bank, Unilever and PPC are 
signatories. Whilst the Global Compact is not explicitly linked to climate change, the environmental 
principles are broad enough to respond to some climate change issues. The Global Compact is 
framed in such a flexible way that allows companies to implement the principles in a way that suites 
them.  The initiative is built on a set of principles based on international declarations and 
agreements for the voluntary members of the Compact to follow. Even though the initiative has 
been labelled “green washing”, it still gains some form of credibility through its global linkages to 
other regulatory systems and its global reach and moral authority of the UN (Jacobsson and Sahlin-
Anderson, 2002).  
At the national level, the Energy Efficiency Accord (EEA) has been the most visible co-regulatory 
governance framework to tackle climate change.  Spearheaded by the National Business Initiative 
(NBI), the accord is a voluntary agreement between business and in cooperation with the 
Department of Energy setting targets to reduce energy consumption. Coal accounts for 77% of all 
the energy sources in South Africa, with a significant amount being channelled to Sasol’s synthetic 
and petrochemicals operations and other energy intensive industries which consume over 40% of 
energy produced in the country (Harold Winkler, interview). This means that the energy intensive 
sectors are a major source of GHG emissions. Thus, the EEA can directly contribute to the mitigation 
of climate change. Many of the energy efficiency measures are firm-internal activities; however, 
their effects regarding reducing the negative externalities caused by the GHG emissions go beyond 
the firm’s boundaries. 
The government and business have a shared responsibility in setting and implementing the rules of 
Accord, with the NBI having the main responsibility to monitor the implementation. To support the 
implementation a Technical Committee was founded to coordinate the functionality of the accord 
regarding sharing ideas, peer support and networks. Even though there is no direct engagement 
between companies in the accord, the sharing of information through the Committee allows for 
companies to learn new skills and acquire tacit knowledge. The EEA mainly responds to the Energy 
Efficiency Strategy of the country which targets a reduction of energy demand whilst still 
emphasizing economic growth. To contribute to reaching this goal the EEA was initiated to facilitate 
reaching the national goals by committing to implement energy efficiency measures which would 
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result in a 15% reduction in energy demand by 2015 (DME, 2005). Currently there are 42 signatory 
companies, eight business associations. 
Even though the EEA contributes to climate change mitigation, the intentionality of the companies 
to contribute to climate change governance cannot be ascertained. Evidence from the respondents 
indicates that most companies joined the EEA due to the “shadow of anarchy”. The shadow of 
anarchy is linked to energy security. The increased demand for energy linked to economic growth in 
the past decade and Eskom’s inability to expand its grid resulted in unstable energy supplies.  This 
was experienced in 2007 and 2008 when Eskom introduced scheduled blackouts to stabilise the grid. 
This affected operations and hampered planning for a lot companies. For example Sasol, “During the 
blackout Eskom notified us to reduce our consumption of all a sudden by 10%. Even though we 
produce more than 30% of our electricity requirements this announcement affected our normal 
production at our synthetic fuels plants” (Goude, interview). Furthermore, there was a perception 
which still exists regarding the capabilities of the government and Eskom to supply adequate stable 
electricity in the short to medium term. “Our electricity system is running with almost no 
reserves...and we continue to hear that the completion of just the first unit of the Medupi power 
station in Limpopo is going to be delayed” (Dambudzo, interview). Hence, members of the accord 
see a connection between the energy insecurity and their own energy efficiency activities and EEA 
membership (Green, interview).  
At the local level, a number of multi-stakeholder climate change initiatives exists which are initiated 
by companies or government in partnership with civic society to tackle collective action problems. 
Sasol has increasingly engaged in multi-stakeholder initiatives to address water governance issues at 
the sub-national level. The company is involved in the South African Department of Water Affairs 
Sector Leadership Group (WSLG) and catchment initiatives as the Vaal River Strategy Steering 
Committee. These governance functions are mainly aimed at contributing to adaptation. Water is a 
particularly important resource for Sasol and many manufacturing companies and limited water 
resources will directly affect their operations. This is illustrated by Lean Strauss’s comments:  
“there is a general agreement that the overall trend, featuring high temperatures and evaporation 
points to a net reduction in available water resources which could cripple our operations because our 
refining and chemical manufacturing processes require water primarily to regulate temperatures and 
generate steam........we are also aware of the responsibility that comes with being a large industrial 
water user, particularly in South Africa where our largest operations are situated....we recognise  the 
challenging regulatory and voluntary commitment landscape ahead of us and have made the 
113 
 
management of water a strategic priority” (New Business Development & Technology head, Sasol, 
email communication). 
The Water Sector Leadership group represents a collective action initiative featuring water sector 
institutions and experts. One of its main objectives include “identifying planning tools, frameworks 
and platforms for key water use sectors and how water is factored into their sector plans 
(Department of Water, 2009). The Vaal River Strategy Steering Committee is responsible for 
managing the Vaal catchment. These shared responsibilities include monitoring and information 
sharing as well as joint planning activities. These collective governance initiatives are effective in 
managing common pool resources such as water because there are numerous stakeholders who rely 
on it. Many of the stakeholders using the common pool resource are “self seeking” and will aim to 
exploit the resource to their benefit. This is illustrated in Lean Strauss’s comments: “There is always 
competition for water. 40% of water from the Vaal river is used by the farmers who are upstream. 
We knew that if we did not engage them through this partnership our operations were going to be 
affected in the long term”(email communication). Therefore, even though the Department of Water 
Affairs has the power to cast a shadow of hierarchy through the regulations, it is unlikely to 
effectively govern the water resources without the collective input of all the interested stakeholders. 
More so, “the government, in particular the municipalities, acting alone cannot easily allocate and 
regulate water in a catchment as big as the Vaal as they are unlikely to appreciate local interests or 
priorities.” (Director, Pegasys Consulting, interview). 
 
 
5.1.4. Political activities to influence and shape policy 
 
Very often the private sector always prefers self regulation with regards to their contributions to 
climate change governance. However, as climate change has become an important public policy 
issue, the private sector particularly the carbon intensive sectors have been heavily involved in 
initiatives to design policy because they are affected by these regulations. At the global level 
multinationals have participated in public forums in formulating the post 2012 Kyoto Protocol 
direction. Since the private sector is going to be directly affected by government commitments to 
emission reduction targets, they feel the need to participate in these public policy forums.  
Furthermore, private sector participation in the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms (Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation) have been able to able to deliver over US$ 60 billion in 
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financial flow to developing countries. With the European Commission estimating that financial 
requirements for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries could reach US$ 130 billion, the 
private sector is required to play a much greater role in developing the policy (EC, 2011). As part of 
their contribution to the Kyoto Protocol Sasol and Eskom were included in the South Africa 
negotiation delegation at the Conference of Parties (COP) 17 Durban conference in 2011. According 
to Sasol’s general manager for communications “the inclusion of a Sasol representative selected by 
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) is meant to ensure that technical experts were on the panel to 
represent the interests of business”. These arrangements tend to give the private sector more 
influence as they receive more details of the negotiations. As a result, criticisms were leveled against 
the inclusion of Sasol and Eskom in the negotiation team because of suspicions that they will not act 
in the state’s interests. An NGO representative is quoted as saying that “there is a gigantic potential 
conflict of interest…Sasol needs to be removed the delegation to ensure that public servants and not 
corporate interests represent South Africa and its people” (Lekalala, Earthlife, 2011). 
In addition to this, Sasol and Unilever have been part of business proposals which are aimed at 
influencing the outcome of negotiations. These multinationals are part of the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Climate Change. The Council indicates that “they have explored 
options for a successful framework for low-carbon, resource-efficient growth, taking into account 
the current economic and political landscape, and identified key enabling elements of action. The 
council proposed a series of specific initiatives and actions that should be implemented at the 
international negotiations”.  Since over 1000 companies and senior political figures attend the World 
Economic Forum annually, the proposals and resolutions of the forum are given serious 
consideration when agreeing international treaties. These proposals or memorandum of 
understandings often lead to the adoption of rules that guide certain aspects of the behavior of the 
parties of the relevant agreement (Lin and Streck, 2009). Multinationals usually participate in these 
public forums alienating companies which do not have global operations. As a result, smaller 
companies do not participate in shaping the international climate change policy. 
At the global and national level business firms have been involved in the development of standards 
and codes of conduct that are increasingly incorporated into law. In the context of the Clean 
Development Mechanism CDM), Sasol and Standard bank which have nitrous oxide abatement and 
solid waste CDM projects, respectively have developed methodologies that guide the calculation of 
GHG emission reductions. As result, these methodologies have become standards and are freely 
available for use by other entities that developing comparable project activity.  
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Whilst companies, mostly the energy intensive sectors (heavy industrial) are involved in climate 
change public policy formulation through different platforms or forums, they rarely actively seek 
state regulation. In fact, at the national level the large energy intensive sectors (Sasol, PPC) often 
focus on political activities to influence the policy direction. This normally involves advocating for 
less regulation. With the emergence of the National Climate Change Response strategy Policy and 
the carbon tax energy intensive companies which include Sasol and Pretoria Portland Cement have 
formed platforms to influence climate change policies. The Energy Intensive User Group (EIUG) 
which represents 32 companies that account for about 44% of all the electricity energy generated in 
South Africa was formed in 1999 “to engage with Government, Eskom, NERSA, organised business 
and other stakeholders to ensure rational, reasonable and economically sound solutions based on 
quantifiable facts”(IEUG, 2012). The Group provides a forum for external advocacy with stakeholder 
“including local and national government, the Regulator and other political and technical bodies by 
clarifying issues, lending support, expertise and capacity where required, thereby ensuring clarity of 
response and effective lobbying” (IEUG, 2012). 
When the Treasury released the white paper on carbon tax in South Africa, the EIUG responded to 
the paper criticising the tax. The carbon policy imposes a tax on emissions calculated at R75 a tonne 
of carbon dioxide, eventually rising to about R200 a tonne (SA Treasury, 2011). Based on Deloitte 
consulting firm’s calculations, the costs as a result of the carbon tax to Sasol would be R9.9billion. In 
its response, the EIUG argued that “The paper on carbon tax is considered too theoretical and does 
not take sufficient cognizance of South African circumstances to balance the need to reduce 
greenhouse gasses while keeping the economy on a job creating path. Rather it focused on 
generating tax revenue with potentially negative implications for the country” (Robertson, 2011). 
According to Shaun Nel spokesperson of the EIUG “carbon tax is going to make electricity more 
expensive and put as many as 700 000 jobs at risk” (interview). As a policy which is going to affect 
companies from different sectors, the carbon tax policy paper also received responses from various 
sections of the business sector. For example, Standard Bank’s Nigel Beck criticised the tax as a 
“revenue generating mechanism for the government........carbon tax should be used to develop 
green energy and tackle climate change” (interview). 
In addition to the EIUG, in 2010, the high carbon emitters also set up the Industry Task Team on 
Climate Change (ITTCC) to “influence the development of economically and environmentally 
effective and sustainable policies to address the needs of both the environment and South African 
industry” (ITTCC, 2010). The initial task of the ITTCC was to respond to concerns by industry on the 
National Climate Change Response Policy. According to the ITTCC website at this stage South Africa 
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still lacks a comprehensive understanding of its abatement and mitigation potential, associated costs 
and impacts (see box 5.2). With this in mind, the “ITTCC facilitates technical work in order to build a 
fact-based repository of current and robust information, which is shared with other industry and 
business groups and the relevant government departments to illustrate the art of the possible and 
inform government policy” (ITTCC, 2012). Whilst their motives are clearly unknown, it seems that 
the high carbon emitters are engaging the policy makers and other stakeholders to ensure there is a 
balance between the need to respond to climate change and reduce GHG emissions, with minimizing 
the economic consequences of actions and the associated social consequences such as job losses. 
However, it is very apparent based on the actions and public engagements of the civil society that 
there is a deep mistrust about the intentions and commitments of energy intensive companies to 
tackle climate change. This is illustrated by a comment by Makoma Lekalakala from Earthlife Africa 
Johannesburg: 
“Despite releasing 21% of South Africa’s GHG emissions per year, they want to increase GHG emissions rather 
than decrease. Instead of investing in renewable energy, they are investing in Carbon Capture and Storage which 
does not provide a long term solution GHG emissions as it creates a false belief of CO2 out of sight of 
mind.Sasol’s marketing and distribution budget was R6.931 billion and GHG management was a mere R60 
million”(interview).  
As a result civil society has continually put pressure and exposed big emitters such as Sasol, for 
example; in 2009 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg organised a “climate change hearing” at the Sasol 
Rosebank headquarters to “charge and prosecute Sasol for contributing to climate change”.   
As the second largest GHG emitter in the country and an important source of employment and 
economic growth, Sasol has had opportunities to directly engage and persuade policy makers on the 
issue of climate change.  In 2011, the company carried out a presentation to a parliamentary 
portfolio committee in response to the National Climate Change Response white paper which was 
later adopted as policy by government. As part of their main concerns Sasol argued that “the 
implementation of a carbon budget and carbon tax will require close policy coordination. This is 
presently not apparent in the White Paper or any other documentation” (Sasol, 2011). The company 
also argued that the climate change policy was an impediment to economic growth in South Africa. 
Together with the Chamber of Mines, Sasol and EIUG have been pressuring the government not to 
include any reduction targets until its implications were clarified. Despite their efforts, the 
government was adamant and implemented the climate change policy in December 2011. 
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     Source: ITTCC website (2012) 
 
At the COP17 climate change conference in 2011 in South Africa, a significant number of South 
African companies (both energy intensive and less energy intensive) were very active in the policy 
discussions to ensure favourable outcomes. On top of this, this was a great opportunity for the 
companies to burnish their climate change reputations. Standard Bank, for example, hosted a 
number of technical side events,  “enabling government negotiations and technical specialists to 
engage around topical issues, such as funding lower carbon growth in Africa, advanced mechanism 
to combat Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) and the African Carbon Asset Development 
Facility” (Standard Bank, 2011). The COP17 also proved to be a useful platform for Standard Bank to 
further develop relationships and influence policy through their memberships to organisations such 
as the Carbon Markets and Investor Association, IETA and UNEP FI. 
Box 5.1: Activities by the ITTCC to influence climate change policy in South Africa 
The ITTCC has submitted responses to the following discussion papers and proposed policies 
 National Climate Change Response Policy Green Paper (2010) 
 Draft National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011) 
 Defining South Africa’s DESIRED: Peak, Plateau & Decline (PPD) GHG Emission Trajectory (2011) 
 Draft MoU on Carbon Budget (2011) 
 ITTCC Letter to DDG National Treasury SA Carbon Options (2011) 
 ITTCC Comment on Carbon Tax Proposals (2011) 
 ITTCC Comment on Started Document for Grouping of Sectors for Carbon Budgets (2012) 
In addition to this the ITTCC has commissioned the following studies: 
 The Economic Impact of Electricity Prices and a Carbon Tax on Industry (2011) 
 Alternative Carbon Pricing Options Study (2011) 
 Assessment of a likely Carbon Tax Structure for South Africa (2011) 
 Assessment of International Carbon Tax regimes (2011) 
 Assessment of National Treasury’s SAGE Economic Model (2011) 
The ITTCC has also participated in numerous projects including the following: 
 The ITTCC is working with Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) Task team on climate change to 
give input to the Department of Environmental Affairs project plan for the Carbon Budgeting 
Process. 
 The Emission Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) Industry Study 
 Implicit Carbon Tax Study 
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5.2 Motivations and constraints to the climate change governance 
options 
5.2.1. Motivations to self-regulation 
 
As highlighted in section 5.1.1, most firms’ internal climate change contributions are a response to 
the set rules and guidelines from collective self regulatory initiatives such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative, the Carbon Disclosure Project and the Energy Efficiency Accord. With regard to mitigation, 
these internal contributions focus on GHG accounting, reporting and process improvement, whilst 
the adaptation efforts focus on coping mechanisms.  Companies engage in these internal initiatives 
primarily because they require less effort and time to implement. The activities are often ad hoc and 
rely on existing assets and capabilities (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). With the exception of Unilever’s 
Sustainable Living Plan, none of the companies made substantial adjustments to their business 
models to adapt to climate change.  This is because these adjustments and at times transformations 
require the firm to engage in ecological learning and planning which involve changes in behavior, 
values and practices.   
Besides the fact that the mitigation and adaptive coping mechanisms require less time and effort, 
companies also engaged in these self-regulatory efforts due to economic incentives. Most 
respondents emphasized that the efficiency gains achieved through process improvement reduced 
their operational costs. Management literature argues that such operational cost reductions can 
increase a company’s market value and competitiveness (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; 
Ammenberg and Hjelm, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002). The shadow of anarchy linked to energy 
security provides the companies the main motivation to become energy efficient. For energy 
intensive companies such as Sasol and Pretoria Portland Cement, the importance of energy security 
is even more evident. These companies rely on a stable supply of energy; hence, the black-outs in 
2007 and 2008 severely affected the companies’ operations. With the current delays in completion 
of Eskom’s Medupi power station and other projects, the future supply of energy for these 
companies remains uncertain. This uncertainty creates challenges for on-going production and slows 
downs adequate planning even for companies which are not in the energy intensive sectors.  
Furthermore, the electricity tariffs have increased by an average of 25% since 2011 which has a 
direct impact on the companies’ operational costs. Therefore, the internal energy efficiency 
activities are seen as a measure to become less dependent on the energy volatility.  
119 
 
Reputation was one of the main motivation drivers for companies’ commitment to the internal 
initiatives such as GHG emission accounting, sustainability reporting and process improvement. This 
was a particularly prominent driver for large companies (Nedbank; Standard Bank; Unilever; Illovo 
Sugar; Sasol and PPC) which were more visible to society and at risk to more civil society pressure.  
Nonetheless, even smaller companies such as Capitec and Orley Foods saw the reputational benefits 
of “being seen to do something which improves the socio-economic and environmental aspects of 
society” (interview). Since climate change is a topic of public discourse in South Africa, the public 
regard energy efficiency and GHG accounting as positive corporate behavior. Sustainability reporting 
among South African companies them to communicate their activities and if required motivate for 
some of the activities (for example, Standard Bank’s motivation to finance Eskom’s coal powered 
stations)7. For companies which are in direct contact with consumers such as banking, inactivity on 
climate change might directly affect their bottom line.  Hence, the relation between reputation and 
economic costs is explicit and motivates public presentation of behavior that is socially considered as 
appropriate. For Sasol, a multinational which is carbon intensive and continually faces NGO pressure, 
the reputational and legitimacy concerns are critical to the company. For example, in 2009 Sasol’s 
nitrous oxide CDM project at Secunda was rejected by the UNFCC methodologies panel partly 
because of the vociferous opposition from NGO Earthlife Africa. Earthlife submitted public 
comments against Sasol accreditation arguing that the “compulsory elements of additionality 
(proving that without carbon funding from the CDM, the project would not be viable) were not 
evident in the project” (Christy van der Merwe, Engineering News).  
More so, it was evident that Capitec bank was considering energy efficiency initiatives by mimicking 
other companies upon realising the reputational effects associated with contributing to climate 
change governance. “Look at Nedbank, they are generally considered a green bank, whether they 
are walking the talk or not, they have benefitted tremendously. Customers, particularly the middle 
class tend to be socially conscious at times, so they will support companies they consider to be 
green. That’s an area which we exploit to see if we can attract those clients” (Capitec marketing 
executive, interview). 
                                                          
7 According Karin Ireton, sustainability manager at Standard Bank, “energy is critical and because of this it would not be 
possible for South Africa or any other developing country to immediately stop using coal fired power 
generation”(interview). 
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Furthermore, Unilever has been able to make substantial adjustments which enable them to make 
progress in adapting to climate change mainly because of their existing capabilities as well as the 
flexibility in developing new products. The company has displayed an important capability to learn 
how climate change affects its operations. As highlighted in section 5.1, through their life cycle 
analysis, the company now has knowledge that their main source of emission is at the end of the 
value chain with their customers. The company’s high level embeddedness within the supply chain 
influence the extent to which the company understands and learns from its ecological problems 
whilst accessing the local knowledge networks.  This means they can successfully design processes, 
products and services which are pertinent to the organisation and its supply chain. On other hand, 
other smaller companies such as Orley Foods do not have the resources and capabilities to embed 
with the supply chain which allows them to recognise and interpret ecological information. 
According to Rohitesh from KPMG “ the inability of these small companies to scale down climate 
change from a global problem to an organisational problem which they can understand, monitor and 
provide evidence of potential cost savings means they are unlikely to have buy-in from the finance 
guys and the shareholders if they want to implement any climate change strategies” (interview). 
Unilever’s climate change strategies should also be viewed in the context of its long standing 
commitment to socialized norms such as sustainability. This is mostly expressed through its 
Sustainable Living Plan (SLP). The SLP is more than a business plan as it allows for the 
institutionalization of sustainability as a core value, not only by setting specific targets, but also by 
creating the necessary capacity to achieve these targets. Unlike many companies, Unilever has 
committed a lot of human resources and developed tacit skills towards climate change which 
enables them to continually improve and innovate. The absence of such resources has undermined 
PPC’s ability to continually improve their process efficiency initiatives. The company was able to 
reduce emissions and energy consumption easily at the beginning but it became more difficult to 
achieve additional reductions as that required more significant changes in the processes which 
highly depend on the availability of tacit knowledge and human resources. The company was able 
reach its target of reducing energy consumption by 20% in 2005 but is currently still to meet its 10 % 
energy efficiency targets by 2015. 
The values espoused by Unilever through the SLP are also driven by the leadership and culture 
within the organisation.  Such leadership and culture has also been instrumental in driving 
Nedbank’s broader sustainability drive. The vision and commitment of top management has played a 
critical role in driving Unilever and Nedbank’s climate change strategies in particular. The top 
management set the strategy of the company and embodies its culture. Hence, if the senior leaders 
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at Unilever did not support the Sustainable Living Plan, then it was likely to fail. At Nedbank this 
perceived corporate commitment to sustainability has also positively affected how top management 
and supervisors interact with employees to elicit ecological behaviour. Furthermore, the 
commitment of the CEO has been complemented by the finance department because there have 
been instances were sustainability initiatives have been undermined by lack of funding.  
On the contrary, public statements in opposition to the new climate change policy and carbon tax by 
Sasol and PPC’s leadership created a perception internally and externally that the companies are not 
committed to tackling climate change. There is still a set of individual and organisational biases in 
some companies that operate to maintain current behaviours that do not support sustainability 
(Hoffman, 2010). Whilst there have been notable improvements, this has been prevalent among 
corporate leaders in the banking and financial sector; real estate and food products in South Africa 
(CDP, 2011). Firstly, these corporate leaders together with their employees lack the literacy 
regarding climate, for example, KPMG consultant revealed that they did a survey among the top 
management of their clients on sustainability issues and they found that over 56% of the 
respondents did not clearly understand the causes of climate change. Many of these managers did 
not see the economic aspects of environmental issues. “These individuals often resisted climate 
science as counter-intuitive and contrary to taken for granted assumptions” (Rohitesh, interview). To 
add to that, “many of the 56% in the survey are the same people that believed that what is good for 
the environment is bad for the economy or if you protect the environment it must be bad for 
economic competitiveness of the firm”(Daya, interview). This could partly explain why some 
companies in the financial sector, real estate and food products refused to participate or responded 
poorly to the Carbon Disclosure Project. 
Whilst the level of literacy on climate change by Sasol or PPC’s top management is not explicitly 
clear, their opposition of the recently introduced climate change policy could have undermined 
creativity or innovation of climate friendly products and services. On the other hand, the values and 
commitment by top management at Unilever most likely played a supporting role in creativity and 
continual innovation of products which help their customers to adapt to climate change: “our CEO’s 
commitment to sustainability has filtered into the organisation and it has helped us attract 
employees who are conscious about the environment.......and more resources have been allocated 
to sustainability.....all this has enhanced our capacity to innovate in areas related to climate change.” 
(Duiys, interview).  
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At Nedbank, in addition to commitment of the top management, staff communication, training and 
engagement has driven the bank to focus more on climate change and sustainability even though 
some their sustainability strategies have been questioned (box 5.4). The bank reports that “its 
effectiveness in the area of environmental sustainability relies heavily on the support, buy in and 
passion of its employees. For this reason the Group makes every effort to engage with staff 
members to raise awareness of environmental responsibilities and opportunities in which they 
involve themselves” (Nedbank, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.2: Initiatives at Nedbank promoting a sustainability culture 
Deep Green Day has become something of an institution within the Nedbank Group culture and 2011 focused on 
entrenching the organisation's reputation as SA's 'green and caring bank'. Employees gave of their time and 
money to make 29 000 sandwiches for distribution to disadvantaged individuals and communities, while a range 
of environmental volunteerism projects allowed staff to build relationships with their colleagues and spread the 
'green' message to others.  
 My Work Space was introduced in 2011. This groupwide communications platform allows for easy, 
customised sharing of information by allowing employees, business units and projects to develop their own 
online profiles and share successes, information and updates across the organisation.  
 Staff roadshows are presentations by Chief Executive, Mike Brown, and other Executive Committee 
members that provide a proven way for senior management to connect with all employees via face-to-face 
presentations or through video conference and share key sustainability information, general progress and 
respond to specific questions from staff.  
 Sustainability Resource has the primary aim of providing groupwide access to important sustainability 
information. This shared portal carries training material, research on climate change, water and social 
sustainability, legislation and policies, international best practice and environmental risk. It also offers tools 
such as SEMS, training material and screening and assessment methods.  
 Super Sustainability Forum is a teleconferencing initiative aimed at all employees outside of the 
Nedbank Group headoffice in Sandton and reduces travel that would have been required for face-to-face 
meetings.  
 Face-to-face communication sessions equip staff members with important insights into a variety of 
environmental sustainability initiatives and the implications thereof for the business. The aim is to enable 
these employees to use their wide sphere of influence within the group and beyond to help change 
environmental mindsets.  
SUSTAINABILITY TRAINING AND POLICY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
To ensure consistency of vision and understanding by all staff Nedbank Group requires that its employees 
confirm that they fully understand the group's sustainability objectives and commitments. In addition each 
employee is required to acknowledge that he or she has received, read and understood all relevant 
environmental policies on an annual basis. At the end of 2011:  
 89,8% of employees had formally acknowledged Nedbank Group's Environmental Policy;  
 90,2% had completed the Corporate Responsibility Policy Acknowledgement; and  
 56,5% had participated in the Nedbank Carbon Survey.  
Due to the ongoing communications and awareness creation in the group, individual staff commitment to 
environmental sustainability continues to increase, with 2011 levels of individual commitment to green at 95,5% 
compared with the 95,0% of 2010. In 2011 a total of 89,4% (2010: 81%) of employees completed the group's 
online sustainability training, which covers the basic principles of sustainability and outlines the bank's approach 
to sustainability and its achievements to date. The training also offers employees practical guidance on how they 
can become involved in helping the group achieve its sustainability targets and objectives. The 2011 Nedbank 
Group internal sustainability survey once again assessed the understanding of sustainability issues and the level 
of awareness of, and buy-in to, the organisation's sustainability objectives and undertakings by staff members. 
No less than 97% of Nedbank Group staff who participated in the survey regard the organisation as a leader in 
sustainability. Other key findings of the survey included:  
93% of staff members believe that Nedbank Group's management is committed to environmental sustainability. 
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        Source: Nedbank, 2011 
In addition to culture and organisational leadership, there is an indication from the research that the 
structure of a company also defines how it responds to climate change. For example, at ABSA, “there 
is no clear coordination of climate change strategy in the different departments at the bank. So, 
ABSA Capital clients such as ESKOM are not exposed or do not deal with other segments of the 
bank” (Wendy Angel, interview). This has created communication breakdowns within the bank 
resulting in failure to capitalise on opportunities to address climate change. Furthermore, certain 
staff members have very strong motivations to resist climate change projects because it threatens 
their job security and in some instances their personal interests. So when introducing climate change 
initiatives, they always see it as: who gains and who loses?   
5.2.2. Motivations to collective self- regulation 
 
The research revealed that multinationals and large listed companies are mostly involved in 
collective self-regulation to set and at times implement and monitor rules regarding climate change.  
Most of these companies (Unilever, Sasol, Standard Bank, Nedbank) face more pressure from NGOs 
due to the significant impact of their operations on the socio-environmental well-being of society. 
Due to this pressure, their reputation is always at stake.  Their reputation also directly relates to 
their “social license” to operate. For companies such as Nedbank which maintain a brand as a “green 
bank” and Unilever which sells branded products have strong interests in protecting these 
brandnames. Therefore, engaging in collective initiatives such as the Equator Principles allows 
Nedbank to align the Principles with their internal management processes which enhanced their 
status as a “South Africa’s green bank”. In 2010, the bank became Africa’s first carbon neutral bank. 
Furthermore, many consumers, particularly in the developed world, are now aware or concerned 
about the effects of climate change; therefore, they are intent on buying products and supporting 
companies which are environmentally sustainable. As a result, multinationals such as Unilever and 
Standard Bank are participating in these collective self-regulatory initiatives to internalize these 
sustainable norms and at times so that they are seen to be doing something. According to Duiys 
from Unilever “we need to play by the new rules reflecting the changing attitudes and behaviors of 
today’s consumers……the Supply Chain program and many initiatives we have enable us to develop 
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new green products” (interview). More so, collective reporting initiatives such as the GRI are 
instrumental in supporting companies to efficiently communicate sustainable brands to consumers. 
Collective self-regulation is also a strategy of choice for companies which are heavily exposed to civil 
society pressure. In such cases, these firms might choose to enter into collective arrangements with 
these stakeholders through partnerships or seek other forms of co-regulation which allows them to 
control the contestation of their reputational risks (Hönke  et al, 2009). For a company such as 
Nedbank which continually faces criticism of “green washing”, their Green Trust partnership with 
WWF SA gives them more visibility through their voluntary emission reduction carbon trading 
projects across Africa. For Sasol and Illovo Sugar, their partnerships with research institutions give 
them the possibility of innovating climate friendly products, hence deflecting the pressure from 
NGOs.  
The reputational and legitimacy concerns of large companies are also directly linked to obligations 
which indicate that firms have to comply to with standards of good governance. Standard Bank, 
Nedbank, Unilever, Sasol and PPC are listed on sustainable indices such as the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index and Johannesburg Sustainability Reporting Index (JSE SRI). These sustainability 
indices are meant to help impact investors in making their investment decisions. Listing on these 
indices subjects these companies to extensive reporting on their sustainability performance.  
Furthermore, companies which are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are required to 
comply with the King III report on corporate governance. The governance code requires all listed 
companies to produce a sustainability report and failure to do so, they have to provide a reason for 
not producing the report. As result, the performance of a company in these indices has strong 
implications on investor perceptions of the firm. Therefore, companies seek collective self-
regulatory reporting standards such as GRI to control the reputational risks associated with low 
rankings on the JSE SRI. According to the JSE, 
“The JSE’s Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Index now incorporates criteria 
focused on climate change, aimed at encouraging companies to consider and report 
on related indicators that assist in the mitigation of and adaptation to climate 
change…we are looking at how to improve price transparency in the South African 
market with the aim of encouraging more projects that reduce carbon emissions” 
CDP Report, 2012). 
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 Furthermore, in recent years South African firms listed on the JSE are now compelled by regulations 
to respond to the sustainability issues espoused in the King III report because many of the principles 
put forward by the report are now embodied in the Companies Act of South Africa. 
In addition to internalizing norms, South African based companies are very aware of the climate 
change discourse. The majority of the companies are dismissive of any climate change skepticism: 
”I’m very convinced and certain that climate change is occurring, the scientific evidence is 
overwhelming……the science has also proven that human beings largely to blame for climate 
change” (Beck, Standard Bank risk analyst, interview). Due to this concern, the companies share the 
opinion that “something must be done on climate change and we are willing to contribute to finding 
a solution” (Ireton, interview). Despite their willingness to contribute to climate change governance, 
many of these collective efforts focus on mitigation which requires less resources and effort. 
Therefore, whilst the companies are aware and concerned about the effects of climate change, they 
are not willing to invest more resources and contribute to adaptation. Hence, the companies focus 
on these collective self-regulatory initiatives which pay more attention towards mitigation.  
According to Rohitesh from KPMG “even though these measures give these companies the 
legitimacy and reputation they are looking for, they do not invest more resources to make a 
difference in consolidated efforts to govern climate change” (interview).  
The fact that reputational concerns are the main driver to collective self-regulation also explains why 
there are fewer smaller; local and unlisted companies engaging in this initiative. Due to the climate 
change impacts of larger companies combined with their potential ability to contribute to 
governance, larger companies are more likely to receive attention from society and civic society than 
smaller companies which very often not listed. More so “smaller companies may not need to rely on 
the annual report or other formal channels to communicate their climate change performance” 
(Rohitesh, interview). Therefore, very few stakeholders are unlikely to be informed about the 
climate change impact of their operations or their contributions. Furthermore, the smaller 
companies are not exposed to more extensive networks to identify partners.  At the local level, 
NGOs “also gain legitimacy and visibility if they target and pressurize larger companies. That is how 
they are seen to be effective……..it is on the basis of this that they continue to receive more funding” 
(Methabo, interview). 
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5.2.3. Motivations to co-regulation 
 
Evidence from the South Africa case studies indicates that when the private sector engages the 
public sector in co-regulation the motivations very often go beyond reputation and legitimacy. At 
the global level, the Kyoto Protocol has been the main driver for private sector collaboration with 
the regulatory bodies. Even though there is a lot of uncertainty regarding international climate 
change negotiations most companies are anticipating that the emerging economies such as South 
Africa will commit to reducing their GHG emissions.  
“Under the UNFCC and its Kyoto Protocol, South Africa  is committed to contributing its fair 
share of global GHG mitigation efforts. Accordingly, South Africa has committed itself to an 
emission trajectory that peaks at 34% below a “Business as Usual” trajectory in 2020 and 
40% in 2025, remains stable for around a decade, and declines thereafter in absolute 
terms”(DEA, 2011). 
Due to this credible threat of regulations, a lot of companies are starting to pre-empt these 
regulations by sharing responsibilities with global regulatory bodies such as UNEP in providing 
governance. According to Karin Ireton from Standard Bank they are “convinced the carbon trading 
scheme will still be functional post Kyoto, so our partnership experience with UNEP, which is one of 
the implementing agents for the carbon market will serve us well to help us for our continual 
involvement in the carbon market” (interview). Due to the fact that very few financial institutions in 
South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa participate in carbon trading, Standard Bank hope to acquire a 
competitive “first mover” advantage through their Carbon Asset Development Facility (ACAD) 
partnership with UNEP.  
However, the uncertainty regarding the Kyoto Protocol also explains why some companies have a 
“wait and see” approach to committing to any climate change governance partnerships. Therefore, 
firms, mostly carbon intensive sectors which face greater regulatory risks from climate change 
regulations are more likely to pre-empt these regulations because they are targeted at them. 
Nonetheless, other sectors are even skeptical that South Africa will meet its target to cut emissions 
by 34% by 2020. “The probability that this can be achieved is highly unlikely to almost impossible. I 
would therefore say that we are almost guaranteed to miss the target” (Robbi Louw, Promethium). 
Therefore, business firms need more clarity: 
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” if we get the right signals and some financial incentives from the international negotiators, much more can be 
done. There is no lack of interest from the business community, but there is still a lot of confusion which gets 
compounded if the negotiators don’t achieve a clear outcome”(interview) 
Despite high levels of uncertainty at the global level, there is a clear emerging climate change policy 
framework which a lot of companies are starting to pre-empt. As a result, firms, mostly energy 
intensive companies participate in the Energy Efficiency Accord (EEA) to avoid possible future 
sanctions. In October 2011 the government of South Africa launched its Climate Change Response 
policy which aims to guide South Africa to a “climate resilient and low carbon, job creating and pro-
poor green economy” (see box 5.4). To support the climate change response policy, the government 
introduced the carbon tax in the 2012 and the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for the energy sector 
outlining the government’s strategy for electricity generation to 2030. The IRP paved the way for the 
participation of Independent Power Producers who will produce the bulk of the renewable energy 
which will account for 42% of all electricity generated in South Africa. These policies send a clear 
signal to business that the country is entering into a regulatory phase to curb GHG emissions. As a 
result, a lot of carbon intensive companies are expecting tougher regulations on energy efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.3: South Africa’s National Climate Change Response Policy at a glance 
The Policy is clear that South Africa is adopting a balanced and developmental approach to responding to the 
challenges and opportunities of climate change This means that South Africa will prioritise climate change 
responses that have both significant mitigation and adaptation benefits, and that also have significant economic 
growth, job creation, public health, risk management and poverty alleviation benefits.  
In implementing the mitigation elements, the policy will focus on the following approaches: 
 Firstly to build on existing emission reduction projects and programmes;  
 Secondly to undertake an in-depth assessment of the mitigation potential of key sectors of the 
economy, as well as an assessment of the best available mitigation options for the country.  
 Thirdly, on the basis of this analysis, and through engagement and dialogue with all stakeholders, the 
country will be in a position to define the desired emission reduction outcomes for key sectors and sub-
sectors.  
 Finally, this work will be further developed into a mix of mitigation approaches, policies and measures 
that are best suited to enable the sectors and sub-sectors to achieve the defined desired emission 
reduction outcomes.  
 As part of this work, key sectors will be required to prepare and submit mitigation plans that set out 
how they intend to achieve their desired emission reduction outcomes.  
The adaptation strategy will first focus on the country’s adaptation planning capacity and this will be done by 
developing long term adaptation scenarios in order to inform national, provincial and adaptation strategies. The 
adaptation strategy will focus on selected sectors such as agriculture, water, health and human settlements. 
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Source: South African Government Information website8 
 
Although state regulations are being introduced, there is skepticism regarding the state’s capacity to 
implement these regulations.  Since the end of apartheid, the South African government has 
developed ambitious and world class environmental regulations, for example, the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA) (39 of 2004). However, the state stills lacks the capacity to 
implement these regulations. This challenge is evident in PPC’s sustainability manager’s response: 
“At present there are three spheres of governance, in terms of regulations that we have to respond 
to: the constitution, NEMA and municipality by-laws and these can undermine innovation. We 
wanted to build a cement plant in the Western Cape but ended up shelving the project because it 
took us three years to go through the different approval stages”(interview). 
Whilst the threat of regulations is a major driver for participants to the Energy Efficiency Accord 
(EEA), some members of the accord saw it as a platform to share information and learn. This was a 
recurring theme for companies who were involved in local level multi-stakeholder partnership 
forums. “The EEA is a great platform to learn and develop trust between industry partners and the 
government because there is so much distrust amongst around…….even though outside the 
agreement information sharing is rare, here the culture of knowledge sharing and even a certain 
belonging has developed” (interview). In addition to this, partnerships which involve NGOs are 
regarded by companies as increasing importance in developing and implementing policies because 
NGOs are well informed attached to ecological environments as they operate at the local level.  
Furthermore, the National Business Initiative (NBI) has been instrumental in influencing companies 
to participate in the EEA. Following the adoption of the Energy Efficiency Strategy for South Africa, 
the Energy Efficiency Accord was signed with government through the Ministry of Minerals and 
Energy. The Accord was facilitated by the NBI and its aim was to assist in implementing the strategy 
and contributing to the achievement of the energy efficiency targets. According to Valerie Green 
from NBI,  
“Without the NBI, it is hard to imagine how business could have come together to tackle 
climate change. As the go-between government and business in the Accord, we provide a 
                                                          
8 Speech by the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, Ms Edna Molewa, at the launch of the Climate Change Policy Framework  
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platform for collective engagement between business and government on demonstration of 
energy efficiency investment, energy savings, emission reductions…”(interview). 
In addition to providing this platform, the NBI was responsible for establishing the Energy Efficiency 
Leadership Network. Members to the Network include the government and business associations. 
Many of these business associations include the Energy Intensive User Group, the Association of 
Cement Manufacturers and the Concrete Manufacturers Association which represent mostly energy 
intensive companies. This explains why the majority of the EEA members belong to carbon intensive 
sectors. Most of these carbon intensive companies also face extensive physical and economic risks 
from climate change. According to Sasol:  
“The issue of energy and water supply and security is regarded as one of our material risks 
and, given that there is going to be an increased focus on renewable energy and reduced 
energy consumption from coal, Sasol joined the Energy Efficiency Accord to help reduce the 
energy intensity of our operations” (Sasol, 2011) 
In addition to this, Illovo Sugar also identified risks and opportunities within their management 
system. These risks are associated with reduced quality of raw materials due to reduced water 
availability and reduced water quality. The company notes that reduced runoff due to reduced 
precipitation could impact on the quality of water especially salinity. This implies that the risks 
associated with climate change play an important role in driving these companies to contribute to 
climate change governance. 
 
5.2.4 Motivations to private sector’s political activities  
 
Evidence from the research suggests that the threat of looming regulations has driven companies, 
mostly multinationals and carbon intensive sectors to participate in shaping the global and national 
climate change policy. It is evident that the ongoing negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol will have 
significant impact on business operations. According to Nicola Robins “the increased interest from 
business in the direction of the Kyoto Protocol stems from the fact that business is partly responsible 
for the emission of large amounts of GHG emissions and at the same time an important stakeholder 
in finding solutions to reducing the emissions”(interview). Evidence from the research indicates that 
most firms are anticipating strict regulations on emission of GHGs; therefore, they are pre-occupied 
with reducing the impact of the potential sanctions or attempting to shape the direction of such 
regulations. For example at the World Economic Forum in 2010, Sasol was part of a group 
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multinationals which released a policy statement on the climate change negotiations encouraging 
“member states to have a holistic view in discussing responses to climate change”. The policy 
statement encouraged member states to look at other policy options excluding carbon tax because it 
would undermine the fragile economy after the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, to reduce the 
anticipated sanctions from the Kyoto Protocol the private sector has participated in the negotiations 
either as part of country delegations or through position statements which outline their 
recommendations. For example, Sasol representatives have been part of South African delegates to 
the Kyoto Protocol climate change negotiations for several years. 
Despite the concerns of the private sector, it’s unlikely that the companies will face the sanctions if 
they do not meet set industry targets. According to the Kyoto Protocol, states have the responsibility 
to implement the emission reduction targets and penalize sectors which do not meet those targets. 
However, empirical research shows that most countries will miss their agreed targets with some 
major polluting countries such as Canada having withdrawn from the Kyoto agreement. Even in 
South Africa there is doubt if the country will meet its emission reduction target of 34% by 2020. 
"The probability that this can be achieved is highly unlikely to almost impossible. I would therefore 
say that we are almost guaranteed to miss the target," said Robbie Louw of Promethium, a carbon 
emissions and carbon credit consultancy. 
The effect of the Kyoto Protocol have spilled to the national level resulting in the National Climate 
change Response strategy, the carbon tax and the vehicle emissions tax which was introduced in 
2010. Despite these comprehensive regulations, the capacity limitations within government could 
undermine its ability to effectively implement the regulations and sanction the private sector. “At 
the moment there is no clarity on the monitoring, reporting and verification of the [carbon] tax. The 
government needs to answer these questions. Will additional staff be employed, will an 
independent company be contracted for the work or will there be a verification authority?” 
(Sonnerberg, interview). This comment also indicates that the private sector’s concerns with the 
regulations are not only a result of fear of sanctions, but the lack of clarity in the policy. Hence, 
private sector participation in public regulation is also aimed at “engaging with Treasury to avoid the 
negative impact on the economy” (Sonnerberg, interview).  
 Furthermore, at the national level, the Energy Intensive User Group which is very active in its 
attempts to influence the rule setting and implementation of the carbon tax argue that these 
punitive regulations will increase their operational costs which ultimately undermine their 
competitiveness. The fundamental argument is that environmental regulations impose significant 
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costs, slow productive growth and thereby hindering the ability of business firms to compete in 
international markets. This loss of competitiveness is believed to be reflected in declining exports, 
increasing imports and long term movement of manufacturing capacity to other countries, 
particularly, in carbon intensive industries (Barret, 1991; jeffe et al, 1995). “Sasol’s contribution to 
the tax would come in at about R3 billion a year (approximately US$ 300 million a year). This 
represents 12% of our profits for the years end June 2012” (Parker, interview). Environmental 
consultant, Andrew Gilder also argued that “there are a range of other tax considerations that might 
rise with the introduction of the carbon tax for which there are no clear answers yet. Carbon 
reduction or energy renewable equipment is costly”. Many responds argued that as a result of the 
carbon tax, the manufacturing sector was set to lose its competitive advantage. “Chinese 
manufacturers, for example are more competitive precisely because they are not subjected to 
environmental taxes” (Bezuidenhout, Manufacturing Circle, interview). Since the carbon tax is in the 
early stages of implementation it is difficult to conclusively argue that it will undermine the 
manufacturing industry’s competitiveness. Jaffe et al (1995) reviewed over 100 studies on the 
potential effects of environmental regulations on competitiveness of American industry, and 
conclude that “studies attempting to measure the effect of environmental regulation on net exports 
overall trade flows and plant-location decisions have produced estimates that are small, statistically 
insignificant or not robust to test of model specification”  
Whilst the carbon tax might increase the operational costs and competitiveness of some firms, there 
is recognition that these regulations will also reward and benefit those firms which significantly curb 
their emissions. As a result, those companies which comply with the regulations will benefit more 
directly, for example by restricting entry to their industry and by improving their resource 
efficiencies in a way that reduces operational costs. Whilst smaller manufacturing firms such as 
Devra Chemicals do not have the capacity to participate in public forums to influence environmental 
regulations, they have benefited from the strict environmental regulations in the Western Cape. This 
has somewhat benefited these small manufacturers as the environmental regulations have created a 
barrier of entry to carbon intensive companies. The strict environmental regulations coupled with 
limited state capacity to implement the regulations forced PPC to abandon its plans to set up a 
manufacturing plant in the Western Cape in 2010. 
Despite the potential risks of sanctions from the Kyoto Protocol some companies participated in the 
negotiations because they saw opportunities to share technological information (BUSA, 2012). Even 
though states have the final responsibility for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, in practice the 
implementation of CDM and JI mechanisms heavily rely on the private sector. According to Business 
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Unity South Africa (BUSA) secretary “one of the key reasons we had technical experts from industry 
as part of the negotiation team was to lobby for the transfer of clean technologies from developed 
to developing countries through financial and other measures”. The industry experts representing 
the South African negotiation team deliberated this issue in an Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
(EGTT). In collaboration with other developing countries, South Africa wanted to establish 
performance indicators for measuring and reporting on technology transfer activities. However, no 
breakthrough could be achieved on this issue because governments could not force the private 
sector to share technologies with developing country counterparts, and the protection of intellectual 
property rights is a key concern.  
 
  
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the main climate change governance contributions by the private sector in 
South Africa. Table 5.2 provides a summary of these governance contributions and the underlying 
drivers to these contributions. The results indicate that the South African case study companies 
contribute to climate change governance through self-regulation, collective self-regulation, co-
regulation and by being involved in public regulation. Some of these contributions complement the 
results which came from the content analysis. Through self-regulation, the companies have varying 
levels of internal strategies which are based on collectively agreed rules and guidelines such as GHG 
accounting and sustainability reporting. Collective self-regulation, involves firms at the global and 
national level collaborating with state actors and various non-state actors such as NGOs to develop 
and implement rules relating to climate change. Standard Bank, Nedbank, Unilever and Sasol are the 
case study companies which are most involved in collective self-regulation. Much of the adaptation 
activities occur at the local level, for example, Sasol’s water management partnerships with 
municipalities and local farmers at the catchment level. Co-regulation entails that companies, mostly 
in the energy intensive sectors share governance responsibilities with the state on an energy 
efficiency accord. Finally, due to the emerging regulatory threat, some companies such as Sasol are 
involved in political activities to influence climate change policy. 
Table 5.2: Modes and motivations for fostering non-hierarchical climate change governance in 
South Africa. 
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Contributions Mitigation/ 
Adaptation 
Companies Main Drivers 
Self-regulation Mostly mitigation and 
very limited levels of 
adaptation 
Standard Bank; Nedbank; Capitec; 
Unilever Illovo Sugar; Orley Foods; 
Sasol Pretoria Portland Cement; 
Devra Chemicals 
Shadow of anarchy; 
Organisational factors; 
reputation 
Collective self-
regulation 
Mostly mitigation and 
adaptation, mostly at the 
local level 
Standard Bank; Nedbank; 
Unilever; Sasol 
Reputation and legitimacy;  
Co-regulation Mitigation Unilever; Sasol; PPC; Standard 
Bank 
Shadow of hierarchy; Shadow 
of anarchy; sectoral 
institutions; problem and issue 
salience 
Political activities to 
influence & shape 
policy 
Mitigation Sasol; PPC Shadow of hierarchy 
 
Evidence from the research indicates that self- regulation is mostly driven by the shadow of anarchy 
associated with the perceived inability of the state to provide energy security. Hence, the shortage in 
energy supplies could undermine the companies’ competitiveness. Some of the internal activities are 
driven by organisational factors such as the resources and leadership which firms, particularly, large 
and multinational companies possess. These organisational resources enable them to invest in 
activities such as energy efficiency. Furthermore, some of these firms have reputations concerns 
which compel them to implement internal climate change strategies. Larger firms are the ones 
which face more reputational risks from consumers and NGOs which explains they are very much 
involved in collective self-regulation. Co-regulatory activities linked to the Energy Efficiency Accord 
among energy intensive companies are driven by the emerging shadow of hierarchy together with 
the shadow of hierarchy as the companies perceive that the government will be unable to ensure 
reliable energy. Furthermore, many of the energy intensive companies which engage in in the 
Energy Efficiency Accord face more regulative, physical and economic risks linked to climate change. 
Finally, the emerging threat from regulations has compelled some companies which will be mostly 
affected by the regulations to engage in political actinides to influence these climate change policies 
and regulations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BUSINESS RESPONSES TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN KENYA 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of how and why Kenyan companies are contributing to climate 
change governance. The results of this chapter also complement the climate change configurations 
and explanatory factors in chapter 4. The first section discusses the main mitigation and adaptation 
governance contributions by the case study companies. The following sections discuss the main 
drivers and conditions for these different modes of governance. The conclusion uses table 6.1 to 
provide a summary of how and why Kenyan companies contribute to climate change governance. 
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6.1 Climate change governance contributions 
6.1.1. Self-regulation 
 
As illustrated in the content analysis results, a significant number of the Kenyan case study 
companies do not have any recognisable climate change governance contributions. The case study 
research indicates that a few companies, mostly large companies are involved in private self-
regulation. This usually involves process improvement in response to different forms of standards 
and guidelines on energy efficiency. Whilst these self-regulatory initiatives could reduce GHG 
emissions, the intentionality of these efforts towards contributing to climate change governance is 
not clear. Large firms (Athi River Mining, Unilever, Standard Chartered Bank, Total Kenya) tend to 
have extensive process improvement initiatives. Total Kenya, for example, has an “Ecosolutions” 
program aimed at developing products and services which helps its value chains including its 
customers to reduce their GHG emissions. In addition to this, the company implements the Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) technology which involves recovering carbon dioxide where it is 
generated and storing it underground so that it is not released into the atmosphere. Whilst 
companies can implement the technology at the firm level, the CCS technology is developed through 
a collective effort of leading multinationals’ R&D projects.  
Low energy intensive companies such as Standard Chartered Bank also respond to various global 
standards and guidelines on energy efficiency. These initiatives include construction of green 
buildings, for example the construction of their headquarters in Chiromo which received a GOOD 
LEED9 from the Leadership in Environmental and Energy Design (LEED) as a modern green building. 
As a less energy intensive company which does not consider climate change to be a material issue, 
these energy efficiencies projects are efforts aimed at enhancing the bank’s legitimacy and 
reputation. For the bank, climate change is mostly viewed as a branding and communications issue; 
hence, the only individual responsible for climate change in the bank is the brand and corporate 
communications manager. The manager indicated that she is responsible for the company’s climate 
change strategy and the executive management are not directly involved.  
With regard to companies operating at the national level, Mumias Sugar have been able to utilize 
existing technologies through its bagasse cogeneration project as part of a response to unreliable 
energy supplies. The bagasse cogeneration project involves generating electricity using the sugar 
                                                          
9 The Leadership in Environmental and Energy Design (LEED) is a program that provides third-party verification of green buildings. For a 
building to earn LEED certification, a project must satisfy all LEED prerequisites and earn a minimum 40 points on a 100-point LEED rating 
system scale 
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cane residue. Athi River Mine has been implementing various technologies which are common 
among cement manufacturers globally such as the use of efficient fans with variable speed drives, 
optimization of compressed air systems, replacing old motors with high efficiency motors, kiln 
combustion system improvements and upgrading older dry kiln to multi-stage preheater kiln. Even 
though the companies did not intentionally implement these measures as mitigation strategies, they 
still managed to reduce their emissions. However, they could not account for the emissions reduced 
because their focus is on cost reductions. Silvester Makaka, from Athi River explained that “with the 
financial crisis it is not even cost effective for us right now to invest in equipment which measures all 
components of flue gases and process gases”(interview)  
At the national and local level, relatively smaller companies in less energy intensive sectors (Kenya 
Commercial Bank, Family Bank, Kuguru Foods) do not have any recognisable climate change 
governance contributions to mitigate or adapt to the impacts of climate change. These companies 
have the same characteristics as the “laggards” presented in chapter 4. According to Peter Nyaga, 
from Family Bank “banks do not release any greenhouse gases and our operations are not tied to 
climate change. Our main obligation is to provide banking to Kenyans. If we are to talk of any social 
responsibilities for us, then it will be to provide affordable and accessible banking. Climate change is 
the responsibility of the big emitters, not us; it is not within our scope” (Nyaga, interview).  In 
addition to this, George Karabo, a Risk Analyst from Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), revealed that 
even though the bank provides financing to small scale farmers who are affected by climate change, 
their financing strategy was structured in such a way that the bank is not exposed to the farmers 
risks. For example, in their contractual agreement, the bank collected the farmers’ loan repayments 
directly from the buyers such as the Kenya Tea Development Agency after the farmers sent their 
yields.   
 
6.1.2. Collective self-regulation 
 
As the case with private self-regulation, multinational and large listed companies are mostly active in 
collective self regulation. At the global level, in addition to the being a member of the Equator 
Principles, Standard Chartered Bank is a member of the UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) working 
group on climate change. The initiative is a partnership between UNEP FI and over 200 financial 
institutions, including banks, insurers and fund managers with the aim of defining and disclosing best 
practices on responsible financing and share information (tools, projects, methodologies and 
137 
 
metrics)” (UNEP, 2007). As a partnership of institutions with financial clout, the UNEP FI has often 
been used as a platform to influence public regulation. The UNEP FI Climate Change Working Group 
has always had a strong presence at the annual conference of parties (COP) as part of the UNFCC 
and Kyoto processes. Through the UNEP FI, the financial institutions have been able influence the 
design of carbon markets; the role of the insurance sector climate change adaptation and the 
designing and deployment of public support mechanisms aimed at mobilising private finance. In 
addition to this, UNEP FI releases an annual declaration on climate change ahead of the G8 summit. 
Whilst UNEP FI is a platform for sharing information and setting carbon finance standards, the lack of 
long term regulatory certainty often compels the partnership to be involved in public regulation. This 
is illustrated in Standard Chartered Bank’s response, “Our key message is that although financial 
institutions should be taking a more proactive role, an absolute prerequisite is strong government 
leadership on adaptation and mitigation measures. In order for market solutions to thrive 
government has to provide us with the necessary regulatory architecture” (Standard Chartered Bank 
strategist, interview).  
The UNEP FI is also responsible for designing instruments and guideline which help financial 
institutions in carbon finance. In 2007, Standard Chartered committed US$ 10billion over five years 
to finance renewable energy projects in Kenya and Africa.  The World Bank reports that Africa 
emerged as a significant newcomer in the carbon market, accounting for 36 million tons or 21% of 
post 2012 CERs (World Bank, 2012). However, UNEP FI noted that the major barrier to further 
unlocking private investment and finance for renewable energy in Africa was the absence of national 
policy and targets which provide the backbone of any country’s overall renewable energy strategy 
and framework within which incentive mechanisms, such as feed in tariffs or quotas are placed 
(UNEP, 2011). As result, one of the respondents argued that the UNEP FI platform would be much 
more “richer as a grouping” if national governments, particularly from developing countries could 
participate. This allows for their greater involvement in designing carbon markets. As part of the 
plans to engage the government, Standard Chartered Bank organised a workshop with the World 
Economic Forum in collaboration with the Kenyan government Climate action Plan, UNEP FI, the UK 
Capital Markets Climate Change Initiative and the US National Renewable Laboratory with aim of 
identifying critical bottlenecks to financing clean energy in Kenya and to design solutions where 
public finance can help unlock private finance. 
Within the food and drink manufacturing sector, Unilever is part of the sustainable Agriculture 
Initiative (SAI) Platform which supports the development of sustainable agriculture among its 
participating members. Unilever launched the SAI in 2002 together with Groupe Danone and Nestle 
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with the aim of jointly developing sustainable agriculture principles and standards through the 
assessment of practices and experiences. As part of the rule setting process, the SAI Platform 
involves the conceptualising of new agricultural methods such organic agriculture which relies on 
ecosystem management and favours the “agronomic, biological and mechanical methods as 
opposed to using external agricultural inputs such as synthetic fertilisers”. This helps in the 
adaptation to the impacts of climate change because organic agriculture maintains the structure of 
the soil, therefore, in the event of climate change related flash floods the rate of soil erosion is 
significantly reduced. In addition to this, the SAI provides guidelines and support to integrated water 
management particularly in the Rift Valley region which has experienced droughts since 2002. 
According to the Unilever branding Director ”the platform’s priority is on creating the right mindset 
for the implementation of sustainable agricultural practises and to cooperate with producers in 
order to find solutions instead of applying a top-down approach” (interview). This tends to stimulate 
participation with the supply chain, although within the boundaries of the platform and create 
opportunities for learning and upgrading to more sustainable agricultural practises. Furthermore, to 
ensure that their supply chain was integrated into the SAI, Unilever partnered with the Rainforest 
Alliance to certify their estates and those of smallholder farmers. The certification process was more 
of a strategy to gain a “first mover advantage” in the market as their sustainable certified products 
can easily be recognisable by customers in the stores. Moreover, the certification enhanced the 
reputation of Unilever as it increased the visibility of their products among customers. 
Through the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative in Kenya, Unilever plays an important role as an 
“inspector” within its tea supply chain by implementing the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI) 
codes of practice. Even as an “inspector”, Unilever collectively monitors the implementation of the 
SAI set rules along its supply chain in partnership with other non-state actors. Through this collective 
partnership, Unilever utilizes their different capabilities to receive and understand the signals about 
the changing climate in tea growing areas in Kenya. According to Margaret Mwauri, Unilever Tea 
Kenya (UTK) Brand Building Director, “we know from talking with our tea suppliers that climate 
change is already affecting them, and we are keen to understand the issues and opportunities in 
detail” (interview). As part of its response to the SAI set rules, Unilever developed its sustainable 
agriculture standards focused on broad based environmental and social issues. In Kenya, Unilever 
Tea focused on the production of sustainable tea along its supply chain. Since Unilever is vertically 
integrated in the tea value chain (that is, the production and processing, trade, blending and 
packaging, marketing and selling) they have more capabilities to influence the tea value chain. The 
SAI is part of the global strategy to change the behaviour of the supply chain, particularly the 
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400 000 smallholder farmers in rural Kenya to produce sustainable tea. To ensure that the supply 
chain complied with the set rules in the SAI, Unilever partnered with Rainforest Alliance to certify 
the suppliers. In addition to Unilever’s agricultural standards, Rainforest Alliance also used the 
standards by the Sustainable Agriculture Network10 in the certification process. 
As the case in many instances, these supply chain transformations are often met with scepticism 
within the company. In particular, it was hard for the brand team to explain how they were going to 
pay a premium to growers for sustainable tea while keeping the retail price unchanged. According to 
the critics, if the consumers were not willing to pay more for sustainable tea, it meant the cost 
would be absorbed in the margins and affect profits. In response Margret Mwauri, Unilever brand 
director explained that “the solution lay on the income side since additional costs in the supply chain 
could be recovered through growth in market share” (interview). In addition to the internal 
scepticism, Unilever also faced the threat of competitors free-riding on their initiative. There are 
risks that once certified, producers could decide to sell the tea to other companies.  
The challenging part in Kenya was to reach the large base of over 500 000 smallholder farmers. This 
means that Unilever and Rainforest had to identify a partner to carry out the certification of the 
farmers and build their capacity to implement the sustainable agriculture strategy. As a result, in 
2006, Unilever and Rainforest partnered with the Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA)11 for a 
new pilot project encouraging Kenya smallholder tea growers to adopt sustainable agricultural 
practices resulting in the certification. The pilot project was called the Farmer Field School (FFS) 
project adopted a “leaner-centred approach, which meant that farmers carried out “hands on” 
observation, experimentation and evaluation” of the sustainable agriculture techniques linked to the 
SAN standards (KTDA, 2009). Extension officers, researchers and external participants acted as 
facilitators. “Learning actively and practically gave farmers the independence and confidence to 
address challenges and introduce changes in their own farms” (Mbadi, interview).  To assess the 
project to ensure if the farmers were making progress, KTDA surveyed participating farmers 
alongside non-participating farmers, and comparing the answers both groups gave. 
                                                          
10 The Sustainable Agriculture Network is a coalition of independent non-profit conservation organisations 
that promote the social and environmental sustainability of agricultural activities by developing standards 
(http://sanstandards.org/sitio/)  
 
11 The Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA) acts as an agent and buyer for most of the tea grown by small-scale 
growers, making up over half of the tea exports from Kenya. 
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At the national and local level, Total Kenya is involved in the “ECOChallenge” an initiative that strives 
to help sustain the environment by bringing people and organisations together to plant trees. The 
Total EcoChallenge provides a major national platform for encouraging and driving tree planting.  
Whilst Total participates in global initiatives to combat climate change, for example, the Global Gas 
Flaring Reduction Partnership, these collective private sector initiatives do not contribute to climate 
change governance in Kenya. Even though tree planting helps in carbon sequestration, the 
ECochallenge is more of a public relations initiative by Total Kenya. At the national and local level, 
many companies also partner with NGOs in tree planting initiatives.  Tree planting is a common 
norm among most large national listed companies suggesting that it requires less resources and 
effort to implement.  Furthermore, companies which have tree planting initiatives extensively report 
these activities on the websites and annual reports indicating that it enhances their reputation. 
 With regard to smaller companies with national or local operations (Family bank; Kuguru Foods and 
PZ Cussons) there is no evidence of their involvement in collective self regulation. It is very evident 
from the research that NGOs in Kenya are more involved in climate change governance, particularly, 
adaptation than the private sector. The nature of NGOs allows them to be actively involved with 
vulnerable communities at the local level. In Kenya this enables them to understand and learn the 
climate change vulnerabilities of pastoralists in Northern Kenya who are most likely to be affected by 
the effects of climate change related droughts (IRIS, 2010).  Climate change forecasts predict that 
Northern Kenya is one of the areas that are going to be most affected by climate change and the 
pastoralists’ support system comprising of livestock and natural resources is very prone to climate 
variability (Luseno et al, 2003). On the other hand, many business firms, predominantly, the less 
energy intensive sectors do not face any direct threats or risks from climate change. Hence, they are 
unable to make sense of the ecological landscape. However, NGOs “ecological sensemaking 
capabilities” entails that they play a crucial role “in bringing the voice of vulnerable communities 
with whom they work with to the attention of policy makers” (Opondo, interview). As a result, there 
are several collective platforms led by NGOs such as the Kenya Climate Change Forum; Forest Action 
Network and the Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers which allow them to 
collectively contribute to climate change adaptation in vulnerable communities. In many developing 
countries, collective partnerships between NGOs and the private sector are strengthening. However, 
challenges exists in fostering these partnerships because the relationship between NGOs and the 
private sector can be combative, with NGOs focusing on monitoring and campaigning against the 
private sector activities (Barbara Stocking, Oxfam, interview).     
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6.1.3. Co-regulation 
 
At both the global level, none of the case study companies were directly involved in sharing 
responsibilities with regulatory agencies to set and implement rules to mitigate or adapt to the 
impacts of climate change. According to a Ministry of Environment regulator “the challenges for 
engagement of business remain high because there are high concerns over costs of adaptation and 
mitigation” (interview). However, the government has been making efforts to engage the private 
sector, particularly, in renewable energy financing and the carbon markets. The government hired a 
carbon credits advisor, Camco Advisory Services to raise private sector awareness of the impact of 
climate change. The company, contracted by the office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of 
Environment will train personnel in the private sector on project implementation, verification and 
negotiating carbon credit transactions to increase sales of carbon credits. At the end of this process 
a Public-Private sector climate change forum will be established to act as the driving force to 
educate, encourage, regulate and manage the creation of a carbon credit market in Kenya. 
Alexander Alusha, the climate change policy advisor in the Prime Minister’s office noted that the 
Forum “will among other things review existing regulatory frameworks, identify capacity gaps in 
public and private sectors to place enabling infrastructure and attract finance under the CDM or 
voluntary carbon markets” (interview). Therefore, the success of the co-regulatory forum will hinge 
on the uptake of CDM projects by the private sector, particularly, the banking and finance sector. 
Currently, there are 16 registered CDM projects in Kenya, which is the second highest in Africa 
(UNFCCC, 2013). 
At the national level, the manufacturing sector has been able to forge a co-regulatory initiative with 
the government through Energy Efficiency Accord similar to that in South Africa. Even though Kenya 
still has a lot of uncertainty with regard to explicit climate change regulations and institutions to 
drive companies to contribute to climate change governance, the Energy Efficiency Accord (EEA) 
spearheaded by the Kenya Association of Manufacturers’ (KAM) Centre of Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation (CEEC) has played an important role in supporting companies, mainly manufacturing 
companies to implement energy efficient initiatives which have the potential to reduce emissions. 
The Accord forms an agreement between the respective manufacturing companies, KAM and the 
Department of Energy for the large industrial consumers to voluntarily commit to significant energy 
savings of between 5% and 15%.  
Whilst the main objective of the Energy Efficiency Accord is to assist signatories become energy 
efficient, companies still had different motives for signing up. A financial director at PZ Cussons 
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revealed that “participating in the KAM CEEC energy efficiency audits helps us access finance for our 
projects to replace inefficient machines (Kamani, interview)”. In contrast ARM which is a larger 
manufacturing company sees the EEA as an opportunity to be “in direct contact with the 
government and honestly discuss the impacts of their energy policy on the private sector”.  On the 
other hand, a Mumias Sugar engineer argued that the “Accord and the related energy efficiency 
initiatives are a dynamic process that facilitates the exchange of experiences. So, we see it as a 
network allowing participating companies to meet up and develop solutions to the energy and 
environmental challenges by sharing experiences with others who are faced with similar challenges” 
(Kaitani, interview). Even though the companies do not seem to share sensitive information, the 
networking allows companies with limited capacities to mimic companies which already have 
implemented successful energy efficiency programs. For example, a lot of sugar milling companies 
are engaged in utilising the residue from sugarcane to generate renewable energy though 
cogeneration. However, as the case with EEA in South Africa, the mimicking undermines the 
companies’ potential to develop more innovative strategies. 
The Energy Efficiency Accord, as one respondent alluded, “is the first of its kind in the country and is 
motivated by gains made through the KAM Energy Efficiency project which demonstrated that 
industries can save between 30%-40% of their energy consumption”. The KAM Energy Efficiency 
programme saves about Ksh2billion [US$24m] annually with potential to save over Ksh 7 billion 
[US$84m] in electricity and over Ksh5billion [US$60m] on fuel (KAM, 2011). The Energy Efficiency 
programmes gained momentum following the acute shortages of power since the 1990s as a result 
of the impact of drought on hydroelectricity generation which accounted for 60% of Kenya’s power 
(Karekezi and Kityoma, 2005).  
In 2001, following acute power shortages which were undermining production for manufacturers, 
KAM CEEC initiated an energy efficiency programme in which they carried out energy audits for KAM 
members in cooperation with various actors as part of a Global Environment Facility-KAM (GEF-
KAM) energy project. At the onset of the programme, only large manufacturing companies such as 
Athi River Mine; Mumias Sugar and East Africa Portland Cement participated in the energy audits 
because they were the most affected by the power shortages. As a result, these large manufacturers 
have been crucial in sustaining the energy audits and energy efficiency programme which was later 
developed into the Energy Efficiency Accord. According to Hillary Rono “without the large 
manufacturers the programme would not be what it is today….especially Athi River Mining. Their 
engineers helped as a lot in the initial audits and training other engineers. When we rolled out the 
programme in Kisumu and the coast they were there with us, at the road shows……” (interview) 
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The support of large companies in energy efficiency could help explain their role as “collective 
institutional entrepreneurs” in developing the Energy Efficiency Accord (Wijen and Ansari, 2007); 
and their capability to attract other smaller manufacturers to sign up to the Accord. Although the 
KAM CEEC is the coordinating agent to the implementation and launch of the Accord, the process 
was beyond the capability of individual actors because it required resources and capabilities which 
KAM could not provide. Even though KAM and the Department of Energy possessed the coercive 
and normative drivers to initiate the Energy Efficiency Accord, there were other actors who 
possessed critical resources and capabilities which were crucial to the development of the Accord. 
Hillary Rono explained that “Athi River Mine; other big manufacturers were very helpful in bringing 
the other smaller companies on board, they speak the same language. But our main challenge going 
forward is bringing on board other sectors” (interview). In addition to this, GIZ, AFD and DFID 
supported the two year process with technical and financial support and linking KAM with other 
networks and stakeholders such as the South African National Business Initiative which had 
implemented a similar Accord in 2005 (see figure 6.1). In his remarks at the launch of the Accord, Mr 
Mamud, the Deputy Minister of Energy lauded the Energy Efficiency Accord saying it “exemplifies a 
new era of cooperation between the Government and the private sector and is certainly the 
preferred alternative to rules and regulations”.  
 
Figure 6.1: Field Level Actors defining the Energy Efficiency Accord 
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Currently, the EEA does not include other sectors other than the manufacturing sector. Mary Kiema 
head of KAM’s CEEC explained the reason behind the absence of other sectors in the EEA: 
“at the moment we are not involving other sectors because there so many measurement 
complexities with different sectors with regard to audits . The assessment of the energy 
efficiency accord in South Africa showed that sector dynamics in terms of energy use are 
different making energy efficiency determination more complicated in some sectors than in 
others........the operating environments in some sectors keep on changing thus requiring a 
need for adjusted baselines. So after we learn some lessons in implementing our Accord then 
we will start looking at using a sectoral approach could in measuring and verifying energy 
efficiency in order to incorporate sector dynamics” (interview). 
 Furthermore, other sectoral institutions have not shown any keen interest in climate change or 
energy efficiency. Despite being represented by the Kenya private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), other 
trade associations such as the Kenya’s Bankers Association did not engage their sector to participate 
in the energy efficiency. 
In an effort to encourage other sectors, particularly, the less energy intensive sectors, to join the 
Accord, KAM in partnership with various actors introduced the Energy Efficiency Awards to market 
the programme and encourage other companies to join in. Furthermore, the CEEC partnered with 
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the University of Nairobi Msc Engineering students through internships to carry audits so as to 
increase the number of engineers to carry out audits in other sectors. According to a KAM CEO “the 
intention is to have students from Polytechnics to come and carry out these energy efficiency 
initiatives” (Maina, interview).  At present KAM is in discussions to expand the internship 
programme to include universities such as Jomo Kenyatta which has a biogas project which the KAM 
representative said could be valuable to many manufacturers in the future. 
6.2. Motivations to the climate change governance options 
 
6.2.1. Motivations to self-regulation 
 
Whilst most manufacturing companies are driven by the economic incentives and energy supply 
concerns to implement the Energy Efficiency Accord guidelines, for a lot of less energy intensive 
companies their energy efficiency initiatives are driven by reputation. Since less energy intensive 
sectors such as banking and finance do not emit any recognisable GHG emissions they don’t face any 
regulatory pressure to reduce the emissions. Therefore, Standard Chartered Bank’s effort to 
implement energy efficiency measures in their buildings can be seen as a way to enhance their 
reputation. This is illustrated in Standard Chartered Bank’s strategist’s statement, “As a large player 
in the banking sector we are often scrutinised and our image is on the line. Everyone expects us to 
do something. If we don’t do anything we are seen as an irresponsible bank even though none of the 
banks in Kenya are doing anything on climate change” (Standard Chartered Bank strategist, 
interview).  
Furthermore, larger firms are more likely to receive more attention than smaller firms. This explains 
why Standard Chartered Bank, Unilever, Athi River Mine and Mumias Sugar reported their climate 
change contributions in their annual reports with different levels of intensity. These large firms also 
operate in competitive environments; hence their reputation is focused on responding to the actions 
of other firms in the same industry. Most leading multinational firms report their climate change and 
sustainability contributions often in separate sustainability reports. Hence, these firms help define 
the rules, norms and beliefs surrounding sustainability reporting, and thus set the expectations for 
other firms’ stakeholders. Therefore, these leading firms of which Unilever is one of them set the 
reporting expectations which determine the reputation of other firms. This was illustrated in 
Standard Chartered Bank’s head of strategy’s statement  
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“Standard Chartered Bank is a global organisation operating in a very competitive 
banking environment. Nowadays with Africa as an emerging market, so many 
financial institutions want to take root in this market. As a result we have to 
benchmark ourselves with industry leaders on all aspects of banking and finance. 
..........and reporting is one of our strengths because we have to communicate with 
our stakeholders...over and above that it is now an industry norm” (interview). 
As a result, companies took into account the reputation of the collective industry in their 
sustainability reporting. The Standard Chartered Bank corporate governance manager seemed to 
indicate that due to the fact that communication with customers is an important strategy in 
competing globally with other leading firms in the industry they tend to report comprehensively.  
Normally energy intensive sectors which emit significant amounts of GHG emissions will be expected 
to face more collective reputational scrutiny than other industries which could force them to report 
on their emissions and climate change contributions. However, it is evident that local companies 
regardless of sector do not seem to face any reputational scrutiny for not contributing to climate 
change governance. According to Judy Njino this could be attributed to the fact that “climate change 
is not a concerning issue to many urban Kenyans for them to go to the extent of pressuring 
companies to respond to it....their immediate life is focused on addressing socio-economic issues” 
(interview).  
This is different for multinationals, for example, in the banking sector, the repercussions of the 
actions of a single firm can have profound effects on all firm working in the same industry12.  This 
explains why Standard Chartered and Unilever would more likely respond to global challenges which 
affect their industries because the actions of a single firm can destabilise the entire industry.  
“Whenever there is a scandal at a global bank you will be surprised at the number of calls we 
get. There is a media frenzy on the issue. They look for a reason to tail all of us (the industry) 
with the same brush” (interview).   
Furthermore, multinationals are more visible than local companies which subjects them to more 
scrutiny, resulting in them being more proactive regarding private self regulation. What is very 
particular with Unilever is that they do not simply view their private self regulation initiatives relative 
to firms in their industry. Instead, their marketing director indicated that they compare their 
contributions, particularly sustainability reporting with that of other leading firms in other industries. 
Unilever does this so as to maintain their global leadership status on sustainability issues. This 
implies that Unilever consider their reputation to also depend on what other leading sustainability 
                                                          
12
 This was the case for the banking industry during the financial crisis in 2008. The collapse of Lehman Brothers had 
considerable impact on the global financial system. It resulted in the introduction of stricter regulations for the  banking 
industry. 
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firms in other industries are doing. Stakeholders will judge them in comparison with the “best of the 
best”. 
 
6.2.2. Motivations to collective self-regulation 
 
At the global level, Standard chartered Bank has been participating in the UNEP FI mostly because 
they see carbon trading as an activity which can add value to their functions. Even though the 
company recognizes the reputational gains of participating in such collective initiatives, the 
opportunities which arise as a result of the UNEP FI have the potential to provide an ”attractive 
return”. 
“Investment banks want fees for selling advice and arranging capital, fund managers want to 
increase assets under management and to achieve superior risk adjusted returns for 
investors……so for us climate change has to positively impact on these core industry drivers 
to enhance a willingness for banks to be involved…….with UNEP FI we are seeking 
opportunities to boost carbon trading in Africa and we see that adding value to our 
functions”. (Standard Chartered Bank strategist, interview) 
Therefore, there is an economic driver in engaging in the UNEP FI as it enables banks to identify 
opportunities in carbon trading. However, several respondents indicated that the policy 
uncertainties globally regarding the Kyoto Protocol and in Kenya was a barrier for them to create 
value from carbon trading. Currently, there have been no commitments or agreement from policy 
makers on emission reduction targets. The Standard Chartered Bank strategist indicated that 
emission reduction targets provide validation for emission trading; the various GHG market support 
services and the pursuit of low carbon intensive technology solutions. These market based activities 
will lead to the establishment of a “price” for carbon which is a prerequisite “for GHG assets and 
liabilities to be included on the balance sheet and for strategic planners to estimate the financial 
value of carbon in project development and capital spending situations. At this point carbon 
becomes recognized by the bank as a factor that needs to be incorporated into all calculations of 
equity value, credit risk, risk management and project viability. In other words, carbon becomes 
recognized as another determinant function of financial value (interview). 
Whilst participating in carbon trading schemes and platforms seem to add value to Standard 
Chartered Bank’s functions, a lot of local banks do not see the value of participating in carbon 
trading. The Risk Analyst from Kenya Commercial Bank explained that carbon trading exposes them 
to a lot of financial risks. Following the uncertainty regarding the Kyoto protocol and the lack of 
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support to the EU Emission Trading Scheme by member states13, the price of a permit to emit carbon 
dioxide fell 40% at one point in June 2013 to €2.81, far from the record high of €32. Therefore, local 
banks avoid carbon trading because it exposes them to financial risks which they cannot share with 
the local market, ultimately undermining their bottom-line profits and market share. Furthermore, 
unlike the global carbon trading market which Standard Chartered Bank partakes in, the local carbon 
trading market in Kenya and Africa as a whole is not regulated and does not have proper 
institutional support which further exposes the first movers. According to a carbon market specialist, 
John Fay “local banks in Kenya have so many other places to make more money which are less riskier 
that carbon trading. Today carbon trading remains a backwater of the global commodities markets 
and its not even included on the bench market Dow Jones UBS Commodity Index” (interview). 
However, at the global level, most of Standard Chartered Banks’ global competitors are signatories 
to the UNEP FI initiative and participate in carbon trading, therefore, their competitive position is 
maintained.       
Whilst multinational banks are starting to recognize the opportunities of climate change, there is still 
a lack of perceived materiality of the issue among the local banks in Kenya. As one responded noted 
“most financial institutions in this country still have this long-standing conviction that companies’ 
environmental performance are at best irrelevant and at worst injurious to companies’ bottom-line 
financial performance” (Interview). Hence, they do not see the financial risk or value in collective 
initiatives which enable them to participate in carbon trading. 
Despite these financial risks in the banking sector, Unilever’s adoption of the role of “inspector” is 
driven by the asset specific relationship with their supply chain. The fact that they have a high “asset 
specific” relationship with their supply chain compels them to find sustainable agricultural practices 
in collective partnerships such as the SAI. Due to Unilever’s vertical integrated in the tea value chain 
(that is, the production, and processing, trade, blending and packaging, marketing and selling) it is 
difficult if not impossible for them to replace or disentangle the supply chain. In addition to this, the 
tea plantations in the Rift Valley and Central province are one of the few locations in the world with 
the ideal tropical climate, red soils and well distributed rainfall ranging between 1200mm to 
1400mm per annum. Therefore, Unilever cannot engage in a “race to the bottom” because they 
have made long term investments in the tea estates and over 400 000 smallholder farmers.  For the 
smallholder farmers, Unilever represents their sole buyer for their tea. As a result, in the face of 
                                                          
13 In June 2013 the freefall in the EU Emission Trading scheme was prompted by the energy and industry committee of the 
European Union parliament opposing a proposal to delay the release of 900 million future permit. This would limit supply 
in the capped market and therefore support the carbon price 
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serious physical risks from climate change, Unilever must learn to manage the risks by implementing 
the SAI guidelines and certifying the farmers to ensure that they practice sustainable agricultural 
practices.  For other companies, for example, local banks which have low asset specific relationships 
often collaborate with a chain of suppliers around the world and yet maintain their distance and 
their ability to drop suppliers and pick up another fairly easily. Furthermore, banks can easily raise 
capital from global investors and do not have to rely on investors or customers in a specific location. 
Hence, they can reduce the risks of too much specialization or dependence on a specific set of 
investors by raising capital on global stock exchanges which gives them more flexibility. 
The Sustainable Agriculture Initiative also enabled Unilever to learn and share information. This was 
illustrated by Unilever’s brand manager, “In a competitive industry like ours there are few areas of 
consensus that vary across specific issue. Within this industry there seems to be a lot of agreement 
about the physical impacts of climate change and the appropriate norms and standards which need 
to be adopted” (interview). Due to this sense of agreement over the need to adopt common 
standards of agricultural practices, the food and drink manufacturing sector is more likely to adopt 
collective self-regulatory standards. These collective agreements including the UNEP FI in the 
banking sector also provide members with training, guidance, technical assistance, and information 
on sustainable practices to its members.  
In addition to economic incentives, the issue of reputation was very apparent in collective efforts by 
companies to engage in tree planting activities. It was evident in the research that the local banking 
sector which has direct transactional relationships with consumers is more likely to partner with civic 
organizations which are considered to have good community relations and reputations. The local 
Kenyan banks often exploit these partnerships to market themselves as “good corporate citizens”.  
The risk analyst from Kenya Commercial Bank noted that reputation matters in the banking sector 
because their relationship with customers and other businesses relies on trust. Reputational gains 
were clearly an important driver for Total’s Eco-Challenge tree planting initiative. The marketing 
executive at Total Kenya noted that “we are often seen as a profit making entity who doesn’t do 
anything for the community. The Eco-Challenge has gone a long way in changing that perception and 
improving our reputation”. The Eco-Challenge initiative also deflects pressure from environmental 
activists and the society who would normally pressure the government to regulate the industry. 
Whilst the tree planting partnership is more of a ‘green washing” initiative, it creates an impression 
that they are doing something to contribute to climate change governance.  
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6.2.3 Motivations to co-regulation 
 
The manufacturing companies’ participation in the Energy Efficiency Accord (EEA) is mainly driven by 
economic and energy security concerns. The pursuit of profit or competitiveness of energy intensive 
manufacturing companies highly depends on the availability of reliable and affordable energy. 
However, the government is unable to provide energy at competitive prices forcing companies to 
step in by voluntarily committing to reduce their energy consumption. Kenyan manufacturing 
companies were exposed to competitive low energy prices when Kenya joined the East African 
Common market Protocol in July 2010, a regional trading bloc involving Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda. This intensified competition for exporting Kenyan manufacturing companies. KAM 
Chairman revealed that “Kenyan manufacturers pay up to US$0.2/KWh, whilst our counterparts in 
Uganda pay US$0.09/kWh. These high power costs have eroded our competitiveness, so we need 
strategies to address this” (Igathe, interview). Therefore, implementing the guidelines in the EEA 
could provide the companies with an option to cut operational costs.  
In addition to the economic incentives, the government has struggled to provide governance in the 
supply of secure energy for the manufacturing industry. Kenya has suffered a series of droughts in 
the past decade which has affected the hydroelectricity generation which accounts for 70% of the 
country’s electricity sources (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008).  Up until 2002 KENGEN was the sole 
provider of electricity in Kenya and at one point its hydropower generation capacity fell to 20% 
(Wambugu, 2008). The power shortages resulted in prolonged blackouts and high cost emergency 
thermal electricity to meet the shortfall in power supply. The drought induced power cuts cost the 
economy about 1.45% of GDP which translates to US$442 million. KAM CEO, Betty Maina described 
how these power cuts affected one of the manufacturers: 
“One of our manufacturers had molten aluminium solidify in that short period the 
power was out. To melt it again it took another 7 hours with a 10% loss of the metal 
and added fuel costs all totalling Sh250 000, a figure that doesn’t include overhead 
costs. The company is being forced to buy a heavy duty generator costing 10 
million”(interview) 
 
As a result of the uncertainty surrounding energy supply in the country, manufacturing companies 
were forced to implement energy efficiency measures linked to the Energy Efficiency Accord.   
The shadow of anarchy caused by the unavailability in secure energy supplies have resulted in 
proactive policy efforts by the government to attract the private sector to partner public actors in 
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setting and implementation of rules in the provision of renewable energy. Whilst local private actors 
have been slow to respond to the government’s overtures, multinational banks and multilateral 
institutions have been engaging with the state in financing renewable energy. The introduction of 
the Feed in Tariff (FiT) Policy and the scaling up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) provided some 
levels of clarity to motivate the multinational actors to partner with government in financing 
renewable energy projects. The FiT Policy was introduced in Kenya in 2008 and revised in 2010 to 
accommodate additional renewable energy sources. The FiT Policy has elicited a total of 49 
expressions of interests from potential investors to develop wind, biomass, hydro, geothermal, 
biogas and cogeneration projects. The NCCRS Action Plan estimates that the country will require up 
to US$45 billion by 2030 to develop 21GW of renewable energy.  
Despite the absence of explicit regulation on climate change mitigation and adaptation which is 
being implemented; the government has been proactive in implementing the FiT policy because it is 
perceived to be intrinsically linked and supporting the pro-growth policies such as the Economic 
Recovery Strategy (ERS) and National Development Plan (NDP). However, the National Climate 
Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) is not perceived to be directly linked or supporting government’s 
intense socio-economic growth orientation. Therefore, the private sector is more inclined to respond 
to incentives and priorities communicated through the national development strategies.  Whilst 
climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts are often perceived to be in conflict with economic 
development policies, responding to climate change might actually support economic development. 
This was illustrated in Ufadhili Trust Executive Director, Mumo Kivuiti remarks:  
“our policies are geared towards achieving economic growth which is okay considering the recession we are in 
right now and levels of poverty in Kenya. The problem is that there is no balance in economic policy. We need to 
understand how we can grow differently. How do we ensure that we have growth that is inclusive and 
sustainable? That is what we are talking about. How can we  reduce poverty with the type of technologies and 
solutions that are also good to the natural environment? That is the equation that we must go after. So, our 
policies need  to support the innovation of energy use, water utilisation……..If that does not happen climate 
change and many environmental impacts will pose a serious risk to the economic development which the current 
polices are trying to fix”(interview).  
Whilst the FiT policy and other government overtures such as the Public-Private sector Climate 
Change Forum have attracted multinational banks such as Standard Chartered Bank and other 
international Development Finance institutions, the local banks have been lagging behind. The 
Chairman of Kenya Commercial Bank alluded to the financial risks associated with renewable energy 
and carbon finance as a reason for the absence of local banks. 
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“there is a need for local companies to be supported financially to develop projects that ease carbon emissions. 
Unfortunately, there has been no credit facility from the local banks to the private sector to tackle climate 
change partly because of high financial risks for some of the projects and the fact that the banks have no policy 
guidance on how to integrate climate change into their banking and lending models”(quoted from Standard 
newspaper, 12/10/2011). 
6.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter discussed the main climate change governance contributions by the case study 
companies in Kenya. The case study findings confirm the results from the content analysis which 
indicate that a lot of companies in Kenya, particularly, the small and less energy intensive companies 
do not contribute to climate change governance. However, some of the case study companies 
contribute to climate change by self-regulating themselves mostly through implementing energy 
efficiency initiatives.  
 Table 6.1: Modes and motivations for fostering non-hierarchical climate change governance in 
Kenya. 
Contributions Mitigation/ 
Adaptation 
Companies Main Drivers & 
constraints 
Self-regulation Mitigation  Standard Chartered Bank; 
Unilever; Mumias Sugar; Athi 
River Mine; PZ Cussons 
Reputation 
Collective self-regulation including 
private sector adoption of role of 
“inspector” 
 Mitigation and 
adaptation at the 
local level 
Standard Chartered Bank; 
Unilever; Total Kenya 
Economic incentives, 
reputation, asset 
specificity 
Co-regulation Mitigation Standard Chartered Bank; 
Mumias Sugar; Athi River Mine; 
PZ Cussons 
Shadow of anarchy, 
sectoral institutions 
 
Furthermore, large firms such as Standard Chartered Bank and Unilever engage in collective self-
regulating through partnerships at the global and local level. Through facilitation within the 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI), Unilever adopts the role of the “inspector” within its supply 
chain. This initiative supports smallholder farmers to adapt to climate change by adopting 
sustainable agricultural practices. Finally, other companies, particularly, energy intensive companies 
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engage in co-regulation by sharing governance responsibilities with the state on an energy efficiency 
accord. 
The companies which engage in self-regulation are mostly driven by reputation concerns. The firms 
assume that by implementing energy efficiency measures internally and reporting their sustainability 
activities they will burnish their reputation. Reputation is also a major driver for multinationals 
engaging in collective self-regulation. The reputational concerns tend to enhance the 
competitiveness of the firms. Unilever’s role as an “inspector” within its supply chain is mainly driven 
by the high level of asset specificity the firm have with its supply chain, particularly, the smallholder 
farmers. Finally, co-regulation through the Energy Efficiency Accord is driven by the Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers. More so, there is a perception among the companies that the 
government is unable to provide secure energy.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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The overall aim of this study was to provide an understanding of how and why companies in areas of 
limited statehood contribute to climate change governance. In order to do so, the study set out to 
address the following research questions: (1) what are the predominant climate change governance 
contributions adopted by companies in areas of limited statehood? (2) What are the drivers or 
constraints that give rise to these governance contributions? To investigate these questions, a 
content analysis survey and 18 case study companies were analysed in South Africa and Kenya, 
countries with varying levels of limited statehood. This chapter provides my interpretations and 
analysis of the findings from the content analysis and case studies. In addition to this, the chapter 
provides a conceptual discussion with reference to the literature on how and why companies 
contribute to climate change governance in areas of limited statehood. 
7.1. Private sector contributions to climate change governance in 
areas of limited statehood 
 
My analysis of the content analysis and case studies indicates that the climate change governance 
contributions of firms in South Africa and Kenya can be categorised into four clusters (laggards, 
emergent planners, efficiency drivers, visionaries). The main governance contributions within these 
clusters include self-regulation, collective self-regulation, co-regulation and influencing regulations. 
Most of these governance contributions focus on mitigation aimed at reducing the GHG emissions in 
comparison to adaptation. The section below provides a discussion of the governance contributions 
within the clusters.  
Laggards 
Evidence from the research indicates that there is a generally low level of response to climate 
change by most companies in Kenya and South Africa. The content analysis indicates that 84% and 
61% of the sampled Kenyan and South African companies, respectively, represent the “laggards” 
which do not have any recognisable climate change governance contributions or adopt primarily 
cosmetic initiatives (table 7.1).  
 
Firms predominantly in sectors with “low issue salience” such as banking and financial services 
dominate this cluster. These “low salience” sectors have less institutional pressures to contribute to 
climate change governance mostly because of the low negative externalities from their operations. 
As a result, they do not intentionally engage in any specific climate change initiatives. Those that 
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make any contributions mostly focus on mitigation efforts which take less effort and time. These 
cosmetic initiatives have more emphasis on energy efficiency activities which do not reduce GHGs 
significantly. Furthermore, the intentionality of these activities is relatively unclear because the 
energy efficiency measures are motivated in the first place by cost savings. Due to the fact these 
firms do not have a clear intention to contribute to climate change governance they do not account 
for the GHG emissions reduced from these measures.  
In the research, there are some “laggards”, for example, Kenya Commercial Bank and Total Kenya 
which are exposed to reputational risks, mostly driven by brand name and market orientation. As a 
result, these firms engage in collective efforts, mostly tree planting which does not significantly 
contribute to reducing the negative externalities associated with climate change.  
These results shed light on the climate change governance contributions by the private sector in 
areas of limited statehood, particularly in a region such as Sub-Saharan Africa which has not featured 
prominently in management literature (Kolk and Rivera-Santos, 2013). The generally low responses 
by firms operating in areas of limited statehood may be contrasted to corporate mitigation 
contributions in areas with consolidated statehood, which have been characterised as featuring 
prominently in businesses’ core strategies (Kolk and Levy, 2001; Eberlein and Matten, 2009; 
Weinhofer and Hoffman, 2010).  
 
Emergent Planners 
In both countries, there is evidence of a few “emergent planners” which are starting to engage in 
climate change governance through internal self-regulation. The ‘emergent planners’ in both 
countries are represented by a mixture of companies from different sectors. However, South 
African companies dominate the composition of this cluster (17%) compared with Kenyan 
companies (6.7%) (table 7.1).  
Companies in this cluster have started to set targets and implementing standards and guidelines 
often developed through collective self-regulation and co-regulation initiatives. The firms internally 
implement these collectively agreed guidelines and standards on GHG accounting, energy efficiency 
and sustainability reporting. Sustainability literature indicates that these are initiatives which 
companies adopt as part of their early response to climate change (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). Hence, 
these efforts mostly contribute to climate change mitigation because less effort and time is required 
(Börzel and Hamann, 2013).  
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As a first step to developing their climate change strategies, the “emergent planners” developed 
GHG emission inventories. A comprehensive GHG inventory was important in improving the firms’ 
understand of their emission profile, potential liability and exposure. “Emergent planners” which 
had moved beyond GHG accounting were starting to set emission targets. These emission targets 
were followed up by substantive climate change contributions, mostly, process improvement. In 
comparison to the “laggards”, the activities of the “emergent planners” were intentional and had 
some benefits for climate change mitigation.  
In addition to this, there were some “emergent planners” who were active in sustainability 
reporting. Several authors (Kolk, 2004, 2002; Dierkes and Antal, 1986) have argued that most of the 
sustainability reporting is window dressing driven by public and government pressure and something 
that is likely to fade away when these forces recede, as was the case in the US in the 1970s. 
However, a combination of continuously high levels of institutional pressure and the forecasted 
severe impacts of climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa could mean that firms in South Africa will 
constantly face pressure to respond and disclose their socio-economic and environmental activities.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in the literature (Morimoto, 2007; Sarfaty, 2011; Lingenfelder, 2011), the 
research revealed that there is no strong correlation between sustainability reporting and 
performance. Firms, particularly those whose reputation is at stake, disclose climate change 
information which enhances their reputation and leave out information which has negative effects 
to their reputation (Eccles et al, 2012).  
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Table 7.1: An outline of the climate change governance contributions by the private sector in South Africa & Kenya 
 Prevalence
14
 Self-regulation Collective self-
regulation 
Co-regulation Political activities to shape 
& influence policy 
Laggards Kenya (84.4%) 
South Africa (61%) 
Cosmetic initiatives    
Emergent Planners Kenya (6.7%) 
South Africa (17%) 
Implementing internal process 
improvement initiatives and 
sustainability reporting in some 
instances. These internal initiatives are 
driven by collectively agreed rules 
   
Efficiency drivers Kenya (8.9%) 
South Africa (10%) 
Sustainability reporting; GHG accounting, 
target setting, reporting, process 
improvement(energy efficiency), internal 
transfer of emissions, carbon trading,  
Partnerships with other non-
actors, for example academia 
in research on energy 
efficiency technologies 
Sharing governance responsibilities 
with regulatory bodies at the global 
and national level, for example,  
the Energy Efficiency Accord 
Political activities to influence or 
oppose climate change policies 
Visionaries Kenya (not present)
15 
South Africa (12%) 
-Comprehensive mitigation and 
adaptation contributions16 including 
activities highlighted above plus 
partnerships, e.g. developing climate 
friendly products and services 
- Transforming the business model to 
adapt to climate change 
-Climate change partnerships 
at the global, national and local 
level 
-Adopting the role of 
“inspector” 
Partner with international 
regulatory bodies, for example, the 
UN is setting and implementing 
rules, for example, UNEP FI, Global 
Compact 
Political activities in partnerships 
with international bodies and 
associations to shape the direction 
of policy 
                                                          
14
 Based on the content analysis survey results 
15
 Among the case study companies in Kenya, Unilever has the characteristics of a “visionary” but a cluster of only one company would not fulfil statistical requirements of the cluster analysis. 
16
 These comprehensive responses include those implemented by “emergent planners” and “efficiency drivers” 
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Efficiency drivers 
This cluster represents companies which have slightly more extensive governance contributions than 
the “emergent planners” (see table 7.1). In addition to GHG accounting and sustainability reporting, 
the “efficiency drivers” engage in co-regulation. At the national level in both countries, the 
government and private actors, mostly energy intensive companies engage in voluntary agreements 
focusing on energy efficiency. Through the Energy Efficiency Accord (EEA), energy efficiency targets 
are set in a collective decision process and the private sector is held liable for implementation. As 
highlighted above, companies implement these agreed energy efficient targets individually.  
 In both countries, industry associations play an integral part in monitoring the implementation of 
the EEA. Hence, firms with strong associative structures were more involved in the voluntary 
agreements. Literature discussing private actors’ role in the provision of public goods indicates that 
“organizing in a business association is an important pre-condition for a possible commitment to 
self-regulation” (Hönke  et al, 2009: 15; Ronit and Schneider, 2000; Porter and Ronit, 2006). 
Therefore, the involvement of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) in Kenya and National 
Business Initiative (NBI) in South Africa in facilitating the implementation of the EEA was crucial in 
helping solve the collective action problem of energy security being faced by individual firms.  
Whilst the EEA allowed for companies to reduce their GHG emissions through implementation of the 
energy efficiency guidelines, most firms’ aim was to ensure energy security rather than contribute to 
climate change governance. As a result, most signatories to the EEA could not account for the 
emission reductions from the Energy Efficiency Accord. This case shows that the link between 
intentionality and action can be very tenuous. Therefore, the fact that companies engage in energy 
efficiency measures to cut costs and ensure energy security indicates that their intention to 
contribute to climate change mitigation is less obvious. Nevertheless, the fact that energy efficiency 
targets are mutually agreed between government and the private sector might increase the chances 
of firms meeting their commitments. Fulfilling the commitments on the energy efficiency targets 
ultimately results in the reduction of GHG emissions. More so, the presence of a shadow of 
hierarchy, particularly in South Africa acts as a driver for the companies to meet the energy 
efficiency targets. Furthermore, government incentives such as the carbon tax induce energy 
intensive companies to be proactive in reducing their GHG emissions through energy efficiency 
initiatives. However, as indicated in the research, in areas of limited statehood the state has limited 
capacity to monitor the implementation of regulations or ensure that the private sector meets the 
agreed energy efficiency targets. 
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In addition to co-regulation, some energy intensive “efficiency drivers” in South Africa have engaged 
in political activities, either to influence the direction of the regulations or oppose specific 
regulations. The research illustrates that some firms have often been co-opted by the state as part of 
government delegations in international climate change negotiations. Given the task complexity 
associated with climate change (Börzel and Hamann, 2013; Rind, 1999), governments increasingly 
incorporate business and NGOs as official members of their delegations because of the 
pervasiveness of these non-state actors on the issue. Both business and NGOs provide knowledge, 
expertise and legitimacy to these climate change negotiations. The presence of non-state actors in 
the Kyoto Protocol negotiations provides the private actors with better access to details of the 
negotiations. As a result, they have more influence in the setting and implementation of rules 
regarding GHG emission reduction and climate change adaptation. In Kenya, the private sector is 
also often invited by government to contribute to renewable energy policy formulation and 
implementation through multi-stakeholder forums.   
In contrast to the above mentioned conciliatory nature of engagement between the state and the 
private sector, the research showed that in some instances energy intensive firms which are exposed 
to regulatory risks, particularly in South Africa engage in political activities to oppose and influence 
the direction of national climate change policy. The South African government has already set in 
place a clear climate change policy which needs to be implemented.  In addition to the threat of a 
shadow of hierarchy, energy intensive firms continuously face pressure from civil society to 
contribute to climate change governance.  Therefore, energy intensive firms use industry 
associations, for example the Energy Intensive User Group (EIUG) to lobby against stringent climate 
change regulations.  
Many companies, including members of the EIUG, do not have a “denialist” approach to climate 
change, so they resort to using an information strategy in which they carry out research at times in 
collaboration with the government to steer policymakers in the direction of their most favoured 
policies. A case in point is the EIUG’s research indicating that the carbon tax is not the best policy 
option for South Africa because it will adversely impact the economy and job creation. Whilst there 
are scientists and experts who are sceptical about certain aspects of climate change science, there is 
no clear evidence that energy intensive firms have gone the route of US firms of attempting to 
influence opinions of experts that have influence on the evolution of the issue. Instead, most of the 
firms’ information strategies are collaborative in nature, mostly with government. 
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Nonetheless, the corporate political activities still involve direct lobbying of government to change 
certain aspects of a climate change policy, for example, the carbon tax. Through this strategy, energy 
intensive companies have been negotiating with the government to secure a cooperative approach 
in which the carbon tax is integrated with other approaches such as carbon trading. In addition, 
some of these companies have utilised constituency building strategies where they put 
advertisements or statements in the newspapers to assure the public that they are taking climate 
change seriously and are developing measures to tackle the problem. This strategy is aimed at 
increasing public awareness of their ability to tackle climate change in an effort to diffuse some of 
the societal and government pressure. Nedbank and Sasol used this strategy at the Kyoto Protocol 
COP17 summit in Durban South Africa in 2010. As an event that garnered significant media 
attention, these companies were heavily involved in marketing the event and hosting several 
workshops in an effort to increase public awareness of their commitment to climate change. 
 
Visionaries 
 
Finally, the “visionaries” cluster, includes companies which have more comprehensive governance 
contributions often including those adopted by “emergent planners” and “efficiency drivers”. Most 
of the “visionaries” in the research are large multinational firms because they possess the required 
resources to engage in comprehensive mitigation and adaptation contributions.  Their broad array of 
activities extends beyond the companies’ boundaries and includes both mitigation and adaptation. 
As a result of the statistical aspects of the cluster analysis of the survey data, there are no 
“visionaries” in Kenya, while 12% of the sampled South African companies are in this group. 
Nevertheless, Unilever represents many traits of this cluster in Kenya. Most of the activities of the 
“visionaries” encompass collective self-regulation. Therefore, through collective self-regulation, the 
private sector in partnership with other non-state actors and at times international agencies 
collectively set the rules on how to reduce the negative externalities of GHG emissions and/or adapt 
to the negative impacts of climate change. 
The “visionaries” participated in collective partnerships at the global, national and local level. At the 
global level the collective partnerships often involved international governing bodies such as the UN 
and the WBCSD which assist in setting and implementation of the rules.  More often, firms 
participate in these collective initiatives with no monitoring and penalties. Nevertheless, there are 
initiatives such as the Global Compact which have a “naming and shaming” mechanism for 
companies which do not produce their progress reports. The intention of this “naming and shaming” 
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is to induce behavioural changes for firms do not adequately implement the collectively agreed 
rules. On the contrary, other collective initiatives such as the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI) 
which Unilever is a participating member allow for problem solving experience in which the private 
actors are heavily engaged. This collective initiative between food manufacturing multinationals 
allows the actors to adopt diverse practical agricultural solutions and at times comparing the various 
performance of each activity along the firms. This triggers a learning process that benefits all the 
participants and informing the decision making process of the firms. Firms participating in the SAI 
are more compelled to implement the sustainable agricultural practices even without any 
monitoring or the threat of penalties because of the high shadow of anarchy they are exposed to in 
the form of reduced yields as a result of climate change.  
Many of these global standards often spill over to the national and local level. In these instances 
some “visionaries” adopt the role of the “inspector” as part of a facilitation process to ensure that 
their supply chain adopt these global standards. Unilever’s SAI initiative in Kenya illustrates this 
governance contribution. In this case, Unilever deploys supervision activities over its suppliers, 
mostly the smallholder farmers to ensure that they adapt to climate change by practising sustainable 
agricultural practices. At the local level Unilever partners with Rainforest Alliance and the Kenya Tea 
Development Agency (KTDA) to certify the farmers to ensure that they meet the expected standard. 
Normally these supervision functions are often carried out by public regulatory officials, for example 
agricultural extension officers. However, due to the low levels of statehood in Kenya and the high 
mutual investment in Unilever’s relationship with the smallholder farmers, the firm is compelled to 
carry out these supervision functions. Therefore, it is hoped that this form of private ordering by 
Unilever helps reduce contractual hazards which could occur if the smallholder farmers fail to 
produce the quality coffee and tea which Unilever requires as a contractual buyer.   
At the national level, some “visionaries” also participate in multi-stakeholder partnerships in setting 
and implementing the rules on issues such as water management. Evidence from the research 
indicates that in these collective initiatives it is often expected that little opposition will arise from 
the private actors when they bear the implementation costs because they are involved in setting the 
rules. The literature argues that this mode of governance has high levels of institutional capacity 
which enables the partnership to generate both participation and legitimacy (Backstrand, 2006; 
2008). The multi-stakeholder nature of such partnerships, for example Sasol’s Vaal River Strategy 
Steering Committee allows for learning and knowledge transfer. Furthermore, complex tasks such as 
adaptation which require a steep learning curve, the pooling of resources and sharing knowledge 
162 
 
through these collective actions increases the chances of governing common pool resources such as 
water.   
At the local level, “visionaries”, are also involved in partnerships with NGOs. However, in Kenya most 
the climate change private sector-NGO relationships are philanthropic whilst in South Africa they are 
mostly transactional (Austin, 2000). The philanthropic partnerships tend to undermine the 
governance contributions of the partnerships partly because the rules of interaction are narrowly 
defined. As an example, the philanthropic relationship between Total Kenya and the NGOs it 
partners with in the tree planting is very confined in terms of resources deployed and points of 
interaction. For Total Kenya the partnership is more incidental but somewhat more important to the 
NGOs as it gave them an opportunity to extract resources, mostly finance. As a result, the NGO’s had 
a “fund raising mentality” aimed at extracting resources and if successful not bother the company. 
On the other hand, in the transactional relationship between Nedbank and WWF, the cornerstone of 
the relationship is through the identification of overlapping missions and a compatibility of values 
(Austin, 2000).  
Whilst some of the climate change contributions of the “visionaries” contribute to adaptation, it is 
evident from the research that most the collective self-regulation still focus on mitigation. As 
illustrated in the research, adaptation requires a lot of time and effort in addition to greater levels of 
“sensemaking”. Hence, climate change adaptation is associated with greater levels of task 
complexity (see Börzel et al, 2013). On the hand, most mitigation efforts require less effort and time. 
Further, since adaptation mostly operates at the local level through mechanisms such as land use, 
agriculture, urban planning and water supply it is difficult for global or even national collective 
modes of governance to address the issues because the responsibility to take action is not that 
apparent (Klein et al, 2005; Swart et al, 2005). In contrast, mitigation operates at a global scale 
allowing a broad range of actors to participate efforts such as carbon trading which aim to reduce 
GHG emissions.  Nonetheless, some of the REDD voluntary projects financed by the Nedbank-WWF 
partnership in the area of carbon sequestration through afforestation, restoration and avoided 
deforestation benefit adaptation, although not always explicitly. Currently the financial incentives 
for corporate engagement in adaptation seem to be very limited, in contrast to mitigation where a 
clear linkage to global carbon markets can be seen (Pinkse and Kolk, 2012). However, in recent years 
there seems to be an overall shift in policy towards adaptation. This shift in developing countries is 
driven by the realisation by policy makers that their geographical location is relatively more 
vulnerable to the potential consequences of climate change.      
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7.2. Variation in the governance contributions 
 
My analysis confirms the relevance of the various drivers identified in the literature review chapter. 
However, in this section l further explain the relationship between the drivers. My literature review 
suggests that the key drivers of corporate climate change responses are associated with institutional 
and competitiveness factors, which I expected to vary across countries, sectors and types of 
companies. Accordingly, my sampling strategy focused on two countries with varying levels of socio-
economic and institutional development (Kenya and South Africa); three different sectors (banking 
and finance, food and drinking manufacturing, and industrial and allied); and large, multinational 
companies as well as smaller, domestic companies. My empirical analysis confirmed systematic 
variations between climate change governance contributions across these dimensions.  
First, corporate climate change governance contributions vary between Kenya and South Africa. It is 
evident from the content analysis and case studies that South African companies have more 
comprehensive and advanced climate change governance contributions than Kenyan companies. 
The main contributor to this variance is these countries’ different levels of statehood. In South 
Africa, the shadow of hierarchy plays a more significant role in driving the private sector to 
contribute to climate change governance. Therefore, the threat of regulations such as the carbon tax 
drives companies to engage in climate change. On the other hand, the governance contributions of 
Kenyan firms are low due to the higher levels of limited statehood of the country, which does not 
have sufficient regulatory capacity to enact and enforce climate change regulation. Furthermore, the 
public policy in Kenya is heavily focused on pro-growth policies which do not adequately integrate 
climate change, creating misaligned incentives for companies. 
At the global level, the Kyoto Protocol and regulations from foreign governments often commit 
MNCs to commit to collective self-regulatory initiatives. As a global climate change regulatory 
framework, ongoing negotiations within the Kyoto Protocol will require all countries to have some 
form of emission reduction targets. Whilst Kenya might not be compelled to set emission reduction 
targets due to its low carbon emissions, South Africa is expected to have some form of reduction 
targets. The country has already committed to an emission reduction trajectory that will peak 34% 
below a “business as usual” trajectory by 2020 and 40% in 2025. These targets have put pressure on 
carbon intensive sectors in particular to commit to mitigating the GHG emissions. The commitments 
linked to the Kyoto Protocol have also resulted in the introduction of the National Climate Change 
Responses Strategy and other climate change related policies such as the carbon tax.  
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Despite the presence of a shadow of hierarchy in South Africa, the ineffectiveness of state 
regulations also induced companies to engage in climate change governance. In Kenya, the absence 
of a shadow of hierarchy also influenced some firms to engage in climate change governance. 
Companies have little faith in the capacity of both the South African and Kenyan governments to 
provide for reliable energy supplies. As a result of the shadow of anarchy, a lot of firms, particularly 
energy intensive companies sign up to the Energy Efficiency Accord. This illustrates that the shadow 
of hierarchy and anarchy can work side by side, affecting different aspects of a governance problem. 
Second, the climate change governance contributions also vary between sectors. My analysis of the 
findings shows that “high salience sectors” which are exposed to higher levels of regulative, physical 
and economic risks from climate change tend to have more extensive contributions than “low 
salience” sectors. These variations are a result of a combination of factors which include sectoral 
institutions and problem pressure. Carbon intensive sectors such as heavy industrial and allied were 
more engaged in co-regulation and self-regulation than the banking sector because they had the 
support of sectoral institutions. For example, in Kenya, the manufacturing sector was mainly active 
in the Energy Efficiency Accord due to the support of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM). 
Associations such as KAM help to solve collective action problems among firms such as energy 
insecurity. The literature indicates that in the market, the temptation for an individual firm to take 
advantage of its competitors complying with strict environmental standards is very high (Debus and 
Thauer, 2009). As a result, firms will tend to free-ride on other companies’ innovations. These 
problems are often attenuated by the discipline imposed by associations (Debus and Thauer, 2009). 
In this research, KAM ensures this discipline by monitoring the implementation of the EEA. In 
addition to this, KAM has been able to mobilise financial and technical resources to support the EEA. 
Mobilisation of resources to support corporate self-regulation is usually difficult if the associative 
structures in the industry are weak.  
The research also revealed that sectors with strong associations and high associative memberships 
of firms at the national level were more opposed to stricter national regulations. This indicates that 
the strong associative structures tend to undermine the shadow of hierarchy. In South Africa, the 
Energy Intensive User Group (EIUG) is engaged in political activities to oppose the carbon tax. In this 
case, associations are used to reduce the regulatory risks and subsequent pressure from civil society 
to regulate business.  In contrast, firms with weak associative membership of firms, for example the 
auto-industry in South Africa engage in a regulatory “race to the top” and voluntarily subject 
themselves to costly regulatory requirements and/ or demanding governments to issue stricter 
environmental regulations (Börzel et al, 2011). Firms in these sectors engage in this regulatory “race 
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to the top” to gain a competitive advantage over their peers and deflect pressure from NGO 
campaigns that may damage their reputation. 
In addition to the influence of strong associative structures, energy intensive companies are often 
compelled to engage in adaptation because of the combined effect of the shadow of anarchy and 
task complexity which is magnified by problem pressure. Firms in “high salience” sectors such as 
utilities and heavy manufacturing have their core activities at stake because most of their business 
models are threatened by regulative, economic and physical risks (Kolk and Pinkse, 2012) As 
illustrated in the research, energy intensive companies are also exposed to complex problems such 
as energy insecurity and water availability. Managing common pool resources such as water and 
energy is a complex task which requires the companies to cooperate with various stakeholders. 
However, the state in Kenya and South Africa has limited capacity to address complex tasks such as 
efficient energy or water supply. Therefore, energy intensive firms such as Sasol collaborate with 
other non-state actors in managing the Vaal river water catchment. 
Lastly, the research revealed variation between companies, particularly, among large, multinational 
firms and smaller, domestic firms. The results show that large, multinational firms have more 
comprehensive mitigation and adaptation contributions than smaller, domestic firms. This variation 
is explained by mostly organisational factors which are independent from statehood. At the supply 
chain and local level, Unilever, a food and drink manufacturing multinational adopted the role of 
“inspector” vis a’ vis their supply chain. This governance contribution is mainly driven by the asset-
specific relationship that Unilever has with their supply chain. The investments that the company has 
with small-holder farmers in Kenya and tea estates are irreversible. Furthermore, there are fewer 
locations in the world which have the suitable climatic conditions to growing tea as compared to the 
Rift Valley in Kenya. Hence, they cannot turn to other sources of supply, since other locations do not 
grow the same quality of tea. For the 40 000 smallholder farmers, Unilever is the dominant buyer of 
tea in the world; therefore, they engage activities which sustain this buyer-supplier relationship. To 
support these empirical findings, Williamson (1975) argues that actors involved in a contractual 
agreement tend to be opportunistic and tempted to cheat on their contractual obligations because it 
is profitable or because of lack of capacity. This implies that due to the lack capacity or the need to 
maximise profits, small-holder farmers might not fulfil their contractual obligations of supplying 
Unilever with high quality and sustainably grown tea. Given this bounded rationality and transaction 
costs involved, buyer firms such as Unilever will devise governance rules “to reduce contractual 
hazards” (Heritier et al, 2009). Therefore, Unilever ensures that its suppliers are certified as part of a 
guarantee that they will produce tea using sustainable agricultural practices. 
166 
 
Furthermore, large companies usually posses unique capabilities and culture which allows them to 
make investments in climate change mitigation and adaptation. As a result, a distinguishing feature 
of the “visionaries” cluster is an explicit leadership commitment to sustainability and/or climate 
change. Unilever, one of the few companies which contributes to adaptation possess the 
organisational resources which allow them to make sense of the complex problems of water 
shortages and soil fertility which are linked to climate change. The “ecological sensemaking” 
capabilities (Whiteman and Cooper, 2011), also allow the multinational to be physically and 
culturally rooted in climate change science and its impacts. The embededdness in the ecological 
systems continually exposes the staff to the physical, economic and regulative risks that the 
company is facing. Hence, the organisational culture will tend to slowly transform, with sceptics 
becoming more accepting of the need to contribute to climate change governance. 
Large, multinational firms have been more responsive to the combined effect of the shadow of 
hierarchy and anarchy than domestic firms because of the reputational gains they hope to gain by 
signalling their intention to contribute to climate change governance. Reputation is often considered 
to be an intangible asset that is extremely hard to imitate turning it into a valuable source of 
competitive advantage (Mahon, 2002; Hunt and Morgan, 1995; Eberl and Schwaiger, 2005). As a 
result, multinationals which often operate in highly institutionalised environments engaged in self-
regulation to improve their reputation with different stakeholders. Nedbank contributes to climate 
change governance because they want to maintain their perceived brand as South Africa’s “green 
bank”. 
Furthermore, the global discourse on corporate environmental responsibility as embodied in 
initiatives such as the Global Compact or the Carbon Disclosure Project has created a strong societal 
expectation about what constitutes appropriate business behaviour. As a consequence, the 
multinational firms in the study were increasingly aware of the need to establish and defend their 
corporate images in the eyes of customers, investors and stakeholders regarding climate change. 
NGOs were also becoming more strategically important as they provide customers, investors and the 
media with information on business behaviour. Hence, NGO pressure is incentivising firms to 
contribute to climate change governance. In efforts to manage these reputational risks, the large 
firms often entered into collective arrangements with some of these NGOs, for example, Nedbank’s 
partnership with WWF. 
The analysis of the findings also shows that the various drivers are alternative rather competing in 
inducing business governance contribution to climate change. In addition to working simultaneously, 
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some of the drivers enhance or mitigate each other. Statehood is a significant factor in the context 
of these possible alternative explanations (figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1: Interaction of drivers at the institutional, organisational and issue-specific level  
Institutional drivers Organisational drivers Issue specific drivers 
Shadow of anarchy   
Shadow of hierarchy  Task complexity 
 Organisational resources  
NGO activism and consumer 
pressure 
Brand-name & market orientation  
 
Firstly, task complexity intensifies shadow of anarchy (1) but weakens the shadow of hierarchy (2). 
This interaction indicates that the state was unable to provide governance of common pool 
resources such as water and energy because of the complexity involved in managing them. The 
shortages in water and energy threaten the companies’ productivity and competitiveness. The high 
level of complexity of the problem and the perception among business that the state was unable to 
provide governance to manage the water resources and energy supply induced the firms to 
contribute to climate change governance. Secondly, the shadow of anarchy is reinforced when the 
problem pressure is relatively high (1). This entails that firms which were highly exposed to water or 
energy shortages were more likely to collaborate with either the state or other non-state actors to 
manage the resource because the absence of action was likely to undermine their competitiveness.  
  
In the analysis, there is interaction which is also independent of statehood. Firstly, high reputational 
risks reinforced NGO activisms and consumer pressure (3). This means that companies such as 
Nedbank which have a brand to protect were more vulnerable to NGO pressure to contribute to 
climate change governance. Likewise, firms such as Woolworths which catered for high end markets 
where consumers are very conscious about climate change and its impacts faced more pressure 
from these consumers to contribute to climate change governance. Secondly, increased task 
complexity reinforces organisational resources (4). This explains the fact that due to the complexity 
involved in adapting to the impacts of climate change, firms invested more organisational resources. 
Reinforces (4) 
Mitigates (2) 
Reinforces (1) 
Reinforces (3) 
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These organisational resources allowed for companies, particularly, the “visionaries” to make sense 
of the problem.   
7.3. Contributions to literature 
 
This thesis discussed the role of business in climate change governance in areas of limited 
statehood, using South Africa and Kenya as the case study countries. This study attempts to 
contribute to the governance literature which aims to understand the role of non-state actors in the 
formulation and implementation of public policies. It is hoped that non-state actors such as 
business firms can improve the governance of public common goods such as the climate change by 
bringing in their expertise and interests (Reinicke, 1998; Reinicke et al, 2008).  
 
This research revealed that business firms can contribute to climate change governance in areas of 
limited statehood. However, in South Africa, despite some governance deficits some of these non-
hierarchical modes of steering (for example, co-regulation) are effective if there is a legitimate 
threat of force through regulations. Therefore, the threat by the state to explicitly or implicitly 
impose binding rules on business firms can incentivise them to engage in non-hierarchical rule 
making collectively rather than to act in self-interests  (Heritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008; Börzel ans 
Risse, 2010). Due to the greater flexibility in self regulation, companies often attempt to avoid 
legally binding regulations. Furthermore, the threat of regulations reduces the incentive of 
companies to renege of their voluntary commitments (Börzel and Risse, 2010). Whilst business 
associations have the responsibility to monitor the implementation of voluntary accords they still 
do not have the sanctioning capacity to deter business from not committing to the targets in the 
accord or engage opportunistic behaviour such a free-riding. Therefore, this research reinforces the 
argument that nation states are still at the centre of decision making in climate change governance, 
as they have the power to issue and reinforce domestic regulation (Clarke and Newman, 1997; 
Jessop, 1997).  
 
However, as the case study in Kenya revealed, the absence of a shadow of hierarchy does not 
necessarily imply the absence of governance. This research argued that there are functional 
equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy cast by the state. At the global level and at times at the 
national level external actors such as international organisations can substitute for a lacking shadow 
of hierarchy in areas of limited statehood. Furthermore, normative forces from local, national or 
international communities often create a strong logic of appropriateness so that the reputation of 
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the private sector to contribute to governance is at stake (March and Olsen, 1998; Börzel and Risse, 
2010). On one hand these norms are transmitted by NGOs, and on the other hand multinationals 
operating in these areas of limited statehood transmit them to the national and local level. In 
response to these normative pressures, private actors engage in self and collective self-regulation; 
co-regulation and involvement in public regulation. 
 
More so, the private sector may contribute to the governance of public goods due to the logic of 
consequence (March and Olsen, 1996; 1998; Weber and Kopelman, 2004). This implies that 
business firms as rational actors contribute to climate change governance if the pursuit of their 
individual profits depends on the provision of common goods such as energy and water and 
collectively binding rules to produce them are absent. With reference to the research, this shadow 
of anarchy created by the Kenyan and South African governments’ inability to provide secure 
energy and water compelled companies to contribute to setting and implementing rules to govern 
these resources, consequently, enabling them to adapt to climate change. The presence of a 
shadow of hierarchy and anarchy in areas of limited statehood implies that these drivers can work 
side by side, affecting different aspects of governance.     
 
While the research findings indicate the importance of governance factors in motivating companies 
to engage in climate change governance, the empirical findings also suggest that organisational 
factors have a significant role to play in driving firms’ contributions. These factors include asset 
specificity (Heritier et al, 2009; Williamson, 1988; 1991; Riordan and Williamson, 1985) and 
organisational capabilities and culture (Teece, 2007; Teece et al, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Whiteman and Cooper, 2011). These organisational factors could also account for the variation in 
governance contributions between firms of different sizes (this is discussed below). More so, 
companies with significant organisational capabilities were able to respond to adaptation, which is 
a complex task. Therefore, as the complexity of the task increased, for example ensuring water 
supply (this is linked more to adaptation than mitigation), the capacity of the state to enforce rules 
plays a relatively lesser role (Börzel and Hamann, 2013). Instead the shadow of anarchy combined 
with asset specific relationships and organisational capabilities and culture become more 
influential.  
 
This study also highlights the importance of task complexity, a contextual feature which has not 
been extensively discussed in explaining companies’ ecological responses. Due to the greater time 
frame and effort required to adapt to climate change, the task complexity is greater than 
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implementing mitigation initiatives. Similarly, task complexity is notably higher in ensuring energy 
security than in, say, devising and implementing a carbon tax. Therefore, the high levels of task 
complexity in climate change adaptation and in securing energy supply give rise to a relatively 
stronger shadow of anarchy. As illustrated by the collective nature of the Energy Efficiency Accord, 
companies respond to the shadow of anarchy through collective business initiatives which involve 
cross-sector partnerships. Nevertheless, the state still plays an important role in facilitating these 
partnerships (Berkes, 2009; Selsky and Parker, 2005). 
 
As highlighted above, management literature has focused mostly on mitigation while neglecting 
adaptation. This could be the case because most of the corporate sustainability literature has 
focused on areas with consolidated statehood in developed economies (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009; 
Hoffman; 2008; Rothenberg and Levy, 2012). Climate change models indicate that most developing 
economies in areas of limited statehood are going to be severely affected by climate change, more 
so than developed economies (Schlenker and Lobell, 2010). This research is among the first to 
integrate climate change adaptation more explicitly into the empirical analysis, building on 
theoretical models in the climate change adaptation literature (Moser and Ekstrom and others 
(O’brien, 2012; Fussel, 2008).  These authors argued that companies’ adaptation strategies can 
range from coping mechanisms to system and business model transformation. This research 
provided some empirical evidence to support this theorisation of adaptation, particularly with 
regard to Unilever’s strategy to transform its business model towards a more sustainable global 
brand. Furthermore, the research revealed that corporate adaptation efforts are driven primarily by 
the shadow of anarchy and asset specificity and that they require particular organisational 
capabilities akin to ecological sense making (Whiteman and Cooper, 2012).  
 
Another important argument presented by this thesis relates to the variation in climate change 
governance contributions between countries, sectors and within sectors. Whilst the shadow of 
hierarchy and anarchy plays an important role in driving business firms’ governance contribution, 
the presence of the climate change issue in the public domain seems to differentiate the 
contributions between the two countries. With regard to sectoral differences, it emerged that 
sectors with strong associative structures and memberships were more likely to engage in self 
regulation. This is because associations were more capable at solving collective action problems 
among firms and could mobilise advocacy support for corporate self-regulation (Debus and Thauer, 
2009). In addition to this, it is apparent that firms in different sectors face different pressures and 
opportunities for both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Therefore, firms in “high salience 
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sectors” such as oil and energy will face more regulatory, physical and economic risks which will 
compel them to self-regulate. Within the sectors, smaller firms with insignificant asset specific-
relationships, limited organisational capabilities and reputational risks will most likely not 
participate in self-regulation. In contrast, multinationals or large listed companies with will more 
likely contribute to climate change governance because they face more institutional pressures. 
More so, these firms often have high asset specific relationships with their supply chains and posses 
adequate resources to self-regulate or adopt the role of inspector over other actors. 
7.5. Avenues for future research  
 
The discussion above can also point to future research opportunities emanating from this research. 
Firstly, the term “limited statehood” is very broad and applies to countries with varying levels of 
statehood. This means that it might be unrealistic to generalise the results to all areas of limited 
statehood. As a result, more empirical data in necessary from other areas which experience varying 
levels of limited statehood. Furthermore, some countries which are considered to have 
consolidated statehood, such as USA might have relatively low levels of shadow of hierarchy to 
influence companies to contribute to governance because the state seems unwilling to steer non-
state to engage in governance. Secondly, the fact that Unilever was the only company which 
implements comprehensive climate change adaptation strategies leaves a gap in understanding and 
querying the current adaptation theories. Therefore, more research is called for to better 
understand the antecedents of adaptation efforts such as transformation of business models.  
 
Secondly, while significant knowledge has been gained regarding the contextual factors driving 
business contributions to environmental and social governance (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Hönke  et 
al, 2008; Debus and Theaur, 2009; Okereke, 2007), few studies have explored the social-ecological 
context and dynamics in which business activities are taking place. Therefore, there is need for 
more research to understand the notion of ecological embeddednes in business responses to social 
and environmental issues. This will contribute to the emerging literature on ecological sensemaking 
(Whiteman and Cooper, 2012). 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 1a:  Cluster centres for combined data in South Africa and 
Kenya 
 
  
Cluster 
4 3 2 1 
VAR00001 2.92 1.65 2.89 .28 
VAR00002 2.83 1.35 2.67 .18 
VAR00003 3.00 1.76 2.56 .18 
VAR00004 2.92 1.35 2.00 .03 
VAR00005 2.83 1.12 2.11 .02 
VAR00006 3.00 2.12 2.33 .23 
VAR00007 3.00 1.88 1.67 .10 
VAR00008 3.00 1.29 1.33 0.00 
VAR00009 2.83 .94 2.33 .07 
VAR00010 2.83 .76 2.00 .03 
VAR00011 1.92 .29 .56 0.00 
VAR00012 2.92 1.76 1.78 .20 
VAR00013 2.92 1.65 2.89 .28 
VAR00014 2.83 1.35 2.67 .05 
VAR00015 .33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VAR00016 2.83 .82 1.78 .05 
VAR00017 .75 .12 .44 0.00 
VAR00018 1.92 .29 .56 0.00 
VAR00019 2.92 1.76 1.78 .20 
VAR00020 2.00 1.12 1.44 .03 
VAR00021 3.00 1.24 2.44 .10 
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VAR00022 2.83 1.18 2.33 .02 
VAR00023 2.08 1.06 1.89 .07 
VAR00024 3.00 1.65 2.44 .10 
VAR00025 2.83 .53 2.44 .05 
VAR00026 2.33 .24 .44 0.00 
VAR00027 2.50 .12 1.44 .02 
VAR00028 2.17 1.18 1.67 .10 
VAR00029 2.83 .53 2.44 .05 
VAR00030 1.67 .24 1.56 .02 
VAR00031 1.75 .47 .89 0.00 
VAR00032 1.67 .47 .89 0.00 
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Appendix 1b: Cluster centers for data in South Africa 
 
  
Cluster 
4 3 2 1 
VAR00001 3.00 2.67 1.67 .16 
VAR00002 0.00 2.67 1.67 0.00 
VAR00003 3.00 1.67 1.33 .26 
VAR00004 3.00 1.00 .67 .05 
VAR00005 0.00 1.67 0.00 .05 
VAR00006 3.00 .33 0.00 .03 
VAR00007 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VAR00008 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VAR00009 3.00 1.00 1.33 .03 
VAR00010 3.00 .67 0.00 0.00 
VAR00011 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VAR00012 1.00 1.33 0.00 0.00 
VAR00013 3.00 2.67 2.00 .34 
VAR00014 3.00 2.67 1.67 .16 
VAR00015 0.00 3.00 1.67 .05 
VAR00016 0.00 2.67 1.67 0.00 
VAR00017 0.00 .67 .33 0.00 
VAR00018 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VAR00019 1.00 1.33 0.00 0.00 
VAR00020 3.00 .67 .67 .26 
VAR00021 0.00 .67 2.00 0.00 
VAR00022 0.00 .33 2.00 0.00 
VAR00023 0.00 .33 2.00 0.00 
VAR00024 3.00 1.67 2.00 .24 
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VAR00025 2.00 1.00 .67 .08 
VAR00026 3.00 3.00 1.67 .11 
VAR00027 2.00 1.33 1.00 .24 
VAR00028 0.00 0.00 .67 0.00 
VAR00029 2.00 1.33 1.00 .24 
VAR00030 2.00 .33 .33 0.00 
VAR00031 2.00 0.00 .33 .03 
VAR00032 1.00 .33 1.00 0.00 
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Appendix 1c: Cluster centers for data in Kenya 
 
Final Cluster Centers 
  
Cluster 
3 2 1 
VAR00001 2.36 1.70 .18 
VAR00002 1.73 1.45 .10 
VAR00003 2.18 1.50 .17 
VAR00004 1.91 .85 .02 
VAR00005 1.27 .85 .02 
VAR00006 2.82 .95 .14 
VAR00007 2.55 .65 .06 
VAR00008 2.18 .30 0.00 
VAR00009 1.82 .70 .04 
VAR00010 1.55 .40 .01 
VAR00011 .45 .10 0.00 
VAR00012 2.09 .90 .12 
VAR00013 2.36 1.70 .27 
VAR00014 2.18 1.50 .05 
VAR00015 0.00 .75 .01 
VAR00016 1.27 .95 .02 
VAR00017 .18 .20 0.00 
VAR00018 .45 .10 0.00 
VAR00019 2.09 .90 .12 
VAR00020 1.45 .85 .10 
VAR00021 1.55 1.00 .05 
VAR00022 1.45 .95 .01 
VAR00023 1.27 1.00 .03 
VAR00024 2.00 1.70 .12 
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VAR00025 1.27 .70 .04 
VAR00026 .36 1.00 .02 
VAR00027 .64 .55 .08 
VAR00028 1.27 .80 .04 
VAR00029 1.27 .80 .11 
VAR00030 .55 .25 .01 
VAR00031 .82 .20 0.00 
VAR00032 .73 .30 0.00 
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Appendix 2a: List of interview respondents in South Africa 
 
Name Affiliation Position/Job description 
 
Wendy Engel Absa Capital Economist 
Karin Ireton Standard Bank Sustainability manager 
Nigel Beck Standard Bank Head, Environmental 
Investment Banking 
Marco Lotz Nedbank Sustainability Carbon specialist 
Brigitte Burnet Nedbank Stakeholder engagement 
manger 
Mike Peso Nedbank Head of Infrastructure, Energy 
& Telecommunication 
Gus Silber Capitec Marketing manager 
Louise Duiys Unilever South Africa Sustainability Manager 
John Coyne Unilever Global brand manager 
Maharaj Singh Unilever South Africa Strategist 
Nadine Watson Illovo Sugar Marketing Director 
Naadhira Royen Orley Foods Corporate Communications 
Manager 
Fred Goede Sasol General Manager Health and 
Environment 
Mike Mullain Sasol Energy engineer 
Urishanie Govender Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC) Sustainability manager 
Glenda Marais Devra Chemicals Director 
Rohitesh Dhawan KMPG Resource Economist 
Bhavanhi Daya KPMG Environmental specialist 
John Hanks Incite Consultant 
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Nicola Roberts Incite consultant 
Riaan van Dalen - Energy consultant 
Dawie Roodt - Energy Consultant  
Greg Stuart - Renewable energy consultant  
Deon Neil WWF Head WWF Biodiversity Unit 
Shaun Nel Energy Intensive User 
Group(EIUG) 
spokesperson 
Makoma Lekalakala Earthlife Africa Representative 
Bobby Peek Earthlife Johannesburg  Representative 
Ninette Polgieter Stellebosch University academic 
Goodwell Nhamo UNISA centre for Corporate 
Citizenship 
academic 
David Fig - Environmentalist/academic 
Vincent Zungu University of Cape Town academic 
Valerie Green National Business Initiative Director: Climate & Energy 
Barnie Kgope National Business Initiative Manager: Climate & Energy 
Vincent Mobane Group FIve SHE officer 
 Lindiwe Chauke 
 
Department of Energy CDM coordinator 
Blessing Manale DEAT Chief Directorate: Planning And 
Coordination 
Mark Gordon Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Development 
Planning 
Western Cape Provincial 
Government 
Director 
Strategic Environmental 
Management 
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Appendix 2b: List of interview respondents in Kenya 
Name Affiliation Position/job description 
Anne Kabugi Standard Chartered Bank Head of brand & corporate 
communications 
Chico Kaitani Standard Chartered Bank Senior strategist 
George Karabo Kenya Commercial Bank(KCB) Risk Manager 
Peter Nyaga Family Bank Legal representative 
Margaret Mwauri Unilever Brand Building Director 
Agatha Mwenenji Unilever Senior strategist 
Peter Mbadi Kenya Tea Development 
Agency 
Assistant Agriculture Manager 
Mr Kaitani Mumias Sugar Engineer 
Jerome Kawara Mumias Sugar Operations manager 
Mvuti Njere  Kuguru Foods Marketing manager 
 
Odhiambo K'Anjejo Total Kenya Corporate Affairs Director 
Silvestre Makaka Athi River Mine Engineer/KAM Energy Advisor 
Martin Shawari Athi River Mine Engineer 
Pail Odupah PZ Cussons Marketing manager 
Verinder Sharma           - Banking sector consultant 
Sashen Gudika KPMG Auditor 
Mumo Kivuiti Ufadhili Trust Executive Director 
Judy Njino Ufadhili Trust Program officer 
Maggy Opondo University of Nairobi Researcher/lecturer 
Carol Kiriuki Kenya Private Sector Alliance Chief Executive Officer 
Joseph Nyanga Kenya Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC) 
Licensing & compliance officer  
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Pauline Kitu National Environmental 
Management Authority 
Environmental legal officer 
Polycarp  Igathe Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers (KAM) 
chairman 
Betty Maina KAM CEO 
Mary Kiema KAM Center for Energy 
Efficiency & Conservation 
(CEEC) 
Executive officer 
Hilary Rono KAM CEEC Program manger 
